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ABSTRACT

Due to the interest in engineering in the initial
phases of the safety movement, and the divergent backgrounds
of safety directors today, writers and practitioners in the
safety field are engaged in a lively debate which centers
around the question "What characteristics should a person
have to make the best safety director?"

In an attempt to

answer the question a primary research project was under*
taken to test the following hypotheses!
Hypothesis One;

Safety directors who are more effec

tive have attitudes about certain organizational, technical
and behavioral concepts that are different from the attitudes
of the less effective safety directors.

Also, the more

effective safety directors tend to have stronger convictions
about the technical and behavioral concepts than do the less
effective safety directors.
Hypothesis T w o :

Safety directors with nonengineering

backgrounds have different attitudes about certain technical
and behavioral concepts than those with engineering back
grounds.

Those with nonengineering backgrounds value and

have stronger convictions about the behavioral concepts than

xviii

those with engineering backgrounds, and engineers value and
have stronger convictions about the technical concepts than
nonengineers.

Additionally, there is a relationship between

the college degree held and managerial effectiveness.
Hypothesis Three:

Experience affects attitudes toward

behavioral and technical concepts and/or the effectiveness
of the safety directors.
Hypothesis Four:

The organizational position of the

safety director affects the amount of power he possesses.
Also, the amount of power and the position of the safety
director have an influence on his effectiveness.
The data used to test the above hypotheses was
gathered by sending 583 questionnaires (42.5 percent re
turned) to safety directors in four industries - Petroleum
Refining, Chemical, Electrical Manufacturing, and Trans
portation Equipment.

The questionnaire included a semantic

differential test of seven organizational, technical, and
behavioral concepts, and questions to gather detailed in
formation on organization characteristics, educational
data, experience of the safety director, and accident
statistics.
The sampled safety directors were divided into ef
fective and ineffective classifications based on the
geometric mean of the accident frequency rates by industry.

xix

At the .05 level of significance the effective safety
directors had different and stronger convictions on the
technical and behavioral concepts relating to accident
prevention.

The first hypothesis was accepted, which put

added emphasis on attitudes in later analysis.
No correlation existed between educational variables
and accident records.

A test for attitude differences in

dicated that the education variable played a minor role in
causing differences in attitudes when compared to other
variables.

Hypothesis Two was rejected and it was concluded

that engineers and nonengineers make equally good (or bad)
safety directors.
Based on an analysis of experience that portion of the
third hypothesis dealing with experience and attitudes was
accepted while the portion concerning experience and ef
fectiveness was rejected.

It was concluded that experience,

may be helpful in attaining strong attitudes on the tested
concepts.
No apparent relationship was found between the levels
in the plant, the level of the safety directors, and the
amount of power the safety directors possessed.

Also, no

correlation existed between position, power, and accident
frequency rates, so the fourth hypothesis was rejected.
However, an analysis of attitudes did indicate that the
xx

more powerful safety directors had stronger convictions
on
«
the concepts than the less powerful.
Simple, multiple, and intercorrelation analysis was
performed on thirty-one variables, and the accident fre
quency and severity rates.

Each industry was handled sep

arately, and combined with others where appropriate.

No

significant correlation existed between the variables and
accident records.

It was apparent that of the variables

analyzed, the attitudes of the safety directors was the
most significant in relation to effectiveness.

xxi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Statement of the Problem
History of Industrial Accidents
Industrial accidents which are caused by unsafe
conditions and unsafe acts have always been with us.

But

not until the Industrial Revolution and subsequent passage
of workmen's compensation laws did industry take explicit
and meaningful action to reduce accidents.
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, roost industrial
activity was carried on in the home under the cottage system.
The injuries were regarded primarily as the victim's own
fault and the employer assumed little or no responsibility
for the accident.

But the Industrial Revolution brought

about the use of new sources of power and improved machines
which were placed in large factories.

Machines that were

designed with virtually no consideration for safety increased
the hazards of work.

Overcrowded conditions in the large

factories and the use of untrained workers added to the
danger.

Eventually the attitude of the worker toward employer
liability began to change.

The worker could see that the

employer was partly at fault when a workman was killed or
injured by a hazardous condition that could have been
eliminated.^ But is was difficult for the employee to get
an adequate court settlement from the employer.

The main

reason was that the employee rarely filed suit for he did
not want to jeopardize his job by suing his employer.

Also,

it was difficult to prove a case in court since there were
three doctrines of common law that served as an adequate
defense against suits brought by injured employees.

First,

the "fellow-servant" rule relieved the employer of liability
for injury as a result of negligence or carelessness of
fellow employees.

Second, the "contributory negligence"

concept relieved the employer of liability if the worker's
own negligence caused the accident.

And thirdly, the

"assumption of risk" rule assumed that the employee accepted
all the customary risks of the job.^

Thus the employee had

^Additional historical background can be found in
Rollin H. Simonds and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Management
(revised edition, Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1963), pp. 3-24; Roland P. Blake, Industrial Safety (third
edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hal1, Inc., 1963),
pp. 12-31; and U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Standards, Safety In Industry: Introduction to Industrial
Safety
(Builetin” l67, Washington, D. £.: TFT S. Government
Printing Office, 1965)•
2Simonds and Grimaldi, o£. cit., pp. 17-18.

the burden of proving that an accident was the employer's
fault, and the employee could not do so if the employer
could establish any of the following about the accidenti
1.

The accident was the fault of a fellow worker.

2.

The accident was the fault of the injured employee.

3.

The injured employee had assumed the risks of his
job and the accident resulted from those risks.

The correct this situation, workmen's compensation laws
were passed in the early 1900's to provide compensation for
all injuries arising out of employment.

The employer is

held liable not on the basis of his fault or negligence,
but on the basis of social policy.

Since accidents are an

immediate and inescapable expense to employers " . . .

work

men 's compensation laws have done more to promote their
interest in safety than all other influences put together."^
The safety movement began with the passage of workmen's
compensation laws and increased industrialization.

Xn 1892

Joliet Works of the Illinois Steel Company established a
Safety Department and the United States Steel Corporation
followed in 1906.

The Association of Iron and Steel

Electrical Engineers held the first "Safety Congress" in
1912.

Delegates from this Congress formed a committee

3 Blake, o p . clt., p. 16.

which included industrial and other types of safety and
which established the National Safety Council in 1914.4
This organization now has thousands of members and is
probably the most outstanding safety organization today.
To accomplish the aims of developing safety engineering as
a profession and improving accident prevention techniques
and knowledge, a group of engineers incorporated the Ameri
can Society of Safety Engineers in 1915.

But the most

significant fact today is that thousands of firms are
practicing an accident prevention program.
The results of the safety movement have been dramatic.
In 1912 an estimated 18,000 to 21,000 worker's lives were
lost.

By 1967 this was reduced to 14,200 even though the

work force had more than doubled and the gross national
product had increased by eigbt-rold .5

Figure 1-1 and

Figure 1-2 further illustrate the effect of the responsible
attitude toward safety by management.

This reduction in

deaths, accident frequency, and accident severity rates is
good from a humanitarian point of view, but the economic

*A chronological history of the National Safety
Council and the American Society of Safety Engineers can be
found in Russell DeReamer, Modern Safety Practices (New
Yorki John Wiley fi Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 316-319.
^Accident Facts (Chicago*
1968), p. 23.

National Safety Council,
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FIGURE 1-1
DEATHS AND DEATH RATE TRENDS
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FIGURE 1-2

SEVERITY AND FREQUENCY RATE TRENDS
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Source: Accident Facts
Council, 1963), p. 28.

(Chicago:

National Safety

consequences of the reduction are also important.

It is

estimated that for every dollar invested in safety there
is a net return of from $1.60 to $2.00.® Additionally,
research suggests that there is a positive correlation be
tween safety and production efficiency .7
The conclusions based on the safety accomplishments
to date are:
1.

disabling injuries can be reduced

2.

it pays to do so**

3.

the expenditures required to do so are relatively
small compared to the return on investment in
safety

4.

most injuries result from a combination of physi
cal hazard and faulty behavior

5.

to achieve and maintain a minimum frequency rate
it is advantageous to minimize the physical
hazards, and to promote the development and
maintenance of safe practice and safety minded-'
ness among management and the workers.^

The implementation of this last conclusion is the primary
task of a safety director and his staff.

U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards,
Safety Subjects (Bulletin No. 67, Washington, D. C . * U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 33.
7Lewis A. DeBlois, Industrial Safety Organization for
Executives and Engineers (London: McGraw-Hill Book company,
Inc., 1926), pp. 251-264.
B&lake, o p . clt., pp. 9-10.
9U. S. Department of Labor, o p . cit.. p. 10.

Development of Safety Management .
Initial Interest in Engineering
It was only natural that in the initial stages of the
safety movement emphasis was on engineering.

The industrial

environment was conspicuously unsafe so the obvious first
step was to clean house, or to do an engineering job.

This

task included such things as improving machine safety guards
and plant layout.

As time passed, there was increased

development, growth, and application of engineering to
accident prevention.

Consequently the individuals engaged

in the safety profession focused their attention on the term
engineering and were usually called safety engineers.
After World War II, questions were raised concerning
the validity and value of an engineering orientation to
safety management and accident prevention.

In 1950 Heinrich

pr€ 'iented a study in his book, Industrial Accident Pre
vention,3-* which indicated that 88 percent of all industrial
accidents are caused primarily by the unsafe acts of persons,
10 percent by mechanical conditions, and 2 percent due to an

*°H. W. Heinrich, "Can Safety Stand on Its Own Feet,"
National Safety News (November, 1955), pp. 20-21, 90-94.
^ H e b e r t W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention
(third edition. New Yorkt McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
1950).
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act of God. ‘

The study and its conclusions have been

criticized and discounted to some extent ,*5 but other
studies and numerous articles have pointed out the import
ance of the human element in accident prevention .*4

The Engineer/Nonengineer Debate
The issue of an engineering orientation to accident
prevention grew into a clear engineer/nonengineer debate
in the fifties.

In his classic article H. W. Heinrich *5

examined the basis of establishing the safety profession
as a branch of engineering.

He pointed out that while

12 Ibid.f pp. 16-19.

* 5Blake, o p . cit., pp. 60-62; DeReamer, 0 £. cit., pp.
17-18.
*4The following sources are indicative of other author 1
comments: John C. Larson, et a l . , The Human Element in In
dustrial Accident Prevention (New York: New York University,
1955); Leon Brody, Human Factors Research in Occupational
Accident Prevention: Its Status and Needs (New York: Ameri
can Society of Safety Engineers and Center of Safety Educa
tion at New York University, 1967); U. S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, The Human Factor in Accidents
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967)
P. Glivinick, at slL., "A Study of Accidents in 147 Factories
Personnel Psychology (Spring, 1957), pp. 43-51; Francis
McGlade, "Psychology in Safety Management," Journal of the
American Society of Safety Engineers (November, 1967), pp.
20-26.

15K«inrlch, lgc. cit

10
engineering had been good to safety* safety could stand on
its own feet and would profit by doing so.

In his opinion

a good engineering job had been done and the more direct
cause of accidents was a
personal act .**16

. . form of man failures* a

His article was followed by others 17

using the same opinion as a basis of questioning the em
phasis on an engineering background.

Additionally* it was

pointed out that few companies required an engineering de
gree for safety work and that a degree's main advantage to
the safety worker was prestige .18

This is not to indicate

that there was a desire to do away with engineering.

Rather*

the desire was to have the emphasis on safety using both
engineering and behavioral knowledge.
By 1960* the discontent and questioning had grown
stronger.

C. Russell DeReamer's article* "Our society Must

Prepare Today for Tomorrow "*9 pointed out "officially" that

16 Ibld.* p. 93.

17

H.
E. Packard* "Let's Not Sell the Safety Engineering
Profession Short*" National Safety News (October, 1958), pp.
187-189; Walter A. Cutter and Thomas H. Wilkenson, "Toward
the Profession of Safety Program Management," National Safety
News (October, 1959), pp. 96-97+; "The Congress Story:
People Problems," National Safety News (December, 1967)* pp.
32-36.
*8Cutter and Wilkenson* o p . cit.* pp. 228-229.
19 C. Russell DeReamer, "Our Society Must Prepare Today
for Tomorrow," Journal of the American Society of Safety
Engineers (May* I960)* pp. 21-24.
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the American Society of Safety Engineers was " . . .
broiled in a lively debatei

em

*Should we remain an engineering

society or become a safety society?'"2®

His judgment was

that "Safety personnel, by concentrating on safety and
leaving the engineering for the engineers, would create a
better opportunity to gain greater skill and competence in
the field of safety."2!- ne further pointed out the following
facts:
A large percentage of Society members are not engineers.
About 80 percent of all safety specialists report to
personnel, less than 2 percent report to engineering.
Not a single "safety engineering" book has been
written in the long history of industrial safety.
Few employers require their safety personnel to have
engineering degrees.
A review of the job descriptions of many safety man
agers and safety directors reveals few and in most
cases no engineering duties.
The title, "safety engineer," is being used much less
by industry; titles such as "safety manager " or "safety
director" apparently are preferred.
The Society is not presently recognized as an engin
eering society by engineering groups, by the Joint
Engineering Council or by employers.

20 Ibid., p. 2 1 .
21 Ibld., p. 2 2 .
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The term, "safety engineering," lacks a clear defini
tion— it could be either mechanical, electrical or
chemical engineering, or perhaps all three .22
Later in I960, the American Society of Safety Engineers
conducted a survey that validated most of the above com
ments .23

Other research also substantiates the comments .24

To resolve some of the differences of opinions as to
the future trends of safety practitioners, the American
Society of Safety Engineers decided in 1965 to sponsor a
study to ". . . identify the safety engineering task and
to establish guidelines for the professional development and
growth of the safety engineering field *"25

There are three

stages to the project .25

22 Ibid., p. 23.

23Peter E. Marconi, "Today's Safety Engineer in Indus
try, Business, and Government," Journal of the American
Society of Safety Engineers (August, 1960) , pp. 33-49.
24william E. Tarrants, "Training Safety Engineerst
Practice and Predictions," National Safety News (January,
1965), pp. 22-24; Walter A. Cutter, Organisation and Func
tion of the Safety Department (New York; American Management
Association, 1951).
25
26

Ibid., Tarrants, p. 23.

This project was drafted by Dr. W. E. Tarrants, and
endorsed by a project review committee of the American
Society of Safety Engineers.
It originally appeared as
William E. Tarrants 1 "The Professional Development of the
Safety Engineering Field," Journal of the American Society
of Safety Engineers (February, 1965), pp. 5-10.
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Phase One defines the nature, scope, and specific
functions of the safety engineering position in in
dustry.
Phase Two identifies and standardizes the educational
preparation necessary for effectively pursuing the
safety engineering task defined in Phase One. . . .
Phase Three involves the legal recognition of safety
engineering as a professional field through the de
velopment and sponsorship of state registration laws. 27
In a 1965 article. Dr. Tarrants, who is heading up the
American Society of Safety Engineers study, pointed out
that the safety engineer " . . .

should serve as a unifying

force in bringing together the knowledge and talents of the
various scientific, behavioral, managerial, and engineering
disciplines. . . ."28
Articles r:i4 arguments followed the ones cited above .28

2 Warrants, "Training Safety Engineers: Practice and
Predictions," o p . c i t ., p. 24.
28 Loc. cit.

29For supplementary opinions on the issue see: Lawrence
S. Hill, "Hybrid Engineers," National Safety News (December,
1952), p. 36; Robert J. McCullough, "What is a Safety Engin
eer, " Journal of the American Society of Safety Engineers
(February, 1959), pp. 2-4; George W. Harper, "The Safety
Engineer," Journal of the American Society of Safety Engineers
(February, 1962), pp. 13-16; Thomas H. Rockwell, "The Safety
Engineer Part II,” Journal of the American Society of Safety
Engineers (February, 1962), pp. 16-19; John Morris, "Engin
eers or Administrators," National Safety News (June, 1965),
pp. 22-24+; Tohn V. Grimaldi, "Management and Industrial
Safety Achievement," Journal of the American Society of
Safety Engineers (November, 1965), pp. 9-14; P. W. Logan,
"Engineering Tomorrow's Basic Component for Accident Preven
tion," Journal of the American Society of Safety Engineers
(November, 19 6677 PP* 7-11.
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Nary Parker Follett's concept of Integration was suggested ?0
but appears to have been ignored in preparing the first
formal article on Phase One.

In an article the American

Society of Safety Engineers' committee working on Phase One
presented "A Tentative Description of the Functions of the
Safety Position in Industry.”

The committee proposed that

the accident prevention field be separated into three cate
gories of service as illustrated in Figure 1-3:

the techni

cian level, the professional level; and the administrative
level.

To get into the professional level, one could take

two paths:

safety engineering or safety specialist .22

This separation recognizes the divergence of view
among current safety practitioners concerning the
requirement for a technical or applied science back
ground versus a non-technics 1 , human behavioraleducational orientation as a prerequisite for pro
fessional accomplishment. 2
But at that time, they limited Phase One M. . . t o the identi
fication of the nature, scope, and functions of the

30

Russell C. DeReamer, “Maximizing Safety Effectiveness,
Journal of the American society of Safety Engineers (August,
1965), pp. 6-7.
31

"A Tentative Description of the Functions of the
Safety Position in Industry," Journal of the American Society
of Safety Engineers (October, 1965), pp. 10-15.
32 Ibid., p. 1 0 .

33Loc. cit
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FIGURE 1-3
HIERARCHY OF SAFETY POSITIONS IN INDUSTRY

SAFETY
ADMINISTRATOR
Supervieory
Level

SAFETY
PROFESSIONAL

SAFETY
TECHNICIAN
Entry Level

Experlence
end/or Degree
Preparation

Experience Flue
Adninlatrstlvu
Abi’Ity

Certification

|SAFETY ENGINEER
INPUT
1. Non-Degree Univereity
Training Program.
2. Two-Year Technical
School a.
3. In-Plant Formal Training

Program .
4. Short Coureee.

5. On-the-Job Training.

INPUT
1. Professional Safety Engineer
ing Undergraduate Degree.
2. Univereity Degreae In Other
Engineering and/or Phyelcal
Science Fielde.
3. Master'a Degree Prograne In
Industrial Safety,
4. Other Degree Prograne with
Additional Safety Engineering
Educational Preparation.

INPUT
1. Undergraduate Degree In
Other Field* with Addi
tional Educational Prep
aration in Accident Pre
vention Subjects.
2. Master'■ Degree Program
in Industrial Safety.
3. Experience and Training
in Accident Prevention

Sourcei "A Tentetive Description of the Functions of the Safety Poaltion
in Industry," Journal of jhj A m r t c a n Society of Safety Engineers {October, I M S ) ,
p. 11.
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professional-level safety engineering position in industry"3*
and ignored the individual who might take the safety
specialist route to safety professional, i.e., the behavi
oral is t.

Similarly, Phase Two and Phase Three were limited

to the engineer.
After much comment and criticism, the tentative des
cription of Phase One was changed in 1966 from that of a
safety engineer to that of the safety professional.

An

attempt was made to use integration and it is this researcher's
opinion that they were successful.

It was established that

"The safety professional in performing these functions will
draw upon specialized knowledge in both the physical and
social sciences ."35

But this does not settle the engineer/

nonengineer debate. One of the most important issues, and
the one that should ultimately settle the debate, is which
factors influence the effectiveness of safety personnel.
Once this is established, the answer to the debate will be
clear.

34 lbid., pp. 10 -1 1 .

35“Scope and Functions of the Professional Safety Posi
tion," Journal of the American Society of Safety Engineers
(December, 1966), p. 7.
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Need for Managerial Effectiveness
The engineer/nonengineer debate and other issues in
safety are important to industry and the safety professional.
Today occupational accidents kill around 14,000 workers
annually in the United States and cause over 200,000 dis
abling injuries.

These accidents cost industry approximately

$6 billion each year .36

Certainly, there are factors that

influence the effectiveness of safety professionals or
safety directors.3?

His orientation and background, as well

as other factors, may have an influence on the accident
statistics.

But the direct question of how these factors

affect the safety director's effectiveness has not been em
pirically studied.

The objective of this study is to

empirically test certain hypotheses that may help establish
those factors that influence the safety director's effective
ness.

^ A c c i d e n t Facts, o p . cit., pp. 3-4.
37

The description of the safety professional by the
American Society of Safety Engineers and the discussion i n 
cluded in this paper apply to those people in the top safety
position in a plant. This study is limited to those safety
professionals who are the top safety managers in plants;
therefore the term "safety director" was used in place of
safety professional so as to indicate this fact.

IB

Statement of the Hypotheses
The major hypothesis of this study 1st
Hypothesis O n e :

Safety directors who are more effec

tive have attitudes about certain organizational, technical
and behavioral concepts that are different from the attitudes
of the less effective safety directors.

Also, the more

effective safety directors tend to have stronger convictions
about the technical and behavioral concepts than do the less
effective safety directors.
A supplementary hypothesis logically evolves from the
major hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis Two;

Safety directors with nonengineering

backgrounds have different attitudes about certain technical
and behavioral concepts than those with engineering back
grounds.

Those with nonengineering backgrounds value and

have stronger convictions about the behavioral concepts than
those with engineering backgrounds, and engineers value and
have stronger convictions about the technical concepts than
nonengineers.

Additionally, there is a relationship between

the college degree held and managerial effectiveness.
But since experience, especially management experience,
may affect one's orientation, another hypothesis evolves as
follows:
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Hypothesis Three;
ward

Experience affects attitudes to

behavioral and technical concepts and/or the effec

tiveness of the safety directors.
Another important variable that may relate to the
safety director's effectiveness and one that has received
little attention is that of organizational position and its
relationship to power.

While it is accepted that a safety

director needs the support of top management, a clearer
picture of the influence of his organizational position on
his power and effectiveness would be useful.

Thus, the

following hypothesis will also be incorporated into the
study;
Hypothesis Four ;

The organizational position of the

safety director affects the amount of power he possesses.
Also, the amount of power and the position of the safety
director have an influence on his effectiveness.

Purpose of this Research
There are four areas that this research may benefit humanitarian, educational, managerial effectiveness, and
productivity.

Humanitarian
One objective of accident prevention work is humani
tarian since it involves the prevention of personal injuries
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and deaths.

Accident prevention efforts reduce suffering,

the possibility of permanent impairment, and the economic
effects of injuries on the workers and their families.
This researcher thinks this study will benefit the humani
tarian objective by helping to find what factors may influ
ence the safety director's effectiveness, or at least to
find those things that do not influence his effectiveness.
In any case, the results should benefit the humanitarian
objective of the safety movement by reducing suffering,
permanent impairment, and economic consequences of injuries.

Educational
This study should help the American Society of Safety
Engineers in accomplishing Phase Two of its three-phase
program, since it will investigate certain educational
factors.

The results of the study may help determine the

basis for offering safety courses in colleges of business
administration and/or engineering.

Hopefully, the research

will provide companies some insight into the educational
qualifications of safety directors.

Managerial Effectiveness
The researcher thinks that the results of this study
will be beneficial to managers in capacities other than a
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safety director, because what is true of the safety director
may also apply to other positions.

It is also hoped that

the research will be a contribution to the field of manage
ment by bringing to light certain aspects of present
managerial philosophies and teachings.

Productivity
Increased productivity is the ultimate test of the re
searcher's efforts.

By testing the hypotheses empirically,

there may be new knowledge developed that will serve as the
basis of managerial decisions and these decisions may lead
to higher productivity.

The extent to which this is true is

the extent to which this research has value.

Methods of Research
To perform the study it was necessary to do secondary
and primary research.

A discussion of the research methods

follows t

Secondary Research
A thorough research of secondary resources was made and
served as a basis for developing the hypotheses and for
substantiating the analysis where ever possible.

The second

ary research was included where it was pertinent for back
ground material, or where it added depth to the analysis of
the hypotheses being tested.
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Primary Research
Since this study is primarily concerned with hypothe
ses testing, a sophisticated primary research project was
undertaken.

The project involved the following stepst

1.

Sample selection.

2.

Questionnaire design.

3.

Analysis of the data.

Initially, the sample selection, questionnaire design and
the methods of analysis will be explained.

Subsequent

chapters will cover the analysis of the data and formulation
of conclusions.

Sample and Response
The universe for the study was the mailing list of the
American Society of Safety Engineers, which contains ap
proximately 9,000 names .38

The writer obtained permission

to use the list from Mr. A. C. Blackman, Managing Director
and Secretary of the American Society of Safety Engineers.
Based on a priori reasoning and the advice of Mr.
Blackman, it was decided that very similar plants and physi
cal environments could be found in each of four industries,
and that these four industries would be satisfactory for the

38

Audit Report * Journal of the American Society of
Safety Engineers (Chicagot Audit Bureau of Circulation,
December 31, 1967), p. 2.
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study.

The industries chosen were Petroleum Refining

(Standard Industrial Classification Code 28), Chemical (SIC
Code 29), Electrical Manufacturing (SIC Code 36) and Trans
portation Equipment (SIC Code 37).
was handled

Each of these industries

separately in the statistical analysis where

appropriate and they were combined when possible.
It was decided that only safety directors with res
ponsibility in a single plant would be considered for the
majority of the study.

Therefore, the researcher went through

the mailing list and picked out the addresses that appeared
to be those of safety directors in single plants of the
chosen industries.

In cases where there was only a home

address, the address was excluded.

Where there was more

than one name for the same plant address, the only one chosen
was the person with an appropriate title.

If the proper

individual could not be determined, a questionnaire was
mailed to the plant address with "Attention: Safety Director."
A total of 583 addresses were chosen.

The distribution for

each region and industry is shown in Table 1-1.

Figure 1-4

indicates the total mailout and return by geographical region.
The questionnaire was placed in the mail on October 18,
1968, and no returns were included if they were received
after November 20, 1968.

Of the 583 forma mailed out, 248

TABLE 1-1
Geographical Dispersion Of Mail-Out
By Industry Group

Region

Chem,

Petro.

Elect,
Mfg.

Trans,
Equip,

Total
By
Region

" jTof

Total By
Region

Eastern

60

12

41

16

149

25.6

North Central

34

13

26

56

133

22.6

Southeast

70

16

11

6

103

17.7

Central

52

36

11

15

114

19.5

Western

17

32

10

25

64

14.4

TOTAL

253

109

101

120

583

Percent of
Total by
Industry

43.4

16.7

17.3

20.6

100.0

in

FIGURE 1-4
MAIL-OUT AND USABLE RETURN BY REGION
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or 42.5 percent were returned.

Forty questionnaires were

not usable for the following reasons:
1.

Part-time safety director (16)

2.

Not part of the population due mainly to errors
in the mailing list (19)

3.

incomplete answers (6 )

4.

Returned too late to be included in the analysis
(9)

After reducing the sample size by those returned ques
tionnaires that were not a part of the sample (19), the
usable net percentage return was 36.8 percent.

The return

of usable questionnaires by region and industry are shown
in Table 1-2 .39

Questionnaire
The design of the questionnaire (see Appendix A) was
based on primary and secondary research, a priori reasoning,
advice of knowledgeable persons, and the needs of the study.
The first portion of the questionnaire made use of the
semantic differential 40 test while the last portion was

39

For a presentation of response averages by industry,
see Appendix B.
AA

The portion of the questionnaire will be given further
treatment in Chapter II. The main source is Charles E.
Osgood, George J. Suci and Percy U. Tannenbaum, The Measure
ment of Meaning (urbana, Illinois:
University of Illinois
Press, 1957).

TABLE 1-2
Geographical Return Of Usable Questionnaires
By Industry Group

Region

Chem,

Petro.

Elect.
Mfg.

Trans.
Equip,

Total
By
Region

%

of
Total By
Region

% of
Mail-out
By
Region

Eastern

24

5

12

11

52

25.0

35.0

North Central

11

2

8

21

42

20.2

31.6

Southeast

34

2

2

1

39

18.7

38.0

Central

26

17

5

0

48

23.1

42.0

Western

9

5

6

7

27

13.0

32.2

TOTAL

104

31

33

40

208

Percent

50.0

14.9

15.8

19.3

Percent of
Mail-out by
Industry
41.1

28.4

32.8

33.3

100.0
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designed primarily to collect objective data.

Pilot Test
Semantic Differential.

To develop the semantic dif

ferential portion of the test, a pilot test was conducted in
the summer of 1968 by giving an initial test to fifty upper
classmen who were majoring in science or engineering and
fifty upperclassmen majoring in education or psychology.
Based on an analysis of the pilot test, the semantic dif
ferential portion of the questionnaire was altered and then
pretested in industry on a limited scale.
Statistical Portion.

The last part of the question

naire was developed with the advice and counsel of knowledge
able people.

An initial questionnaire was pretested in local

industry during September, 1968.

A copy of the questionnaire

was mailed to safety directors in the petroleum and chemical
industries who agreed to cooperate in the pretest.

The ques

tionnaires were picked up by the researcher and at that time
a personal interview was conducted relative to the clarity
and improvement of the questionnaire.

Adjustments and im

provements were made on the questionnaire after each inter
view.

Additionally, Mr. Blackman of the American Society of

Safety Engineers reviewed it to see that it was in a form
that, in his judgment, would benefit the engineer/nonengineer
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debate.
The complete questionnaire consisted of eleven pages.
Seven pages were used for semantic differential testing,
one page was instructions, and three pages were for the
purpose of gathering statistical data.

Each questionnaire

was accompanied by a cover letter from the writer, an en
dorsement letter from w. E. Stuffing, President of the
American Society of Safety Engineers, and a return envelope
to be mailed under a business reply permit.

Methods of Analysis
The analysis of the data was facilitated by using
such commonly accepted statistical procedures as regression
and correlation analysis.

Other techniques were used to

analyze the semantic differential.

The analysis was per

formed on an IBM 7040 at the L. s. U. Computer Research
Center.

Limitations of the Study
Financial
Due to financial limitations, the questionnaire method
of inquiry was the only method used to collect empirical
data.

This limitation also influenced the number of indus

tries chosen and the number of returns from those industries
that were chosen, since no follow-up mailing was performed.

Industries
The results of the study are limited to the industries
chosen.

Any extrapolation'is questionable;

thus this

limits the applicability of the results.

Statistical
As always, there is a question of randomness in any
survey.

This researcher thinks the returns are representa

tive of the total universe of the chosen industries and of
the industrial universe.

No formal tests of representa

tiveness or randomness were employed because of practical
considerations and expense.

From the analysis of the ques

tionnaires returned completed and uncompleted, the re
searcher thinks that the response was sufficiently random
to satisfy the randomness assumption of sampling theory.

Preview
The hypotheses serve as the logical basis for the
order of research and analysis.
The safety directors are classified as effective and
ineffective in Chapter II and analysed to test Hypothesis
One.

Conclusions are drawn in that Chapter that puts added

emphasis on attitudes.
Attention is given to the engineer/nonengineer debate
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In Chapter III by analyzing education, attitudes, and accident records.

This is followed by an analysis of experi

ence in Chapter IV to test Hypothesis Three.
In Chapter V, the issues of organization position and
power are discussed with respect to the attitudes and
effectiveness of the safety directors.

To conclude the

analysis. Chapter VI reveals a thorough multiple correla
tion of all the variables considered in the study;

and,

of course, the last Chapter provides a summary along with
conclusions and recommendations.

\

CHAPTER XI

EVALUATION OF THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL TEST BASED ON
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SAFETY DIRECTOR

One of the primary objectives of this en$>irical study
was to analyze the attitudes of safety directors.

A special

' measuring technique, the semantic differential, was used to
accomplish this goal .1
This Chapter is concerned with an analysis of the at
titudes of effective and ineffective safety directors.

The

analysis will serve as a basis for testing the first
hypothesis.
But first, a fundamental explanation of the semantic
differential is in order.

Construction of the Semantic Differential Test

Logic of the Semantic Differential
Osgood, et a l ., postulate there is a semantic space,
"...

a region of some unknown dimensionality and Euclidian

^This technique was developed and illustrated in Charles
E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, The
Measurement of Meaning (Urbane, Illinoisi
University of
Illinois Press, 1957).
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in character."

2

The semantic differential test defines a

concept as a point in this space.

Thus, the test enables

one to differentiate the connotative meanings of concepts
among two or more groups or individuals by analyzing the
position of various points in the semantic space .3
An example will serve to illustrate the above.

First,

the dimensions of the semantic space must be determined.*
For the concepts chosen in this study it was determined that
two dimensions define this semantic space.
are called POTENCY and EVALUATIVE .5

The dimensions

The EVALUATIVE dimension

signifies whether a concept is considered "good" or "bad"
while the POTENCY dimension is concerned with the degree or
intensity of "goodness" or "badness."

Once the dimensions

are determined, two dimensional in this case, the semantic
space can be visualized or illustrated as followsi

2 Ibid., p. 25.
3 Ibid., pp. 25-30.

*See Fred N. Kerlinger. Foundations of Behavioral Re
search (New Yorkt Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1964),
pp. 564-566, for a more detailed example and explanation.
c
''These are names given to two possible dimensions of
the semantic space. They are the results of a great deal
of factor analysis by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum.
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8
(me)

7

(employees)

6

5
4
(unions)

3
2

Legend:

E-Evaluative scale
P«Potency scale

6

8

1

1

2

3

4

5

7

9

Specific concepts can be placed in this space via the
semantic differential.

For example, suppose there is a

desire to place specific concepts, such as "me," "employees,"
and "union,” in this semantic space from a group of college
students.

To do this, a semantic differential test would

be given to a sample of college students to gather scores
on the concepts "me," "employees," and "unions."

The

semantic differential test would yield an ordered pair of
numbers indicating the coordinates of the concepts within the
space.

Assume the results were "me" ■ (6,7), 6 units on X

and 7 units on Y, "employees" ■ (5,6) and "unions" ■ (2,3).
These ordered pairs of numbers would enable one to position
the concepts in the semantic space as illustrated.

The
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position would give an indication of the concepts' "abso
lute meaning" and from this "relative meaning" could be
established.

In the example, the concepts "me" and

"employees1* were similar in meaning while "employee" and
"union" had different connotative meanings.

Further, the

concepts "me" and "employee" were perceived as "good

and

"strong", while "union" was low on both "goodness" aid
"strength."
It follows that the same test could be administered
to a different group, say industrial workers, and the re
sults of the test compared to those of the college students
in order to see if the concepts have any different connota
tive meanings among the two groups.

Consequently, the

semantic differential is appropriate in testing hypotheses
on connotative meanings and attitudes relative to specific
concepts.

The selection of the specific concepts for this

study is covered next.

Concept Selection
The selection of the concepts, which were to be evalu
ated on a series of scales, was the first step in designing
the actual semantic differential test.

The determination

of the concepts was based on the nature of the hypotheses,
needs of the study, and, finally, the industry pilot study
mentioned in Chapter I.

A total of seven concepts was chosen.

Two of the

concepts ("MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS" and
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN ACCIDENT
•*PREVENTION") were concerned with technical aspects of
accident prevention and are referred to as T-l and T-2
respectively.

Two concepts ".(EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION ,

PLACEMENT, TRAINING, AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION 11
and "EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS") were concerned
with behavioral aspects of accident prevention and are re
ferred to as B-l and B-2.

The three remaining concepts

were relative to the safety director's organisational
position, management support for him, and his power, and are
similarily referred to as 0-1, 0-2, and 0-3.
worded as follows:

They are

"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION," "MAN

AGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT," and "YOUR
POWER AND AUTHORITY."

These concepts were used as stimuli

for responses.
In order to eliminate bias and interdependency among
the concepts, three steps were taken.
was put on an individual sheet.

First, each concept

Secondly, the concepts

were arranged so that no two concepts of the three categories
were back to back.

Third, in order to gain uniformity the

comment "Please mark the series of descriptive scales ac
cording to what the following concept means to you" was
placed at the top of each page containing a concept.
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Once the concepts were selected and arranged, the
next step was to determine the bipolar adjective scales
that were used to obtain responses to the stimuli.

Scale Selection
Osgood, et a l . , have done a great deal of factor
analysis on bipolar adjective scales to measure the potency
and evaluative dimensions.

Based on lists^ provided by

Osgood, et a l .,several evaluative and potency bipolar ad
jectives were chosen to be used in a pilot study.
primary criteria played a part in their selection.

Two
First,

the scales were chosen based on their relevance to the
concepts.

It was necessary to compromise and select a

couple of scales relevant to some concepts and not others.
Once this group of scales was determined, the selections
for the pilot study were chosen on the criteria that they
were maximally loaded on the evaluative or potency factor
and minimally loaded on other factors.^

The list was

eventually narrowed down to six evaluative and six potency
scales.
Using the twelve scales, and concepts similar to the

^Osgood, Suci, and Tannanbaum, o p . cit., pp. 35-61.

7A more detailed explanation can be found in ibid.,
pp. 78-80.
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ones actually used in the questionnaire, a pilot test was
given to 100 undergraduates at Louisiana State University
in Baton Rouge.

Fifty were engineering or science majors

and fifty were psychology or education majors.

Based on

the pilot study of undergraduates and a later industry pilot
study, the final ten bipolar adjective scales were chosen.
The five evaluative scales chosen were:
Bad - Good
Unimportant - Important
Unsuccessful - Successful
False - True
Foolish - Wise
The five potency scales chosen were:
Shallow - Deep
Weak - Strong
Lenient - Severe
Light - Heavy
Soft - Hard
To eliminate systems or patterns of replying, it is
recommended that the scales be rotated vertically and
horizontally.

Consequently a random number table was used

to determine both the order in which each scale would appear
in the evaluative or potency set of scales and whether the
"positive" end would be to the right or left.
Once all of the above had been accomplished, the sub
jects were asked to evaluate the concepts against the set
of scales as specified in a detailed set of instructions
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(see Appendix A ) .

The responses by the parties served to

locate the concepts in the semantic space for purposes of
comparisons and analysis.

A discussion of the statistical

techniques used in the analysis follows.

Methods of Analysis
There were primarily two statistical tools used re
lative to the analysis of the semantic differential— the
"t" test and the D statistic.

"t" test
The "t" test8 was used to test hypotheses dealing with
statistical significant differences in the meaning of
concepts between groups.

The procedure involved calculating

8The "t" test was used to test for statistical signifi
cant J f f e r e n c e in means,
it involved estimating the
standard deviation of universe, setting up the null hypothe
ses
X 2 and calculating the "t" value according to the
following formula 1

The best source for more information on situations where it
is necessary to use the weighted average of individual sample
estimates of the standard deviations of the population based
on each sample is Samuel B. Richmond, Statistical Analysis
(second edition, New Yorki The Ronald Press, 1964}, pp. 190193.
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the means, standard deviations, and variances for the 70
possible responses (7 concepts X 10 responses) for each
group used in the comparison.

To establish any statistical

significant difference in any one scale relative to a concept,
the 111" statistic was calculated and the scale was determined
to be different or not different at some level of significance.
To compare any two groups, based on the 140 means and
standard deviations, 70 MtN statistics were calculated and
each was analyzed for significance.

If one scale for either

of the factors {evaluative or potency) was statistically
significantly different, the meaning of the whole concept
was considered different between the compared groups.

This

followed since either one of the dimensions could position
the concept in the semantic space significantly different
from the other concept, or the same concept for a different
group.

Based on this explanation, the decision criterion

was derived.

Decision Criteria
A level of significance of .05 was used throughout
the study to test for significant differences in the meaning
of concepts between groups.

Thus, if any one scale differed

at the .05 level of significance, the connotative meaning or
attitude of that group was considered different from the
other group.

This level of significance seemed sufficient

since it required that one out of five, or twenty out of one

hundred scales, must be statistically significantly different
to consider the connotative meaning of the concept different
among the groups.

At the .05 level of significance it would

be expected that only five out of one hundred scales would
differ due to chance.

D Statistic
The "D" statistic is a measure of the Eucledian distance
between two points in the semantic space.

Since the semantic

space was two dimensional, the ND N statistic was merely the
generalized geometric linear distance between two concepts.^
This statistic was used in conjunction with the "t" test to

9

Where E

-

P

*

the coordinate measuring the evaluative
dimension
the coordinate measuring the potency
dimension

D2xy - 2 <Ex “ Ey>2
Dxy

+

^ (Ex - Ey)2

2 <PX ~ Py>2
+

- Py)2
or
i

Where the D value for evaluative and potency scales
of two groups are desired separately for
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determine the amount of distance between the concepts that
differed in order to determine the concepts that had the
greatest linear separation.

To provide a clearer picture

of the factors that differentiated the concepts, the eval
uative and potency factors were calculated separately.
The stage has now been set for the following numerical
analysis.

Analysis of Effective Versus Ineffective Safety Directors
The purpose of this section is to confirm or refute the
first hypothesis.

To reiterate, the first hypothesis was

stated as follows:
Safety directors who are more effective have at
titudes about certain organizational, technical
and behavioral concepts that are different from
the attitudes of the less effective safety
directors.

Also, the more effective safety

directors tend to have stronger convictions
about the technical and behavioral concepts than
do the less effective safety directors.
The first step in testing the hypothesis was to divide the
safety directors into two groups, effective and ineffective*
Once this was done, standard statistical techniques were
applied to the semantic differential test.

If there were
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significant differences between the two groups in the
selected concepts, the hypothesis was confirmed.

The re

mainder of the chapter is concerned with the classification
and analysis of the safety directors.

Basis of Selecting the Groups
It was first decided that only full-time safety
directors who were over a single plant or several plants in
a single city would be used in the analysis.

Also, it was

necessary that the accident statistics be provided by the
respondents.

These qualifications eliminated 53 of the

safety directors from this particular analysis.
The one-year and three-year accident frequency rates
were the criteria selected for the classification of safety
directors.

The figure is generally accepted as the best

available measure of performance.^0

Other measures have

Roland P. Blake, Industrial Safety (third edition,
Englewood Cliffs, N. J . : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 45;
Russell DeReamer, Modern Safety Practices (New York: John
Wiley t Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 297; Herbert W. Heinrich,
Industrial Accident Prevention (third edition. New York;
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 191; Rollin H.
Simonds and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Management (revised
edition, Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963),
p. 36; U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards,
Safety Subjects (Bulletin No. 67, Washington, D. C .t 0. S.
Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 58.
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been suggested^, and this one is not foolproof.

But out

of the available measures of safety performance, it is one
that is recorded by a standardized technique^*2 and generally
felt to be indicative of effectiveness.
After the above decisions ware made, it was necessary
to consider the effects of other variables on the frequency
rate so as to eliminate their influence on the classification
procedure.
The Influence of Related Variables
The variables selected for analysis of their effect
on accident frequency rates were plant age, number of em
ployees, budget of the safety department, and the type of
industry.

Regression and correlation analysis of plant age

and number of employees indicated that these factors had no
significant influence (r2 < .06) on the frequency rate.

Henry G. Gatterwhite and Robert M. LaPorge, "A Com
parison of Three Measures of Safety Performance," Journal
of the American Society of Safety Engineers (March, 1966),
pp. 9-15; William E. Tarrants, "Applying Measurement Con
cepts to the Appraisal of Safety Performance," Journal of
the American Society of Safety Engineers (May, 1965), pp.
15-22.
12

The standard technique of recording accident statis
tics for purposes of reporting and insurance is contained in
American Standard Method of Recording and Measuring Work
Injury Experience (revised edition. New York: American
Standards Association, Inc., 1954) and American Standard
Method of Recording Basic Facts Relating to the Nature and
Occurrence of work Injuries (New York: American Standards
Association, Inc., 1963).
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This could be the result of the industries chosen since the
data gathered indicated low variance on these factors.
The data gathered on the budget of the safety depart
ment was judged by the writer to be too incomplete and
inaccurate for purposes of analysis,

This was indicated by

some of the comments found on the returned questionnaires.
The poor quality of responses on the budget was attributed
to the faulty design of that question.
The remaining factor, type of industry, was a variable
that needed attention in the classification of safety
directors.

The average frequency rates for the four indus

tries were different as shown in Table 2-1.

Consequently,

each industry was handled separately when the safety direc
tors were divided into effective and ineffective classifica
tions .
It is interesting to note the similarity in the figures
reported by this study and the NSC figures in Table 2-1.
It is thought that any differences were a result of how
respondents classified their industry.

For example, the

researcher noticed that some safety directors in petroleum
plants classified themselves in the chemical industry, which
may have raised the average for the chemical industry and
lowered the petroleum industry's average.

This classifica

tion problem also showed up in the return analysis on page 27
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TABLE 2-1

Comparison of Survey Results To Figures Reported By The
National Safety Council On One-Year and Three-Year
Average Frequency Rates

Industry
Chemical
Petroleum
Electrical
Transportation

Survey
1967
3.61
5.26
2.35
5.06

Results
1964-66
4.47
7.20
2.10
5.71

National
1967
3.55
7.11
2.52
6.284-

Safety Council*
1965-67
3.57
7.37
2.25
7.09+

+Estimated by averaging the National Safety Council's
figures for the Automotive* Shipbuilding* and Railroad
Equipment.
*Source:

Accident Facts (Chicago: National Safety
Council, 1968), pp. 26-35.

where the return figures indicate that more people in the
chemical industry replied.

The researcher also attributes

this to safety directors misclassifying themselves.
The results of considering the variables plant age*
number of employees* and type of industry was that each in
dustry had to be considered separately for purposes of
classifying the safety directors as effective or ineffective.

The Actual Classification
Once it was decided that each industry had to be dealt
with separately for purposes of classifying the safety
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directors, the task could proceed.

Initially it was decided

that the distribution of frequency rates for each industry
would be divided into two groups with the arithmetic mean
as the dividing point.

A Chi-Square test was performed for

each of the four arithmetic distributions of frequency rates
to check for normality.
1.

The results were as follows;

The chemical industry was not significant at any
level of significance.

2.

The petroleum industry was significant at the .1
level of significance and not significant at the
.2 level based on the one-year frequency rate.
The three-year rate was significant at the .005
level.

3.

The electrical industry's one-year distribution
of rates was significant at the .005 level, but
the three-year distribution was not significant at
any level.

4.

The transportation equipment's distribution of oneyear rates was significant at the .001 level, but
again the three-year rates were not significant at
any level.

It became obvious that the distribution of one-year and
three-year accident frequency rates was not arithmetically
normal.

Some transformation of the rates was needed.

Since
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the values were "rates,” It was decided to transform the
rates into a logarithmic value.

Again, the Chi-Square test

was performed with the results indicated below:
1.

The chemical industry's distribution of one-year
rates was significant at the .001 level of signifi
cance and the three-year distribution was signifi
cant at the .025 level.

2.

The petroleum industry was significant at the .025
level for the one-year rates and significant at
tne .3 level for the three-year rates.

3.

The electrical manufacturing industry's distribu
tions of rates for one-year and three-years were
significant at the .7 and .4 levels respectively.

4.

The transportation equipment industry's distribu
tion was significant for one-year and three-year
rates at the .4 and .5 levels respectively.

Consequently, the distribution of logarithms was a
much better approximation of the normal distribution.

Based

on this conclusion, it was decided that each distribution
of logarithmically transformed rates would be divided into
two groups about the geometric mean13 or the anti-log of log

n
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two groups were defined as the effective and

ineffective safety directors.
The next step was to find the geometric mean of the
accident frequency rates for each industry, which are shown
in Table 2-2.

Once these were found, it was possible to

divide the four industry distributions into two groups each
and then combine each effective and ineffective with the
others who were classified as effective and ineffective.

TABLE 2-2
Geometric Means Of The One-Year And Three-Year Average
Frequency Rates For The Sampled Industries

Industry

Geometric Mean
For One-Year Average

Geometric Mean
For Three-Year Average

1.19
3.26
1.10
1.91

1.69
3.85
1.18
2.30

Chemical
Petroleum
Electrical
Transportation

It is the Nth root of the product of the values
log G - logX1 +

log Xj

t

log Xj ,,,, log X^

N
log G ■ log X
N
For further explanation see Frederick E. Croxton and Dudley
J. Crowden, Applied General Statistics (second edition, Engle
wood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), pp. 198-203.
^4Since the log of zero is undefined, it was necessary
to give those safety directors who had an accident frequency
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The effective and ineffective in this case were defined as
indicated in Table 2-3.

After the safety directors were

classified the two resulting groups could then be compared.
TABLE 2-3
Accident Frequency Rates Used To Divide The Safety Directors
Into Effective and Ineffective Classifications

Industry
Chemical
Petroleum
Electrical
Transportation

Effective
1964-66
1967
(Below)
(Below)
1.3
3.4
1.2
2.0

ineffective
1967
1964-66
(Above)
(Above)

1.8
3.9
1.3
2.4

1.2
3.3
1.1
1.9

1.7
3.8
1.2
2.3

The writer thought that the study would be enhanced by
additional analysis of effective and ineffective safety
directors based on a further classification procedure.

The

initial distributions of rates for the four industries con
tained people in the middle or "gray" area about the mean.
To block out this gray area, the middle 25 percent of the
safety directors were eliminated by going approximately .32
sigma log G on each side of the mean and discarding those
who fell in this area.

Thus, the effective and ineffective

were also defined as indicated in Table 2-4.

rate of zero a numerical value. The value assigned was .1
for both the one-year and three-year figures. This bias,
was necessary so that the log G could be computed.
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TABLE 2-4

Accident Frequency Rates Used To Divide The Safety Directors
Remaining After The 25% Deletion Into Effective
And Ineffective Classifications

1967
(Below)

Industry
Chemical
Petroleum
Electrical
Trans porta tion

.8
2.3
.8
1.3

Effective
1964-66
(Below)

Ineffective
1964-66
1967
(Above)
(Above)
2.0
4.7
1.6
2.2

1.1
2.6
.9
1.6

2.7
5.9
1.6
3.5

The safety directors had to meet one final criteria
before they were included in the analysis.

The three-year

frequency rate had to fall into the specified limits.

For

example, where a one-year rate would qualify a safety direc
tor for analysis in the second classification, but the threeyear rate would indicate exclusion, the safety director was
not used in the analysis in any way.

Also, if the one-year

rate indicated ineffectiveness but the three-year rate indi
cated effectiveness, the safety director was classified as
effective.

This procedure resulted in the distributions

shown in Tables 2-5 and 2-6.
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TABLE 2-5
Distribution Of Effective And Ineffective Safety Directors,
Before Deletion, By Industry

Industry
Chemical
Petroleum
Electrical
Transportation
Total

Effective

Ineffective

38
7
13
14

42
11
10
12

72

75

TABLE 2-6
Distribution Of Effective And Ineffective Safety Directors,
After Deletion, By Industry

Industry
Chemical
Petroleum
Electrical
Transpor tation

Total

Effective

Ineffective

20
6
8
11

32
8
9
10

45
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Chi-Square Test Of Classification
A question existed as to whether the classification
technique resulted in two distributions with significant
differences in their means.

Thus, some investigation was

in order relative to this matter.
The first thought was to apply a "t" test, but again
the writer was concerned with normality.

Therefore a Chi-

Square test was performed on each of the four distributions
(two effective and two ineffective) to check for normality
on the arithmetic and logarithmic scales of the one-year
and three-year accident frequency rates.

The levels at

which the test for normality was found to be significant is
illustrated in Table 2-7.

it was clear that the first two

distributions, all the effective and all the ineffective,
were more logarithmic normal.

Also, it appeared that the

distributions at .32 sigma log G away from the mean were
more logarithmic normal than arithmetic normal.

Conse

quently, the "t" test was performed to test for a significant
difference in the log G's.
The

"t" test on the one-year frequency rate of the

effective and ineffective safety directors, when all were
included, indicated significant difference at the .12 level
of significance, but more importantly the three-year fre
quency rate was significant at the .02 level of significance.
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TABLE 2-7

Levels Of Significance Based On A Chi-Square Test For
Normality Of Arithmetic And Logarithmic Accident
Frequency Rates Of The Effective And Ineffective
Safety Director

1967

Classification

Arithmetic

Logarithmic

Arithmetic Logarith
mic

Before Deletion
Effective
Ineffective

.1
None

.025
.1

.4
None

.001
.7

.025
.025

.05
.01

.025
.005

.5
.025

After Deletion
Effective
Ineffective

When the safety directors who were in .32 sigma log G area
around the mean were eliminated, the differences became more
significant, as would be expected.

The one-year frequency

rates were significant at the .06 level of significance and
more importantly, the three-year frequency rates were
significant at the .001 level of significance.1^

15The characteristics of the safety directors in each
distribution were analyzed to see if there were any other
statistically significant differences in the responses given
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The classification procedure has resulted in groups
of safety directors who have mean frequency rates statistically significantly different from ones in other
classifications.

The next step was to analyze the semantic

differential test in order to confirm or nullify the major
hypothesis.

Semantic Differential Analysis
Once the safety directors were classified, the analy
sis of the semantic differential involved the previously
discussed "t" test and D statistic.

Each of these statis

tics were computed for the distributions where all the
safety directors were classified as effective and ineffec
tive, and then the values were calculated for the distribu
tions where those safety directors with accident frequency
rates within .32 sigma log G of the geometric mean of the
frequency rates were excluded from the analysis.

Test For Differences
The first step in the analysis of significant differ
ences in attitudes concerned the effective and ineffective

in each case. The responses for each distribution is given
in Appendix C. There were no characteristics found to be
significantly different between the compared distributors
except the accident frequency rate.

safety directors where all were included in the distribu
tions.

The "tM scores for concepts that showed significant

differences between the two groups appears in Table 2-8.16
A positive "t" value represents a stronger score on the
semantic differential test for the effective safety direc
tors.

This is the result of

subtracting

the scores of the

ineffective safety directors from the effective, in which
case a positive value can only result from the selection of
more extreme spaces toward the positive bipolar adjectives
by the effective safety directors.
At the .05 level of significance with 145 degrees of
freedom, the critical ”t” values are +1.96 and -1.96.

Those

scores over or under the critical "tM value are underlined,
and indicate a significant difference in attitudes of the
two groups relative to that concept.

Thus, the effective

safety directors had different (indicated by ”t" values)
and stronger (indicated by a positive Mt" value) attitudes
about the following concepts:

l^in case the reader would prefer to use some level of
significance other than .05, a complete list of "tN values
that relate to the partial tables shown in the chapter are
illustrated in Appendix D.

TABLE 2-8
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
By Effective And Ineffective Safety Directors
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.774

1.174

1.089

1.360

2.917

1.340

0.933

0.045

1.269

1.916

1.410

3.4.10

2.297

0.630

1.844

2.093

1.514

1.190

1.841

1.860

1.843

3.058

2.812

0.983

2.562

1.715

1.5S4

1.736

0.832

0.453

1.327

2.119

0.475 -0.220

0.798

1.020 -0.046

0.513

0.520

0.695

1.220

2.900

1.261

2.213

3.520

1.742

1.692

0-1 -0,604
Concepts

T-l
tft
&B-1
®
O
gT-2
o
o
B-2
Note:

0.177

3.642

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (Effective - Ineffective).
Degrees of Freedom:
145
Critical tttn values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of nt ” values can be found in Appendix D, Table D-l.
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"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
“MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
A glance at the visual semantic

p r o f i l e s ^

shown in

Exhibits 2-1 through 2-7 will reveal more about the attitudes
of the two groups.

It is evident that both the effective

and ineffective groups had stronger attitudes about all the
concepts except one, "Management Support For You and Your
Department."

Also of interest is the consistency of higher

scores on the part of effective safety directors on those
concepts that differed.

These points lead to the conclusion

that both the effective and ineffective safety directors
reacted strongly toward all the behavioral and technical
concepts, but the effective ones consistently had stronger
attitudes or convictions about the behavioral and technical
concepts.

This does not indicate that these attitudes lead

to lower accident frequency rates.

I t may be that the low

accident record results in the strong attitudes.

Neither

the data nor the statistics used reveal the line of causa
tion, but further analysis in later chapters does, in the

17Notice that the bipolar adjectives have been rotated
such that the positive adjectives are on the right.
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EXHIBIT 2-1
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish .

Wise

Unsuccessful
Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep
Heavy

Light

Legend:

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

"

Effective Safety Directors

— — —

Ineffective Safety Directors

EXHIBIT 2-2
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: —

— —

Effective Safety Directors

Ineffective Safety Directors

EXHIBIT 2-3
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION”
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad
False .

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep
Heavy

Light
Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: ~
— — —

Effective Safety Directors
Ineffective Safety Directors

EXHIBIT 2-4
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: —
— — —

Effective Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 2-5
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish
Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow .

^ Deep
Heavy

Legend:

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

™

Effective Safety Directors

— — —

Ineffective Safety Directors

64

EXHIBIT 2-6
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES1 ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
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EXHIBIT 2-7
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
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judgment of the researcher, give some hint that attitudes
may influence accident rates.
It was puzzling as to why there was a difference in
the attitudes about the concept "Your Organizational Posi
tion."

Correlation analysis was performed to see if there

was a significant difference in the organizational posi
tions of the effective and ineffective safety directors and
no difference was indicated.

The researcher can only render

the opinion that the more effective directors saw themselves
in a better position and that their good accident record
enforced their attitude on this matter.

In any case, both

groups seemed to value their position, but the effective
safety directors valued theirs more than the ineffective.
Another point of interest was the apparent neutrality
of attitudes relative to the concept "Management Support
For You and Your Department."

Neither group conceived the

support as "good" nor did they have "strong" convictions
about it.

Does this mean ineffective safety directors do

not get the support of management, but don't think its
"bad" while the effective get the support, but due to their
greater concern for technical and behavioral aspects of
accident prevention don't see the support as "good?"

Or

does the management of firms in which accident rates are

low give the same support as those in which rates are high?
The data does not allow a statistical answer to these ques
tions, but in the judgment of the researcher the effective
safety directors had neutral attitudes about the management
support because of their concern about accident prevention.
While they may have had good support relative to other firms,
it still was not enough support to make them think it was
"good" or to make them have strong convictions about its
"goodness."
As previously indicated, after the analysis of the
classifications where all safety directors were included,
the gray area around the mean would be deleted and then the
same analysis made of the remaining directors.

The resulting

“t" values for concepts that showed significant differences
between the remaining directors appear in Table 2-9.

The

only additional concept that showed significant difference
was "Your Power and Authority."

However, the "t" values

were higher for the other concepts that differed, indicating
a larger separation of mean values.

Again the positive "t*

values indicate higher scores for the effective safety
directors and a glance at Exhibits 2-8 through 2-14 illus
trate the consistency of the stronger attitudes of the
effective safety directors.

Thus, it seems that as one

moves towards the extremes of effectiveness and

TABLE 2-9
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
By Effective And Ineffective Safety Directors After
Deleting .32 Sigma Log G About The Mean
Bi-Polar Scales
2

3

4

5

6

7

3

9

0-1 -0.626

1.937

1.341

1.692

1.929

2,306

1.361

0.082

0.481

2.066

T-l

1.691

1.352

2.793

1.717

1.675

2.770

2.700

2.301

2.006

2.666

” B-1

0.706

1.741

2.616

2.561

0.702

3.148

1.490

1.191

1.500

0.853

0.502

1.103

2.489

0.449

0,184

1.280

1.722 -0.013

1.333

0.343

0.770

0.331

2.683

1.290

0.804

2.990

2*3.31

3.226

1.297

1.81?

0.210 -0.023 -2.627

0.406

0.534

0.526

1.143 -0.407

Concepts

1

tx

S t -2
(5
o B-2

0-3 -0,626 -0.531
Note:

10

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the ,05 level
of significance (Effective - Ineffective),
Degrees of Freedom:
102
Critical nt n values: +1.93 and -1.93
A complete list of "t” values can be found in Appendix D, Table D-2.
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EXHIBIT 2-S
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
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EXHIBIT 2-9
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
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EXHIBIT 2-10
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
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EXHIBIT 2-11
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
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EXHIBIT 2-12
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
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EXHIBIT 2-13
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
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EXHIBIT 2-14
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant
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ineffectiveness the attitudes become even more differenti
ated.

This increased differentiation seems logical, but

why were the attitudes of the ineffective safety directors
better toward their power and authority at the extremes?
As before, the researcher can only speculate that the less
effective safety directors were in a more satisfied state
about their power, while the effective safety directors,
who were more "concerned" about safety, were less satisfied
with their state of power and authority.

Test For Linear Separation
To further analyze the semantic differential tests, the
D scores were calculated and are shown in Tables 2-10 and
2-11.

The largest separation in the semantic space when all

safety directors were included occurred with respect to the
concept B - 2.

After the deletion process was performed

the D scores became larger for all concepts, but the largest
separation occurred with respect to T - 1 with.B - 2 follow
ing in rank of separation.

These observations substantiate

the previous statement that the differentiation of concepts,
becomes greater as the extremes of effectiveness and inef
fectiveness are reached.
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TABLE 2-10

Potency And Evaluative D Scores Of Effective And
Ineffective Safety Directors Before Deletion

D Score
Concept
0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

Evaluative
.59
.92
1.12
.15
.47
.69
.60

Potency
.69
.88
.83
.23
.30
1.21
.20

TABLE 2-11
Potency And Evaluative D Scores Of Effective And Ineffective Safety Directors After A Deletion Process

D Score
Concept
0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

Evaluative
.99
1.02
1.21
.44
.62
.86
.49

Potency
1.00
1.57
1.01
.31
.64
1.33
.40

Conclusions
No basis was found to refute the major hypothesis.
Thus, the following was accepted:
Safety directors who are more effective have at
titudes about certain organizational, technical
and behavioral concepts that are different from
the attitudes of the less effective safety
directors.

Also, the more effective safety

directors tend to have stronger convictions
about the technical and behavioral concepts
than do the less effective safety directors.

The more effective safety directors clearly valued and
had stronger connotations about the technical and behavioral
concepts than did the less effective.

The line of causation

between effectiveness and attitudes was hard to ascertain,
but it is the judgment of the researcher that the more ef
fective safety directors were acutely concerned about the
behavioral and technical aspects of accident prevention, and
this resulted in lower accident frequency rates.

CHAPTER III

RELATIONSHIP OP EDUCATION TO THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL
TEST AND MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS

The role of education in determining the effectiveness
of safety directors is a hotly contested subject today that
centers around the engineer/nonengineer debate.

To help

resolve this debate, this chapter will be concerned with the
testing of the second hypothesis, which was stated as follows
Safety directors with nonengineering backgrounds
have different attitudes about certain technical
and behavioral concepts than those with engineer
ing backgrounds.

Those with nonengineering back

grounds value and have stronger convictions about
the behavioral concepts than those with engineering
backgrounds, and engineers value and have stronger
convictions about the technical concepts than non
engineers.

Additionally, there is a relationship

between the college degree held and managerial
effectiveness.
In addition to testing the second hypothesis, other facets
of education, such as supplementary courses dealing with
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safety, and the level of education, will be investigated to
determine any relationship between these variables and ef
fectiveness.

Analysis of the Semantic Differential for Safety
Directors With Engineer and Nonengineer Degrees
This section will be limited to those safety directors
who hold a college degree in order that the second hypothesis
may be investigated.

It should be noted that the hypothesis

is not unique to the safety field.

It has been established

that engineers are more technically oriented than nonengi
neers,1 and that this orientation may influence engineers
ability to manage.

2

For specific studies on this matter see: Max Freyd,
"The Personalities of the Socially and the Mechanically In
clined," Psychological Monographs, Vol. 33 (No. 4, 1924),
pp. 1-101; Charles H. Goodman, "A Comparison of The Inter
ests and Personality Traits of Engineers and Liberal Arts
Students," The Journal of Applied Psychology (December,
1942) , pp. 721-737; Ross Harrison, Winslow Hur t, and Theo
dore A. Jackson, "Profile of the Mechanical Engineer:
II
Interest," Personnel Psychology (Autumn, 1955), pp. 315330; Carroll E. Izard, "Personality Characteristics of En
gineers as Measured By The Edwards Personal Preference
Schedule," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 44 (No. 3,
1960), pp. 332-335; H. B. Moore and S. J. Levey, "Artful
Contrivers: A Study of Engineers," Personnel (September,
1951), pp. 148-153; Edward K. Strong, "Nineteen-Year Fol
low-up of Engineer Interests," Journal of Applied Psy
chology (April, 1952), pp. 65-74.
2For varied discussion on the merits of engineers as
managers and on managing engineers, the following selected
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In view of the above facts and the conclusions of
Chapter II relative to the attitudes or orientation of the
safety directors, the second hypothesis takes on added
significance,
The statistical procedures used to test the hypothesis
were the techniques previously employed relative to the
semantic differential, and the additional technique of cor
relation analysis.

The first step was to see if there were

any significant differences in the attitudes of the engineers
and nonengineers.

Classification of the Safety Directors
The procedure for separating the safety directors into

articles are representative of numerous other articles on
these subjects:
AMA Management Report N o . 58, "Optimum Use of Engineer
ing Talent" (New York: American Management Association,
1961); Robert D. Best, "The Scientific Mind Vs. the Manage
ment Mind," Management Review (November, 1963), pp. 23-26;
James William Caldwell, "Management Skills For Scientist in
Supervision," Advanced Management (April, 1959), pp. 22-26;
Basil J. Candela, and Frederick J. Gandet, "Do Engineers
Make Good Managers," Factory (March, 1964), pp. 82-83;
Clinton J. Chamberlain, "Coming Era in Engineering Management," Harvard Business Review (September-October. 1961), pp.
87-94;
"Coming to the Defense of the Scientist," Iron Age
(July 27, 1967), p. 25; William B. Given, "The Engineer
Goes Into Management," Harvard Business Review (JanuaryFebruary, 1955), pp. 43-52; Herbert E. Krugman, "What Kind
of Managers will Scientist Make?," The Management Review
(May, 1958), pp. 22-28; George S. Odiorne, "Making Managers
Out of Engineers," Personnel (November, 1956), pp. 259-266;
V. Donald Schoeller, "Pioneers of Management: The Engineer
ing Function," Advanced Management-Office Executive (Nov
ember, 1962), pp. 14-17.
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the engineer/nonengineer groups was straightforward.

All of

the safety directors with college degrees were sorted into
either the group with engineer or science degrees, or the
group with' some other college degree.

Where the safety

director held a graduate degree, the classification was
based on the major of that degree.

Since some argument

might result from the classification of those with science
degrees into the engineer group, the two groups were also
analyzed with the scientist excluded.

These classification

procedures resulted in the following distribution of safety
directors:
Engineers

Nonengineers

Engineer Degree
Science Degree
Total

53 (42%)
18 (14%)
71 (56%)

Business Degree
Other

40 (31%)
16 (13%)
56 (44%)

The analysis of the semantic differential test for each group
is reported next.

Test for Differences
The "t” scores for the concepts that differed between
the engineers, scientists included, and nonengineers are
shown in Table 3-1.

A positive value indicates a higher

score on the part of the nonengineers, thus, the nonengineers
had "better" and "stronger" convictions about the conceptsi

TABLE 3-1
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
By Engineers, Including Scientists, And Nonengineers
Bi-Polar Scales

Concepts

1

2

3

4

‘5

6

7

6

9

10

T-l

1.240 0.660 2.310

0.742

2.627

1.922

2.219

1.660

1.314

1.236

B-l

2.900 2.094 1.305

1.416

3.223

1.942

2.261

2.539

2.506

1.906

0-3

0.321 1.233 1.761

0.177

1.716

1.157

1.244

2.216

0.926

1.320

Note:

Underlined values indicate significant difference at the .05 level
of significance.
(Nonengineers - Engineers)
Degrees of Freedom:
125
Critical nt" values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "t" values can be found in Appendix E, Table E-l.
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"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
A glance at the visual profiles in Exhibits 3-1 through
3-7 illustrates that both groups of safety directors had
high means on both the evaluative and potency scales about
all the concepts except 0-2.

Any significant difference in

attitudes was the result of stronger convictions on the part
of nonengineers.

An interesting fact is that of the techni

cal and behavioral concepts that differed— the nonengineers
had the strongest convictions about both.
The exclusion of the scientists from the analysis did
not lead to any surprisingly different results as shown in
Table 3-2.

The only concept that changed was "Your Power

and Authority" which no longer showed significant difference.
The visual semantic profiles for this comparison are also
shown in Exhibits 3-1 through 3-7.
The visual profiles on two of the organizational con
cepts, "Management Support For You and Your Department" and
"Your Power and Position," were of interest.

It appears

that none of the safety directors used in the analysis had
"good" attitudes about management support.

Possibly manage

ment was not giving appropriate support for accident
prevention activities as far as the engineers and nonengineers
were concerned.

In an attempt to decipher why the concept

EXHIBIT 3-1
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
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EXHIBIT 3-2
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
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EXHIBIT 3-3
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
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EXHIBIT 3-4
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
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EXHIBIT 3-5
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
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EXHIBIT 3-6
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
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EXHIBIT 3-7
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
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TABLE 3-2
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
By Engineers, Excluding Scientist, and Nonengineers
Bi-Polar Scales
to
g.T-1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.888

0.606

2.015

0.375

2.376

1.484

1.846

0.950

1.253

0.957

gB-1
3.198 2.509 1.376 1.240 2.678 1.639 2.028 2.38$ 2.149 1.869
o
Note: Underlined values indicate significant difference at the ,05 level
of significance {Nonengineers - Engineers).
Degrees of Freedom:
107
Critical "t" values: +1.98 and -1,98
A complete list of ntn values can be found in Appendix E, Table E-2.
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"Your Power and Authority" differed, correlation analysis
was performed on power and education, but no correlation was
found.

Since the concept differed only when the scientists

were included, it is the opinion of the writer that the
scientists to a large extent, and the engineers to some ex
tent, were not as tolerant of lack of authority, and
consequently did not have as high of an opinion of the
authority they possessed as compared to the nonengineers.
It became quite clear that the engineers placed no more
value than the nonengineers on the technical concepts.

The

next step was to determine the degree of linear separation.

Test for Linear Separation
The D scores in Tables 3-3 and 3-4 point out the large
separation on the evaluative and potency scales between the
concepts on which there was a difference in attitudes.

The

D scores on the concepts that differed increased when the
scientists were excluded, which suggest that they lowered
the mean values of the bipolar adjectives on those concepts.
This further suggests that the scientists did not value as
strongly the concepts that differed.

Thus when they were

excluded, the mean values on the scales were increased and
the concept "Your Power and Authority" no longer showed
any difference.
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TABLE 3-3

Evaluative And Potency D Scores For Engineers,
Including Scientists, And Nonengineers

D Score
Concept

Evaluative

0-1
T-l
E-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

.57
.78
1.21
.64
.34
.20
.64

■J

Potency
.64
.93
1.11
.38
.46
.47
.80

TABLE 3-4

Evaluative And Potency D Scores For Engineers,
Excluding Scientsts, And Nonengineers

D Score
Concept
0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

Evaluative
.55
.72
1.25
.72
.42
.25
.51

Potency
.63
.81
1.08
.45
.51
.40
.60
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The following analysis of education and effectiveness
was necessary in order to complete the testing of the
second hypothesis.

Correlation of Educational Variables To Accident
Frequency Rates
It was decided that several variables relating to edu
cation should be correlated with accident frequency rates
in order to thoroughly test the second hypothesis/ and to
fully resolve the engineer/nonengineer debate.

The vari

ables were, highest degree held, years beyond the highest
degree, college major, college degree major, hours of speci
al courses dealing with the technical or non-human aspects
of accident prevention, the sponsor of the courses,

4

hours

of special courses dealing with the behavioral or human
aspects of accident prevention, and the sponsors of those
courses.

These variables were correlated with the one-year

and three-year accident frequency rates of those safety
directors over a single plant, or several plants in a single
city.

Additionally, each industry was treated separately

4The sponsors were grouped under National Safety
Council, American Society Safety Engineers, company, trade
groups, government, and college.
'’For averages of these variables by industry, see
Appendix B.
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in the correlation analysis.

Since the frequency rates were

logarithmically normal, the rates were correlated arith
metically, then a logarithmic transformation was performed
on the rates, and they were again correlated.
The results of correlating all the variables with the
frequency rates, the logarithms of the frequency rates, and
with one another was clear.

None of the variables were

correlated with accident frequency rates since the highest
coefficient of determination (r2 ) was less than .10.
fact, most r 2 values were less than .04.
insignificant intercorrelations

In

Also, there were

(r2 < 10) among the variables

themselves, with the exception that major in college cor
related with degree major.

No correlation matrices are

presented- here since the matrices would add no value to the
statements made above.

Conclusions
The hypothesis being tested indicated that engineers
had stronger convictions about the technical concepts, but
they did not.

Also, it stated that nonengineers had stronger

convictions about the behavioral concepts, but this occurred
with respect to only one of the behavioral concepts.

The

last point of the hypothesis was that some relationship
existed between the college degree and accident rates, but
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it was found that no such relationship existed, nor did any
of the other educational variables correlate with accident
frequency rates.

Clearly, the second hypothesis must be

rejected.
A subtle but significant result can be derived from
the previous analysis and conclusions.

Remembering that the

more effective safety directors had stronger convictions on
the behavioral and technical concepts, it would be of in
terest to know what factors might influence a difference in
attitudes independent of the accident rates.

Since the

college degree of the safety directors did not correlate
with accident frequency rates, it can be said that the engi
neers and nonengineers were randomly disbursed in the ef
fective and ineffective classifications; thus, each group
was influenced by both the high and low accident rates.

In

view of the fact that nonengineers had significantly differ
ent scores on the concepts T-l and B-l, it can be said that
the college degree was, to some extent, a factor that
accounted for a difference in attitudes irrespective of ef
fectiveness.

However, it is the researchers opinion that

the education variable plays a minor role in causing dif
ferences in attitudes when compared to other variables
studied in future chapters.
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The engineer/nonengineer debate seems to have fallen
into the "either/or" trap.

The analysis covered in this

chapter and the resulting conclusions seem to indicate that
both groups make equally good (or bad) safety directors.

CHAPTER IV
RELATIONSHIP OF EXPERIENCE TO THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL
TEST AND MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS

Writers in the field of safety management have not
ignored experience and its importance to the effectiveness
of safety directors.^"

They have suggested that it adds to

the qualifications of a man for the safety directors job.
I

The American Society of Safety Engineers even found a posi
tive relationship in experience and accident frequency rates
in a survey of all their members, however, they did not take
into account other variables that may have influenced their
findings, such as the age of the plants, and types of in
dustry.2

^The authors either point out specifically that experi
ence is useful or their comments on the qualifications of
safety directors makes it evident that the writers favor the
experienced.
See; Roland p. Blake, Industrial Safety (third
edition, Englewood Cliffs, N. J . : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963),
pp. 249-250; Lewis A. DeBlois, Industrial Safety Organization
for Executives and Engineers (London; McGraw-Hill Book Com
pany, Inc., 1926), p. 95; Russell DeReamer, Modern Safety
Practices (New York: John Wiley 6 Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 319321; Rollin H. Simonds and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Managemant (revised edition, Homewood, Illinoisi Richard D . Irwin,
Inc., 1963), pp. 64-67.
2Peter E. Marconi, "Today's Safety Engineer in Industry,
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This chapter addresses the question "Does experience
have any relationship to the attitudes of safety directors
and their effectiveness?"

The vehicle used to answer the

question is a test of the third hypothesis which was stated
as follows:
Experience affects attitudes on behavioral and
technical concepts and/or the effectiveness of
safety directors.
To test the hypothesis it was necessary to analyze the data
based on six classifications of experience, which were as
follows:
Total years

of work experience

Total years
engaged in a supervisory capacity over
any activity
Total years

engaged in safety work full-time

Total years

engaged in supervising safety personnel

Years as safety director at the present facility
Age
Each experience classification was divided, according to its
median, into the more experienced and the less experienced.
This was necessary to facilitate the semantic differential
analysis for attitude differences.

To check for any relation

ship of experience and effectiveness, simple correlation

Business, and Government," Journal of the American Society
of Safety Engineers (August, 1960), p. 48.
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analysis was performed on the classifications of experience
and accident frequency rates.
The evaluation of attitudes by experience classifica
tion is covered next.

Analysis of the Semantic Differential
Total Years of Work Experience
The more experienced safety directors were considered
to have over 21 years of work experience in the chemical
and electrical industries and over 28 years in the other two
industries.

Those with fewer years of experience were of

course classified as less experienced.

This resulted in a

total of 105 safety directors being classified as more ex
perienced and 103 as less experienced.

The "t" values for

concepts that differed are shown in Table 4-1 and indicate
the more experienced had stronger attitudes on the following
concepts:
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEE'S ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
The concepts were not separated by any great difference as
shown by the D scores in Table 4-2.

TABLE 4-1
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings
Of Concepts By Total Work Experience
Bi-Polar Scales

Concepts

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

9

10

0-1

>.497

1.765 1.751

1.621

1.573 -0.100 2.217

1.430

1.314

1.303

T-2

3.701

-0.174 0.661

0.951

1.359

1.251

2.115

1.176

B-2

L.635

0.650 1.526

1.643

2.534

1.227

0.925

0-3

3.679

0.004 0.230

0.646 2.102

1.566

1.577

1.156

Note:

0.000 1,71?

1.363 1.500 0.626
-1.053

0.609

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experience - Less experience)
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical "t" values:
+1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "t" values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-l,
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TABLE 4-2

Evaluative And Potency D Scores
For Total Work Experience

D Score
Concept
0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

Evaluative

Potency

.64
.26
.44
■ .46
.34
.57
.35

.57
.42
.40
.25
.59
.64
.69

All the safety directors had "good" attitudes about the
concepts that differed as shown in Exhibits 4-1 through 4-7,
but the degree of "goodness" was stronger for those with more
work experience since the high "t“ values were on the potency
scales.
Total work experience does appear to influence the at
titudes of safety directors for those with more experience
did think the concepts 0-1, T-2, B-2, and 0-3 were "good"
and they thought "stronger*1 about this goodness than the less
experienced.
It appears that possibly the more total work experience
the safety directors had the more concerned they became about
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EXHIBIT 4-1
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful
Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep
Heavy

Light

Legend:

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard
High Total Work Experience
Low Total Work Experience

105

EXHIBIT 4-2
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: —
—

High Total Work Experience
—

Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-3
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: —

High Total Work Experience
Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-4
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light A

Legend:

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

— ■ —

High Total Work Experience

— — -

Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-5
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad .

Good

False

True

Lenient

. Severe

Shallow

x Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak .

i Strong

Soft .

Hard

Legend: — —
—

High Total Work Experience
Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-6
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS”
Important

Unimportant

Wise

Foolish .
Unsuccessful .

Good

Bad .

. True

False
Lenient

Severe

Shallow .

Deep

Light

. Heavy

Weak .

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: —

—

High Total Work Experience
Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-7
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish .

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Legend:

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

1—
— — —

High Total Work Experience
Low Total Work Experience
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the behavioral and technical aspects of accident prevention.
The only explanation for the difference in attitudes of the
safety directors on the organizational concepts 0-1 and 0-3
is that the more experienced safety directors acquired the
stronger convictions on position and power solely on the
basis of their experience, for no correlation was found in
experience and these variables.

Total Supervisory Experience
The safety directors with fewer than 15 years of super
visory experience were classified as less experienced (92)
and all others as more experienced (116).

The concepts found

to be different among the two groups were:
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
-EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN ACCIDENT
PREVENTION"
-EMPLOYEE'S ACTS' CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
The "tM values are shown in Table 4-3 and the D scores appear
in Table 4-4.

Those safety directors with more supervisory

experience had stronger attitudes about all the concepts
that differed except the first one.

TABLE 4-3
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings
Of Concepts By Total Supervisory Experience
Bi-Polar Scales

Concepts

1

2

3

4

3

6

7

3

9

10

B-l -1.933

-0.005 0.127

0.230

0.620 0.456

0.250

0.773

0.367

0.763

T-2

0.226

-0.119 -0.143

0.669

0.944 0.992

2.556

1.661

1.859

2.125

B-2

2.132

1.144 -0.033

0.164

1.369 2.885

2.814

3.344

1.457

3.223

-0.226 -0.537 -0.255 -0.874 0.908

0.342

1.129

1.042

2.055

0-3 -0.192
Note:

Underlined Values indicate significant difference at the .05 level
of significance.
(More experienced - Less experienced)
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical "t" Values:
+1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "tir values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-2.
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TABLE 4-4

Evaluative And Potency D Scores For
Total Supervisory Experience

D Score
Concept

Evaluative

0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B—2
0-3

.48
.12
.40
.50
.21
.48
.18

Potency
.59
.43
.22
.18
.77
1.08
.52

It is interesting to note the large separation on the
concept "Employees1 Acts Cause Host Accidents."

Apparently

the more experienced, in terms of work and supervisory ex
perience, had stronger attitudes about the. human element in
accident prevention.

On the other concepts that differed,

all the safety directors had strong attitudes, but the more
experienced were slightly stronger, with the one exception
noted above.

The semantic profiles for this and later

classifications are included in Appendix G since they are
all somewhat similar to the first set in Exhibit 4-1 through
4-7.

The semantic profiles for this classification are

shown in Exhibits 4-8 through 4-14 in Appendix G.
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Full-Time Safety Work
Safety directors with over 14 years of full-time safety
work were classified as more experienced (80) and those with
less than 15 years of experience were classified as less
experienced

(128).

The "t" values in Table 4-5 indicate

the more experienced had stronger attitudes on the following
concepts:
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES* ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"

The D scores in Table 4-6 and the semantic profiles in Ap
pendix G, Exhibits 4-15 through 4-21, are indicative of the
consistency of the stronger attitudes the more experienced
safety directors had toward the concepts that differed.
The full-time safety experience seemed to have a signifi
cant influence on attitudes.

The longer a safety director

had been involved in full-time safety work, the stronger
were his convictions about the importance of the behavioral
and technical aspects of accident prevention.

The more

ex

perienced safety directors also had stronger convictions
about their position and power, but no correlation existed

TABLE 4-5
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
By Total Full-Time Safety Experience
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

9

0-1

0.426

0.699

1.591

1.153

1.043

1.660

2.037

2.264

0.754

1.046

T-l

1.552

1.432

1.256

1.332

2.431

1.930

1.731

2.005

1.660

2.343

W B-1 -1.253

0.357

1.296

1.109

1.595

0.309

1.231

2.065

1.364

0.421

0.134

0.132

1,114

1.321

2.061

1.257

1.253

2.007

1.100

1.449

2.765

2.052

1.250

1.330

2.723

2.643

2.470

1.346

1.554

3,606

1.497 -0.399

0.697

0.997

0.932

10

■P

S'T-2
o
c
OB-2
0-3

0.339 -0.617 -0.054

Note :

0.477 -2.039

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experience - Less experience).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical "t" values: +1,96 and -1.96
A Complete list of nt" values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-3.
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between these variables and experience, so the difference
in attitudes is attributed to the experience.

The role of

experience and attitudes on power and positions is admitted
ly puzzling, but the researcher's opinion is that the more
experienced safety directors got more "involved*1 with all
aspects of their job and their strong convictions about their
power and position was indicative of this.

TABLE 4-6

Evaluative And Potency D Scores For
Total Full-Time Safety Experience

D Score
Concept
0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

Evaluative

'

.49
.62
.54
.31
.34
.78
.32

Potency
.74
.83
.56
.24
.52
.83
.30

Total Experience in Supervising Safety Personnel
All safety directors, regardless of industry, with less
than eight years of supervisory experience were put in the
low experience group (99) and the others put in the high
i

experience group (109).

As noted in Table 4-7 the more

TABLE 4-7
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
By Total Experience In Supervising Safety Personnel
Bi-Polar Scales
1
0-1

.2

0.916 -0.213

3
1.464

__ 5
2.107

6

7

8

9

10

0.485

0.195

2.516

2.284

2.294

0.975

2.042

2.605

1.986

0.956

2.021

2.563

o.T-1
a>
cB-1

1.637

0.653

1.026

2^97

2._003

1.694

1.625

1.357

0.144

1.240

1.396

1.536

1.430

0.306

0.961

1.906

°B-2

2.858

1.946

1.583

2.463

1.570

1.959

1.858

2.012

o

Note:

----

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experience - Less experience).
Degrees of Freedom:
20o
Critical "t" values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "tM values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-4.
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experienced safety directors had higher scores on the follow
ing concepts:
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
The D scores in Table 4-8 and the semantic profiles in Appendis G, Exhibits 4-22 through 4-28, reveal similar
differences as noted in the previous sections.

But the

attitudes seemed to be more influenced by full-time safety
experience than by experience in supervising safety person
nel.

TABLE 4-8
Evaluative And Potency D Scores For
Total Supervisory Experience
Over Safety Personnel

D Score
Concept
0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

Evaluative
.49
.62
.54
.31
.34
.78
.32

Potency
.74
.83
.56
.24
.52
.83
.30
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Safety Director at Plant
Safety directors with less than 8 years experience as
safety director of the plant at which they worked were
classified as low experienced (129) while the others were
considered as safety directors with more experience (79).
As shown in Table 4-9, the more experienced had stronger
convictions with respect to the following conceptss
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS IN LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS”
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Again, the D scores in Table 4-10 and the semantic profiles
in Appendix G, Exhibits 4-29 through 4-35, show the con
sistency of the more experienced having stronger convictions
on the concepts that differed.

Age
In the chemical, electrical, and transportation industries
the safety directors in the petroleum industry under 43 were
considered young giving a total of 117 young safety directors,
and 91 old safety directors.
The only concepts that differed were*

TABLE 4-9
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
By Years As Safety Director At Present Facility
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0-1

0.958

2.251

1.713

2.092

0.609

0.131

2.163

1.822

1.701

0.082

T-i

2.534

1.285

1.593

0.761

0.811

0.080

0.746

1.271

1.316

1.643

®
o
gB-2

0.129

0.629

1.421

2.104

1.792

1.909

2.561

1.788

1.657

1.351

2.798

2.834

1.852

1.961

1.377

1.971

1.167

2.544

1.877

3.001

0-3

1.766

0.157

0.587 -0.712 -0.757

1.918

0.994

1.024

1.490

2.384

CO

d .T-2

Note:

10

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical nt n values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of nt ’| values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-5.
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"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"

TABLE 4-10

Evaluative And Potency D Scores For Total
Time As Safety Director At Present Facility

D Score
Evaluative

Concept

.69
.51
.47
.40
.56
.82
.40

0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

Potency
.62
.52
.57
.36
.77
.86
.75

But notice the "t" values in Table 4-11 indicate that the
younger had stronger convictions about the first concept
(B-l).

Possibly the stronger convictions on this concept

were more influenced by experience in certain capacities,
such as full-time safety, than by age alone.
The D scores in Table 4-12 and the semantic profiles in
Appendix G, Exhibits 4-36 through 4-42, indicate little
separation of concepts in the semantic space.

Thus, age did

not account for much difference in the attitudes of safety
directors.

i

t

TABLE 4-11
Significant Differences In Connotative
Meanings Of Concepts By Age

Concepts

Bi-Polar Scales
1
B“2 -2 *°95
T-2
Note:

0.075

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

9

10

-0.474

0.230

0.925 -1.091 -0.255 -0.077 -0.635

0.006

0.431 -1.444

1.437

2.091 -0.359

1.030

1.509

0.735

1.061

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (Old - Young).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical nt n values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "t" values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-6.
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TABLE 4-12

Evaluative And Potency D Scores
By Age

0 Score
Concept
0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

Evaluative

Potency

.32
.29
.47
.47
.51
.46
.33

.40
.31
.23
.22
.42
.47
.35

Now that the semantic differential test for the various
groups have been analyzed, the remainder of the chapter will
deal with the correlation analysis and conclusions.

Correlation of Experience To Accident Frequency Rates
The correlation analysis involved correlating each of
the experience classifications to the arithmetic and logarith
mic one-year and three-year accident frequency rates by in
dustry.

There was no significant correlation (r^< .10) in

experience and managerial effectiveness as measured by the
accident frequency rates.
The lack of correlation between accident frequency rates
and the amount of experience indicates that the safety
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directors, based on the experience classifications, were
randomly distributed in the ineffective and effective
classifications.

Thus, both the high and low experienced

were influenced by the high and low accident records.

This

point is important because now it is possible to draw con
clusions about the differences in attitudes based on the
fact that the differences were a result of experience, not
effectiveness.

Conclusions
Based on the analysis in this chapter, the following hy
pothesis is accepted:
Experience affects attitudes on behavioral and
technical concepts and/or the effectiveness of
safety directors.
The amount of experience did affect the attitudes of the
safety directors on the behavioral and technical concepts.
Further, the difference in attitudes among the more experi
enced and less experienced was evidently highly influenced
by the amount of full-time safety work.

But no relationship

was found between experience and effectiveness.
Since the safety directors were randomly distributed in
the effective and ineffective classifications, based on
experiences, an important point arises.

There were
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differences in the attitudes of those with high and low ex
perience, especially with respect to full-time safety work,
so high experience was a factor that accounted for stronger
attitudes bn the part of all safety directors.

Assuming

that the strong attitudes are favorable, then a person with
high experience may be more desirable than one with low ex
perience because of his possible stronger convictions about
the technical and behavioral aspects of accident prevention.
While this chapter was limited to a specific analysis
of the behavioral and technical concepts, any differences in
the attitudes relative to the organizational concepts were
revealed, and some differences were found.

Further analysis

of these differences is made in Chapter V, but suffice it
to say the data indicated at this time that differences in
attitudes were a function of experience.

It is the judgment

of the writer that the more experienced safety directors were
more concerned about safety, and consequently saw their or
ganizational position and power as more important and they
had stronger convictions about this than the less experienced.

CHAPTER V

THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION AND POWER ON
MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND ATTITUDES

Power and organizational position are considered to
be among the variables that upper management has perogative
over and that may influence the effectiveness of safety
directors.^

But there is little agreement among writers as

to what the proper level of each should be to attain the best
results.

This lack of agreement is due mainly to either

the lack of empirical research on the subject or to the con
flicting and incomplete results of the research that has been
performed.
A survey by the American Society of Safety Engineers in
1953 indicated that it was preferable for the safety director
to occupy a high organizational position,

2

but a similar

survey in 1958 revealed the opposite conclusion.

3

However,

^Roland P. Blake, Industrial Safety (third edition,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p.
249.
2"The Safety Engineer in Industry: A Survey," The
Management Review (August, 1955), p. 57.
3E. Peter Marconi, "Today's Safety Engineer in Industry
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the prevailing opinion that is voiced by most writers is
that the ". . . safety engineer or director should report
to someone high enough up in the organization to be respected
and of great influence throughout the company.

. . ."4

Similar confusion also exist with respect to authority
and power because the safety director's position is consider
ed a staff position, consequently safety directors are not
directly responsible for the safety record.

But safety

directors do have indirect authority since they are respon
sible for providing advice and other services to the line
organization.5

It is also recognized that the staff officials

Business, and Government," Journal of the American Society
of Safety Engineers (August, 1960) , p. 40.
^Rollin H. Simonds and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Manage
ment (revised edition, Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
IncT, 1963), p. 62; For other comments see: Russell DeReamer,
Modern Safety Practices (New York: John Wiley 6 Sons, Inc.,
1958) , pp. 325-328, and U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Standards, Safety Subjects (Bulletin No. 67, Washington,
D. C . : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 88-94.
5Robert c. Sampson, The Staff Role in Management (New
York: Harper and Brothers, l9$!>)V This fact is well recognized by the writers in the safety field as noted in: Blake,
o p . c l t ., p. 246; Lewis A. DeBlois, Industrial Safety Or
ganization For Executive And Engineer (London, England:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1926), p. 59-65; DeReamer,
o p . cit., p. 13;
Herbert W. Heinrich,
Industrial Accident
Prevention (third edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 1950), p. 45-49; Simonds and Grimaldi, o p . cit.. pp.
43-55.
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do issue orders to the line in some cases,6 and that when
the staff’s suggestions and advice are
decisions over a period of time.

good, they do become

So,the safety

director

does have power, but there ", . . is no agreement as to
precisely what specific powers the safety engineer should
have."8
The objective of this chapter is to help clarify the
position and power issues discussed above by investigating
the fourth hypothesis which was stated as followst
The organizational position of the safety
director affects the amount of power he
possesses.

Also, the amount of power and

the position of the safety director have
an influence on his effectiveness.
The next section will focus on the relationship of
position and power, and will be followed by a section re
lating these variables to accident frequency rates.
Additionally, a final section will be concerned with any
relationship that might exist between position, power, and

^Earnest Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Or
ganization Structure {New York: American Management Associa
tion, 1952) , pp. 71-76.
7
J ames Mooney, The Principles of Organization (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 34.
O
Simonds and Grimaldi, o p . cit., p. 64.
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attitudes.

This final section is included for two reasons.

The first is that two of the concepts that were tested relate
to organizational position and power.

The second reason, and

perhaps the more important, is that the analysis in previous
chapters, particularly Chapter II, have indicated some rela
tionship in effectiveness and ineffectiveness, and a differ
ence in attitudes.

In view of that, the final section takes

on added significance and will receive thorough attention.

The Relationship Between Organizational
Position and Power
This section is concerned with the question "Is there
any relationship in the organizational position of the safety
director and his power?"

The answer to this question will

serve as a basis for either accepting or rejecting the first
part of the fourth hypothesis.

But before looking directly

at this question, it is necessary to describe the techniques
used in the study to quantify power and organizational
position.

Measurement of Power
Power is defined as

9
. . the ability to do something.”

^Herbert G. Hicks, The Management Of Organizations (New
Yorki McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1967), p. 222.
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Certainly there are other definitions,^ but this definition
provides a useful framework for designing a technique to
measure or quantify power.
The first step in developing the measuring tool was
to devise some questions that would reveal the amount of
power a safety director possessed, as he saw it.

Several

techniques were tried or considered with the result being
the final four questions of the questionnaire in Appendix A.
The reader will notice that the questions do not use the
word "power", but rather used the word "right."

The in

dustry interviews performed in the pre-testing stage of the
questionnaire construction made it clear to the writer that

For other definitions and discussions the following
sources are excellenti
Peter M. Blew and W. Richard Scott,
Formal Organizations (San Franciscoi Chandler Publishing
Company, 1962), pp. 27-40; Dorwin Cartwright (ed.), Studies
In Social Power (Ann Arbor, Michigani The University of Michi
gan, 1959); Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Engle
wood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); John R.
P. French and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," in
Dorwin Cartwright and A. F. Zander (eds.). Group Dynamics
(second edition, Evanston; Row, Peterson and Company, 1960),
pp. 607-623; Robert L. Kahn and Elise Boulding, Power and
Conflict in Organizations (New York: Basic Books, Inc.);
william G. Scott, Organization Theory; A Behavioral Analy
sis For Management (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1967), pp. 200-207; Max Weber, The Theory of Social
and Economic Organization, translated by A. M. Henderson
and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Illinois; Free Press and
Faloon's Wing Press, 1947), p. 152.

131
the safety directors did not like the word "power."11

It was

found that when the word "power" was used, the safety direc
tor simply would not respond in such a manner that the
researcher could establish what they were actually able to
do.

Each director interviewed suggested using the word

"right" and admitted that it would evoke a Response that was
indicative of what they were able to do.

In further pre

testing when the word "right" was substituted, it did, in
fact, stimulate a response that was indicative of the defini
tion of power used in the study.
It was necessary to have four questions with each ques
tion having four alternatives in order to evaluate the power
of the safety directors.

The subjects

covered by the four

questions were chosen because they were considered to be
major areas over which upper management has wide discretion
in granting or allowing the safety director power.

The four

alternative answers for each question were designed to place
the safety director on a continuum with very powerful on one
end and no power on the other end.
Once the questions and alternative answers were con
structed, it was possible to determine a numerical value for

^This phenomenon is not unique to safety directors, as
recognized by other writers. Seer Bertram M. Gross, Or
ganizations and Their Managing (New York: The Free Press,
1968), p. 76i Cartwright, o£. cit., p. 2.
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any responding safety director that was a "measure" of his
power.

The procedure was to assign a value of one to four

for each response according to the following scheme:
1

-

ho right at all

2

-

the

right to advise and recommend

3

-

the

right to advise and recommend, but my re

commendations are actually carried out a
large majority of the time
4

-

the right to require actions.

Thus, the highest summed power value
X power value
que

w sb

4) and the lowest four.

sixteen (4 question
Based on this techni

the power values for the 208 usable respondents were

calculated.

The values varied from sixteen to five and were

logarithmically normal in shape with a geometric mean of
12.75.

Measurement of Organizational Position
The measurement of organizational position was more
objective.

The safety directors used in the study gave

responses to questions four and five in section B of the
questionnaire which revealed their organizational position
and the total levels in the plant organization structure
respectively.

Thus, a safety director could be classified

according to the level he occupied in the plant organization,
and he could be classified according to the total number of

133
levels In the plant organization in which he worked.

A

notation system was used such that 5/3 meant the safety
director worked in a plant that had 5 levels in its organi
zation structure and he occupied a level two steps below
the top man, or the third level.
Once the measurement techniques were established and
the data gathered it was possible to study the relationship
in power and position.

The next section covers that analysis.

Interaction of Power and Position
To determine the relationship in position and power
it was necessary to correlate the two variables, perform a
logarithmic transformation of power, and perform the corre
lation analysis again.

This operation treated the safety

directors as a group, but it was thought that thoroughness
required that the safety directors should be separated ac
cording to the levels in their plant organization and corre
lation analysis performed on each group.

This provided a

study of position both absolutely and relatively.

Few of

the plants had less than four levels in the organization
and few had more than six; consequently, when the safety
directors were separated according to levels in the plant
the classes were (a) four levels or less (64),
levels (85),

(c) and six levels or more (59).

(b) five
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Based on the classification procedure and the loga
rithmic transformations/ a total of eight correlation solu
tions were necessary to analyze the relationship in power
and organizational position.

The highest coefficient of

determination (r2 ) yielded by the analysis was .10.

No

relationship was found between the levels in the plant, the
level of the safety director, and the amount of power the
safety director possessed.

That part of the fourth hypo

thesis which stated such a relationship is clearly rejected.
A possible explanation for the lack of correlation
between position and power may be that the plants with fewer
levels had more decentralized management.

To check this

out, the plant levels were correlated with plant size and
no correlation was found (r2 < .10).

This may be an indica

tion of decentralization and this phenomenon might counter
act any difference in position and power, thus leading to
no correlation between the two.
A discussion of the remainder of the fourth hypothesis,
which is concerned with the influence of position and power
on accident rates, is covered next.

Correlation of Organizational Position and Power to
Accident Records
To correlate organizational position and power to
accident frequency rates, it was necessary to deal with each
industry separately.

Also, the power function and the
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one-year and three-year accident frequency rates were log
arithmically transformed in conjunction with one another
and independently.

The resulting sixteen correlation

solutions yielded no coefficient of determination that was
significant.

There appears to be no relationship among the

variables of position, power, and accident frequency rates.
The remaining question is "Do attitudes differ among
safety directors with varying power and organizational
position?"

This question is the subject of the next section.

The Influence of Position and Power on Attitudes
Since there was no apparent relationship between posi
tion and power, these variables were treated separately in
the analysis of attitudes.

The first portion of this sec

tion will deal with position and the latter with power.

Analysis of Organizational Position
Attitudes seem to be a significant variable that relates
to the effectiveness of safety directors, so the analysis of
position with respect to attitudes was more exhaustive than
was originally expected.

A study of attitudes was made by

comparing semantic differential scores of those safety
directors who occupied different levels in plants that had
the same number of levels in the organization and by
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comparing the scores of safety directors who occupied a high
or low position in a plant classification with those who had
a high or low position in a plant with a different total
organizational level classification.
When the safety directors in plants with the same number
of levels in the organizational structure were treated
separately, the following comparisons were made:
Four Levels or Less
4/2 - 4/3
4/3 - 4/4
4/2 - 4/4

Five
5/2
5/3
5/2

Levels
- 5/3
- 5/4
- 5/4

Six Levels or More
6/3 - 6/4
6/4 - 6/5
6/3 - 6/5

When the safety directors in high and low positions were
analyzed regardless of the levels in the organization struc
ture , the following comparisons were made:
Low
4/4
4/4
5/2

-

Low
5/4
6/5
6/5

Low
4/4
6/5
5/4
4/4
6/5
5/4

- High
- 5/2
- 5/2
- 6/3
- 6/3
- 4/2
- 4/2

High - High
4/2 - 5/2
4/2 - 6/3
5/2 - 6/3

Table 5-1 is a concise summary of the results of the various
comparisons.

Only the codes for the concepts that differed

are presented in Table 5-1, but the Mt N scores for all the
concepts for each comparison appear in Appendix H.
There were obviously some differences in attitudes, but
the reader may notice, after studying Table 5-1, that any
consistency of the differences among the high and low
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TABLE 5-1
Concepts That Showed Significant Differences Based On A
Comparison Of Organizational Positions

Groups Compared
Four Levels Or
Less

Five Levels

Six Levels
Or More

Low To Low
Low to High

High To High

4/2 - 4/3
0-1*
B-2
0-3

4/3 - 4/4
T-2 -

4/2 - 4/4
B-l
0-3

5/2 - 5/3
0-1

5/3 - 5/4
0-2
0-1
T-2
B-2

5/2 - 5/4
0-1
T-2

6/3 - 6/4
B-2

6/4 - 6/5
0-1
T-l

6/3 - 6/5
0-1
T-l

4/4 - 5/4
0-3
4/4
6/3
None

4/4 - 6/5
None
6/5 - 4/2
0-1+
0-1
0-3

5/4 - 6/5
0-2
5/4 - 4/2
T-l
0-3

4/2 - 5/2
T-l
T-2

4/2 - 6/3
T-l
0-3

5/2 - 6/3
0-3

*Concepts listed under a group indicate that the group had
stronger attitudes relative to those concepts.
+The group in 4/2 thought their organizational position was
"good", but didn't feel strong about it while those in 6/5
did not think their position was very good but felt strong
ly about it.
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organizational level comparisons is hard to determine.

This

same problem exists among the attitude differences when the
safety directors in organizations with different levels were
compared.

To help solve the problem all those in high posi

tions (4/2, 5/2, 6/3) and all those in low positions
5/4, 6/5) were compared.

(4/4,

By referring to Tables 5-2 and

5-3, and Exhibits 5-1 through 5-7 it becomes obvious that
those safety directors in the high and low positions thought
the concept "Your Organizational Position" was "good", but
the ones in the high position thought "stronger" about the
"goodness."

Neither group thought the concept "Management

Support For You And Your Department" was "good" or "strong,"
but the safety directors in the low positions placed higher
value on the concept than those in high positions.
After analyzing Table 5-1 and 5-2 the conclusion

was

that the attitudes of safety directors on the technical and
behavioral concepts were independent of the level in the or
ganization they occupied, and independent of the number of
levels in the organization.

However, the organizational

positions and total levels did influence the attitudes of the
safety directors on the organizational concepts 0-1 and 0-2.
With this path covered, the remainder of the chapter is
concerned with power and attitudes.

TABLE 5-2
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
According To High And Low Organizational Position

Concepts

Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

5

0-1

1.203 -0.539

0-2

0.808 -2.464 -1.124 -1.062 -0.348

Note:

1.573

4

6

1.684 -0.700 -1.435
0.800

7

8

9

10

0.225 -0.035

2.126 -0.689

0.643

0.634 -0.081

0.138

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (High - Low).
Degrees of Freedom:
114
Critical "t" values:
+1.98 and -1.98
A complete list of "t" values can be found in Appendix H, Table H-22,
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EXHIBIT 5-1
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful

Important
Wise
Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Legend:

Heavy

Weak .

Strong

Soft .

Hard

"■

Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions

— — —

Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT 5-2
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"

Unimportant
Foolish .
Unsuccessful «
Bad .
False .
Lenient .
Shallow
Light
Weak
Soft

Important
Wise
Successful
Good
True
Severe
Deep
Heavy
Strong
Hard

■

Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions

——

Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions

EXHIBIT

5-3

Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient .

. Severe

Shallow .

Deep

Light

Heavy

Legend:

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

■—

■

— — —

Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions

Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT 5-4
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant
Foolish .
Unsuccessful
Bad .
False

Important
Wise
Successful
. Good
True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow .

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend;

Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions

— — —

Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT 5-5
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
± Important

Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful

Wise
Successful

Bad

, Good

False

True

Lenient .

. Severe

Shallow
Light
Weak
Soft

Deep
Heavy
Strong
Hard
Safety Directors In.High Organizational
Positions

Legend:

— —

Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT

5-6

Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful

Important
Wise
Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Legend:

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard
— ■

—— —

Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions

Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT 5-7
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish .

Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad .

Good

x
False .

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Legend:

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

—

Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions

—— —

Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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TABLE 5-3

Evaluative And Potency D Scores For The
Safety Directors In High And Low
Organizational Positions

D Score
Concept

Potency

Evaluative

0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

0.65
0.42
0.54
0.29
0.42
0.39
0.66

0.64
0.29
0.43
0.85
0.47
0.26
0.68

Analysis of Power
To compare safety directors that had different amounts
of power, it was necessary to divide them into two groups,
those with more power and those with less power.

The geo

metric mean of the power value served as the basis for
dividing the safety directors since the power values were
logarithmically normal.

Therefore, those with a value of

12 or less were classified as having less power

(92) while

those with a power value of 13 or more were classified as
having more power (116).

After classifying the safety

directors, the means and standard deviations were calculated
for each group and then a "t" test was performed.

According

to the decision criteria used in the study, the following
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concepts were found to have higher value and potency to
those safety directors classified as more powerful:
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
The "t" values for concepts that differed are shown in Table
5-4, while the D statistic for all the concepts appear in
Table 5-5.
The semantic profiles in Exhibits 5-8 through 5-14 in
dicate a consistency among the concepts that differed.

The

profiles also reveal the fact that both groups had strong
convictions on all the concepts, except 0-2.

It is inter

esting that there was no statistical significant difference
in the safety directors' attitudes on the concept "Your
Authority and Power."

Doth apparently placed high value on

their power, but the mean values on the potency Beales in
dicated neither group thought very strongly about the value
it had.
It is evident there was a relationship in power and
strong attitudes, but power did not correlate with accident
frequency rates.

It may be that since the safety directors

were in a staff position their personal ability to influence

TABLE 5-4
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
According To Power Held By The Safety Directors
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-1

1.465

1.750

2.759

2*3.69

1.835

2.778

1.842

1.725

3.343

2.177

T-l
m
&B-1
«
c 0-2
o
o
T-2

1.563

1.373

4.039

2.930

3.158

2.791

3.479

2.462

4.714

1.790

2.706

1.257

2.652

2.316

3.070

2-A?i

2»572

3.984

4.045

2.852

0.259

1.057

0 .3S3

0.616

2.670

0.017

1.015

1.872

1.180

0.742

0.613

0.233

2.967

0.345

0.912

1.579

0.897

0.483

0.792 -0.602

B-2

1.365

1.070

2*014

1.798

2.195

0.932

1.671

1.987

2.836

Note:

2.422

Underlined values show significant difference at the .05 level
of significance (More powerful - Less powerful).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical nt n values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "tn values can be found in Appendix H, Table H-23
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TABLE 5-5
Evaluative and Potency D Scores For More And Less
Powerful Safety Directors

Concept
0-1
T-l
B-l
0-2
T-2
B-2
0-3

D Score
Evaluative
.094
1.08
1.20
.78
.56
.81
.30

Potency
.096
1.39
1.39
.45
.37
.85
.64

others was more important than the power they had relative
to the areas considered in the questionnaire. And it is the
researcher's opinion that the strong attitudes associated
with the effective safety directors was beneficial to their
ability to influence others.

Therefore, giving the safety

director power may have value because it strengthens at
titudes.
Conclusions
The following hypothesis is rejectedi
The organisational position of the safety director
affects the amount of power he possesses.

Also,

the amount of power and the position of the safety
director have an influence on his effectiveness.
There was no apparent relationship in power, position, and
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EXHIBIT 5-6
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION1'
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad .

. Good

False

. True

Lenient .

. Severe

Shallow

i Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft .

Legend: —
—— —

Hard

More Powerful Safety Directors
Less Powerful Safety Directors

EXHIBIT 5-9
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
, Important
Unimportant

Wise
Foolish

Unsuccessful

*.

, Good

. True
False .
. Severe
Lenient
. Deep
Shallow ^
, Heavy
Light ..
Strong
Weak .
Hard
Soft .

More Powerful Safety Directors

Legend:

—

Less Powerful Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT

5-10

Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant

^ Important

Foolish .

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False .

True

Lenient .

Severe

Shallow .

Deep

Light

Legend:

Heavy-

Weak .

Strong

Soft

Hard

■■

More Powerful Safety Directors

— — —

Less Powerful Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 5-11
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad .

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Legend:

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

"* — 1 More Powerful Safety Directors
—

-

Less Powerful Safety Directors

EXHIBIT 5-12
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant ,
•j. Important
Foolish .
Wise
Unsuccessful ,
i Successful
Bad .
j\

Good

False .
. True
Lenient .
•, Severe
Shallow .

i Deep
Light .
i HeavyWeak *
i Strong
Soft .
. Hard
Legend:

More Powerful Safety- Directors

-

Less Powerful Safety Directors

EXHIBIT 5-13
Behavioral Profile Two
‘"EMPLOYEES* ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant .

Important

Foolish .

Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad

Good

False

. True

Lenient .

Severe

Shallow .

i Deep

Light

x Heavy

Weak .

Strong

Soft .

Hard

Legend:

~,M ~

More Powerful Safety Directors

— — *

Less Powerful Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 5-14
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish .

Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad

Good

False .

True

Lenient .

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak .

Strong

Soft .

Hard

Legend:

More Powerful Safety Directors
—

Less Powerful Safety Directors
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effectiveness.

However, a study of the semantic differen

tial test did show a relationship in position, power, and
attitudes.
There was a relationship in the attitudes on the con
cepts 0-1 and 0-2 and organizational position of the safety
directors.

The safety directors in high positions had

stronger convictions about the value of their organizational
position, but did not have scores as strong as the safety
directors in low positions on the concept HManagement Sup
port for You and Your Department."

It may be that the

safety directors who were high in the organization were
more desirous of management support or they were aware of
how little support they actually did have.
There was a definite relationship in power and atti
tudes.

The more powerful safety directors had stronger

convictions about the behavioral and technical concepts.
Since power and effectiveness did not correlate, the differ
ences in the attitudes occurred irrespective of the
accident records of the safety directors.

Thus, it appears

that the more power the safety directors thought they
possessed, the stronger were their convictions on the techni
cal and behavioral aspects of accident prevention.

However,

it is recognized it may be that as the safety directors
became more personally committed to their job of accident

prevention they assumed more power than their less committed
coharts.

The analytical techniques used do not indicate

the casual relationship, but it is the opinion of the re
searcher that the power a safety director thinks he has and
his attitudes are interdependent; and his attitudes can be
strengthened on concepts by increasing the power of the
safety director.

The value of strengthening the attitudes

may be that it will ultimately increase the safety directors
ability to influence others.

CHAPTER VI

CORRELATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

Purpose of the Analysis
One of the concerns of this study was the relationship
of selected variables and accident records.

In previous

chapters certain variables were correlated with accident
frequency rates with the result that no meaningful relation
ship was

found to exist.

The questionnaire gathered data

that has

not been related to the accident records, thus,

the purpose of this chapter is to consider all the variables
covered in the questionnaire in relation to the accident
records of the responding companies.

The technique used to

study the relationship was simple and multiple correlation
analysis.
Due to the large number of correlation
were necessary to

problems that

perform the analysis, the format of the

chapter will be to present a concise summary of the variables
that were related, followed by the results and conclusions.

Summary of Correlated Variables
All the variables listed below were intercorrelated,
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that is, correlated with one another, and multiply corre
lated with the one-year and three-year accident frequency
and severity rates.

Additionally, it was necessary to per

form logarithmic transformations on the power value, and
the frequency and severity rates due to their logarithmic
normality.

The industries

(chemical, petroleum, electrical

manufacturing, and transportation) were treated as a group
and dealt with separately in the correlation analysis.
The variables were as follows:
(1 ) age of plant
(2 ) number of employees
(3)

number of engineers working in the safety
ment under the safety director

depart

(4)

total number of subordinates to the safety
director

(5)

organizational position of the safety director

(6 )

total organizational levels in the plant

(7)

total work experience

(8 )

total supervisory experience

(9)

total full-time safety work experience

(1 0 ) total experience as supervisor over safety
(11 )

years as safety director at present plant

(1 2 ) age of safety director
(13)

highest academic degree held by the safety
director
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(14)

years beyond highest academic degree held by the
safety director

(15)

major in college

(16)

power to initiate safety programs and campaigns

(17)

number of levels above the safety director where
actions can be required in initiating safety
programs and campaigns

(18)

power to discipline employees outside of safety
director's department

(19)

number of levels above the safety director where
actions can be required in disciplining employees
outside of the safety director's department

(2 0 )

power to stop a job or any phase of a job outside
of safety director's department

(2 1 ) number of levels above the safety director where
action can be required relative to stopping a job
or any phase of a job outside of the safety
director's department
(2 2 )

power to set safety specifications and/or pro
cedures on such things as plant layout, new
processes, job specifications, and machinery
specifications

(23)

number of levels above the safety director where
actions can be required relative to safety
specifications, and/or procedures on such things
as plant layout, new processes, job specifications
and machinery specifications

(24)

college degree major

(25)

college curriculum the safety director thought
would be most useful for his position

(26)

hours of special courses dealing with the
technical or non-human aspects of accident pre
vention
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(27)

sponsor of the technical courses

(28)

hours of special courses dealing with the be
havioral or human aspects of accident prevention

(29)

sponsor of the behavioral courses

(30)

1967 accident frequency rate

(31)

1964-1966 accident frequency rate

(32)

1967 accident severity rate

(33)

1964-1966 accident severity rate

(34)

total power value

(35)

organizational position considering both the
total levels in the organization and the level
of the safety director

Results and Conclusions
The more than 50 (thirty-one by thirty-one)

intercorre

lation tables did not yield anything but the obvious.

The

only variables that had high coefficients of determination
(r2 > .50) were major in college and college degree major,
the experience classifications and the power values for the
four power areas.

The other variables had intercorrelation

values that were insignificant (r2 < .20).

The multiple

correlation analysis did not result in a coefficient of
determination greater than .31.
It is apparent that no important intercorrelations
existed among the variables considered in this study, and no
significant multiple correlations existed among the considered
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variables and accident records.

If any phenomenon or re

lationship exist relative to the effectiveness of safety
directors, it must be, as far as this study is concerned,
the differences in attitudes.
This completes the analysis of the data which serves
as the basis for the summary, conclusion, and recommendation
presented in the next and final chapter.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

And the end is that the workman shall live to enjoy the
fruits of his labor; that his mother shall have the comfort
of his arm in her age; that his wife shall not be untimely
a widow; that his children shall have a father, and that
cripples and helpless wrecks who were once strong men shall
not longer be a by-product of industry.
P. B. Juhnke

Summary and Conclusions
Due to the interest in engineering in the initial
phases of the safety movement, and the divergent backgrounds
of safety directors 1 today, writers and practitioners in the
safety field are engaged in a lively debate which centers
around the question "What characteristics should a person

^The description of the safety professional by the Ameri
can Society of Safety Engineers and discussion included in
this paper apply to those people in the top safety position
in a plant. This study is limited to those safety profession
als who are the top safety managers in plants; therefore the
term "safety director" was used in place of safety profession
al so as to indicate this fact.
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have to make the best safety director?"

The primary issue

is whether the safety director should be an engineer or a
nonengineer.

But a study of the literature made it evident

to the researcher that empirical research was needed in
order to evaluate many variables that may influence the ef
fectiveness of safety directors.

This was indicated by the

serious consequences of industrial accidents today (14,000
deaths, and 200,000 disabling injuries annually at a cost of
$6 billion) and the lack of empirical research in the area.

Consequently, a primary research project was undertaken to
test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis One:

Safety directors who are more effec

tive have attitudes about certain organizational, technical
and behavioral concepts that are different from the attitudes
of the less effective safety directors.

Also, the more

effective safety directors tend to have stronger convictions
about the technical and behavioral concepts than do the less
effective safety directors.
Hypothesis T w o :

Safety directors with nonengineering

backgrounds have different attitudes about certain technical
and behavioral concepts than those with engineering back
grounds.

Those with nonengineering backgrounds value and

have stronger convictions about the behavioral concepts than
those with engineering backgrounds, and engineers value and
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have stronger convictions about the technical concepts than
nonengineers.

Additionally, there is a relationship between

the college degree held and managerial effectiveness.
Hypothesis Three:

Experience affects attitudes toward

behavioral and technical concepts and/or the effectiveness
of the safety directors.
Hypothesis Four;

The organizational position of the

safety director affects the amount of power he possesses.
Also, the amount of power and the position of the safety
director have an influence on his effectiveness.
The data used to test the above hypotheses was gathered
by sending 583 questionnaires to safety directors in four
industries - Petroleum Refining (SIC Code 28), Chemical

(SIC

Code 2 9 ) , -Electrical Manufacturing (SIC Code 36), and Trans
portation Equipment (SIC Code 37).

The questionnaires asked

the safety directors to take a semantic differential test by
evaluating the following organizational, technical, and be
havioral concepts against ten bipolar adjective scales:
CODE

CONCEPTS

0-1

"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION?

T-l

"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST
ACCIDENTS

B-l

"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION,
PLACEMENT, TRAINING, AND COUNSELING
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"

0-2

"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR
DEPARTMENT"
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CODE

CONCEPTS

T-2

"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF
EQUIPMENT IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"

B-2

"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"

0-3

"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"

Additionally, the questionnaire gathered detailed information
on organization characteristics, educational data, experi
ence of the safety director, and accident statistics.

Of

the questionnaires mailed out, 42.5 percent were returned
and 85+ percent of the returned forms were usable for analy
sis.

The summary and conclusions of the empirical research

follows.

Effective Safety Directors Did Have Different
And Stronger Attitudes
The first step in the analysis of variables was to see
if the attitudes of the safety directors differed on the se
lected organizational, technical and behavioral concepts in
order to test the first hypothesis.

The sampled safety

directors were divided into effective and ineffective classifications based on the geometric mean

of the one-year and

three-year accident frequency rates of each industry.

Then

^The one-year and three-year accident frequency rates
were found to be logarithmically normal.
^The variables age of plant and number of employees
were considered as further basis of division, but it was not
necessary to do so since these variables did not correlate
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the means of the semantic differential scores were tested
for significant difference at the .05 level of significance.
The more effective safety directors had stronger convictions
on the concepts 0-1, T-l, B-l, T-2, and B-2.
hypothesis was clearly accepted.

The first

The more effective safety

directors did have different and stronger attitudes on the
organizational, technical, and behavioral concepts.

Also,

an investigation of the mean scores showed that both groups
had strong convictions on all the concepts except 0 -2 .
Thus the difference in attitudes was due to the more effec
tive safety directors having stronger convictions.
It is the researcher's opinion that the strength of
the convictions by the effective safety directors is an
indication that they were both behaviorally and technically
oriented; and this joint orientation added to the safety
directors* effectiveness.

More basically, the researcher

thinks that the strong attitudes relative to the behavioral
and technical concepts were an indication of the dedication
and commitment of the effective safety directors to their
job.

As the safety directors became more dedicated to or

concerned about accident prevention, the accident rates were

with the accident records. This was attributed to the low
variance of these variables in the sampled population.
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favorably influenced.

It is recognized that more favorable

accident rates probably influence attitudes, that is acci
dent rates and attitudes were interdependent.

The point is,

however, that safety directors may have to be extremely
enthusiastic about their job before the safety records will
be noticeably influenced.

As they become more dedicated

the accident records may be influenced, and then the atti
tudes may be reinforced leading to a spiraling effect on
both attitudes and accident rates.
The researcher could be wrong about the causal relation
ship since the analysis does not necessarily imply causation;
however, it does not preclude causation either.

Therefore,

why should industry take a chance and be passive in influ
encing the attitudes of their safety directors.

It is the

value judgment of the researcher that the companies who desire
better accident records (hopefully all do) should do all
they can to strengthen the attitudes and commitments of the
safety directors toward accident prevention.

The lack of

high mean scores on the concept 0-2 may be an indication
that management was not giving support to the safety direc
tors.

Even if management was giving support, they had not

convinced the safety directors in the study that it was
"good" and "strong."
The analysis of the data in Chapter II raised a ques
tion that went one step beyond the hypothesis to be tested
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in future chapters*

What factors might influence or streng

then attitudes on the tested concepts?

Some possible answers

were revealed in later chapters.
Education Did Not Have A Significant Relationship
To Attitudes Or Effectiveness
Chapter III was concerned with testing the second hy
pothesis which concerned the influence of education on the
attitudes and managerial effectiveness of the safety direc
tors.

In addition to testing the second hypothesis, other

facets of education# such as supplementary courses dealing
with safety# and the level of education# were investigated
to determine any relationship between those variables and
effectivenes s.
The first step in the analysis was to divide the safety
directors into two groups# those with engineering and science
degrees and those with other college degrees.

Then a "t"

test was performed on the mean values of the semantic dif
ferential test for the two groups of safety directors to see
if they had any significantly different attitudes.

The

nonengineers had stronger convictions about the concept T-l#
B—1# and 0-3.

In case of objections about the scientists

being included in the engineer group# the scientists were
excluded from the analysis and the *t” test performed again.
The only concepts that differed then were T-l and B-l and
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the nonengineers had stronger convictions on those two
concepts again,

since the concept 0-3 no longer differed,

this might indicate that the scientists were not as tolerant
of lack of'authority as the engineers, and consequently did
not have as high of an opinion of the authority they did
possess.

This conjecture was enhanced by the fact that no

difference was found in the amount of power among the groups.
An investigation of the mean values on the semantic
differential tests indicated that the groups tested had
good attitudes on all the concepts except 0 - 2 .

Thus, it

appeared that neither the engineers nor nonengineers thought
the management support for them or their department was
"good."
The next step in testing the hypothesis was to correlate
certain educational variables to effectiveness.

The vari

ables were h j h e s t degree held, years beyond the highest
degree, college major, college degree major, hours of
special courses dealing with the technical or non-human
4

aspects of accident prevention, the sponsor of the courses,
hours of special courses dealing with the behavioral or
human aspects of accident prevention, and the sponsors of

4The sponsors were grouped under National Safety Council,
American Society of Safety Engineers, Company, trade groups,
government, and college.
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those courses.

These variables were correlated with the

one-year and three-year accident frequency rates of those
safety directors over a single plant, or several plants in
a single city.

Additionally, each industry was treated

separately in the correlation analysis, and the frequency
rates were correlated both arithmetically and logarithmical
ly.

The results of correlating all the variables and the

logarithms of the frequency rates was that no significant
correlation was found (r

2

< .1 0 ).

Clearly the second hypothesis was rejected.

There

appeared to be no relationship in the college degree, such
as engineer versus nonengineer, and other educational
variables to effectiveness.

The nonengineers did have

stronger attitudes on two concepts, thus they might have a
slight edge in their degree of concern for accident preven
tion.

But it was the researcher's opinion that the educa

tion variable plays a minor role in causing differences in
attitudes when compared to other variables.

The analysis

and conclusions of Chapter III seemed to indicate that
engineers and nonengineers make equally good (or bad) safety
directors.
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Experience Did Influence Attitudes
In order to test the third hypothesis data was gather
ed on the experience of the safety directors based on the
following six classifications:
1.

Total years

of work experience

2.

Total years engaged in a supervisory capacity
over any activity

3.

Total years

engaged in safety work

full-time

4.

Total years
personnel

engaged in supervising

safety

5.

Years as safety director at the present facility

6.

Age

The attitudes of the safety directors were analyzed by
dividing them into the more and less experienced based on
the six classifications.

The median value of experience by

industry was the criteria for division.

The more experienced

safety directors had stronger convictions on the concepts
indicated in the following summary:

Experience Classification

Concepts On Which Attitudes
Differed

1.

Work

0-1, T - 2 , B-2, 0-3

2.

Supervisory

B-l, T-2, B-2, 0-3

3.

Safety Full-Time

0-1, T-l, B-l, T-2, B-2

4.

Supervising Safety

0-1, T-l, B-l, B-2

5.

Safety Director

0-1, T-l, T-2, B-2, 0-3

6.

Age

B-l, T-2
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It was evident that experience influenced attitudes and a
check of the mean scores and linear separation of the
concepts lead the researcher to conclude that the amount of
full-time safety work was the most influential of the
experience variables.
To complete the testing of the third hypothesis it was
necessary to correlate each experience classification to the
arithmetic and logarithmic accident frequency rates.

There

was no significant correlation in experience and managerial
effectiveness as measured by the frequency rates (r^ < .1 0 ).
That portion of the hypothesis tested dealing with ex
perience and attitudes was accepted while the portion con
cerning experience and effectiveness was rejected.

Since

there was no correlation in effectiveness and experience,
the experience classifications were equally affected by the
high and low accident frequency rates in the effective and
ineffective classifications used in Chapter II.

Since the

attitudes of the more experienced were better toward the con
cepts irrespective of the accident rates, it was safe to say
that experience, especially full-time safety experience,
favorably affects attitudes.

This was not to say that safety

directors with more experience were more effective, for they
were not, but rather it indicated that if strong convictions
are desired that actual, or possibly simulated, full-time
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safety experience is favorable.

So as not to over-emphasize

the full-time safety experience classification, it is repeat
ed that the other experience classifications also had an
influence on attitudes.
Power, Position, And Effectiveness Were Not Related
Chapter V was concerned with the role of power and
position in determining the effectiveness of safety directors.
The determination of the relationship was necessary to test
hypothesis four.

The chapter also included an analysis of

any differences in attitudes based on power and position.
The analysis of attitudes was included because of the im
portance they assumed as a result of previous conclusions.
The position classification was based on the level of
the safety director in the plant organization and/or the
total levels in the plant organization .5

Power was defined

as ". . . the ability to do something"** and was quantified
by assigning numerical values to the responses given on the
last four pages of the questionnaire .7

5For a listing of the classifications see Table 5-1.
^Herbert G. Hicks, The Management of Organizations,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19(17), p. 222.
7For a full explanation of how power was classified,
see pages 126 through 159.
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After position and power were quantified, it was pos
sible to correlate the two variables.

The power value was

found to be logarithmically normal, therefore, it was neces
sary to perform a logarithmic transformation on the power
values.

Also, it was necessary to consider position both

from a relative and absolute standpoint.

This was done by

treating the safety directors as a group and also classify
ing them according to the total levels in the plant organi
zation in which they worked.

The resulting correlation

analysis yielded no coefficient of determination above .0 1 .
No apparent relationship was found between the levels in the
plant, the level of the safety directors, and the amount of
power the safety director possessed.

That part of the fourth

hypothesis which stated such a relationship was clearly re
jected.
The remaining correlation analysis that had to be per
formed dealt with power and position and their relationship
to effectiveness.

Thus, position, power, and the logarithms

of power, were tested for correlated with the accident fre
quency rates and the logarithms of the rates by industry.
No significant correlation was indicated by the analysis.
The fourth hypothesis was rejected in total.
But the question of a difference in attitudes among
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the safety directors in different positions and with differ
ent power still needed exploration.

Position was analyzed

first by classifying the safety directors according to their
organizational position and by the total number of levels
in the organization in which they worked.

Twenty-one compar

isons were made between the various classifications with no
clear results.

As a final comparison all the safety direc

tors in very high and very low organizational positions were
compared and the only concepts on which they differed were
0-1 and 0-2.

And again, the groups of safety directors all

had high means on all the concepts except 0-2.

The con

clusion was that the attitudes of the safety directors ap
peared to be independent of the level in the organisation
that they occupied, and independent of the number of levels
in the organization.
The safety directors were divided into two groups
around the geometric mean of their power values so that a
comparison of the more and less powerful safety directors
could be compared.

The more powerful safety directors placed

more value on and thought stronger about the value of the
concepts 0-1, T-l, B-l, 0-2, T-2, and B-2.

Both groups had

strong attitudes on all the concepts, except 0-2, but the
more powerful had much stronger convictions on the concepts
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that differed.

Since power did not correlate with effective

ness, the conclusion was that power influenced attitudes
irrespective of accident frequency rates.

Thus, if stronger

convictions are desired, then it may be possible to streng
then them by giving the safety director more power and
convincing him that he does have more power.

Since power

did not correlate with the accident records, the researcher's
opinion was that personal ability to influence, on matters
other than the areas covered by the questionnaire, was more
important than the power measured in the study.

Also, it

was felt that the attitudes of the effective safety direc
tors might affect their ability to influence, and the value
of giving more power would be to strengthen the attitudes of
safety directors.

Attitudes Evolve As The Important Variable
The last analysis chapter. Chapter VI, completed the
study by performing a simple, multiple and intercorrelation
analysis of thirty-one variables and the one-year and threeyear accident frequency and severity rates.

g

Each industry

was handled separately, and combined with others where ap
propriate.

Logarithmic transformations were formed on power

SSee Chapter VI for a complete list of the variables.
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and the accident statistics.

The highest multiple corre

lation value (r^) was .31, thus, there was no correlation
in the variables tested and accident frequency and severity
rates.

It was obvious that of the variables analyzed, the

attitudes of the safety directors was the most significant.
This conclusion served as a basis for formulating the
recommendations in the next section.

Recommendations
The recommendations of the researcher are aimed at
four groups - the American Society of Safety Engineers, the
upper-level management of companies, individual safety
directors, and other researchers.

The recommendations,

which are judgments of the writer based on research and ob
servation, for each group will be handled in the order given.
It should be recognized that recommendations concerning any
one group has implications for the others.
The American Society of Safety Engineers, which can
be equated with those in the safety field, is given prior
treatment because the research performed in this study is
of direct concern to its members.

First, the writer recom

mends that the Society determine whether it is a "safety"
society or an "engineering" society and base the decision,
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not on what persons would make the best safety profession
als, but on what those in the organization want the Society
to represent.

If they chose to be a safety organization,

then they should truly represent the safety professional by
dropping any differentiation in engineers and nonengineers.
For example, the first step would be to discontinue any work
on Phase Three in which an attempt will be made to register
safety engineers.

After all, this will only serve to put

more emphasis on engineering in safety at the expense of the
behavioral aspects of accident prevention, and to divide the
present membership into the elite group who would qualify for
professionalization and a subordinate group who would not.
By the same token, if the members want an engineering organ*
ization they are responsible for recognizing that they are
serving only a small part of the safety workers, and only
dealing with one aspect of accident prevention.

There is

an advantage to being an engineering group in that the mem
bers can be more specialized and concentrate on the techni
cal aspects of accident prevention.

While

here that the Society1s aims be determined

it is recommended
by its members,

which is only realistic, the researcher sees a safety society
as having more

value to the industrial community

in light of

the heavy toll of accidents today.
The second recommendation to the American Society of
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Safety Engineers concerns the educational program being
developed in Phase Two of their research project.

Two con

clusions of this study were that attitudes may influence
effectiveness and experience influences attitudes irrespec
tive of accident rates.

Would it be possible to simulate

experience in the classroom?

Only more research could

answer that question with high certainty, but the researcher
thinks that experience can be simulated.

It should be

possible to do so through the use of the case method, but
using realistic cases.

Consequently, it is thought that it

would be beneficial for the committee in charge of develop
ing an educational program for safety professionals to not
only design a list of courses, but also to be concerned
about the subject content of certain courses, such as speci
fic safety courses.

Also, it seems obvious that the courses,

recommended should deal with both technical and behavioral
subjects.

However, it is important that the committee move

in some direction rather than have a stalemate over details.
After all, the study indicated that persons with any college
degree make equally good or bad safety directors, so the
most important thing is to get some curriculum instituted
in colleges in order to accomplish the objectives of Phase
Two.

At least a person who is interested in safety can

receive his education in a recognized area by industry and
his profession.
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A final recommendation is for the American Society
of Safety Engineers to encourage more research on the human
element both on a micro and macro basis.

Some suggestions

on specific studies the writer thinks are important are
mentioned'later in this section.
The upper line management of companies have the
responsibility for safety, thus some recommendations are
directed toward them.

It is generally accepted that upper

management should do all they can to make it possible for
the safety directors to advise and assist line management.
No doubt management thinks they are doing this, but the
safety directors in the study did not have "good" attitudes
about the management support.

Thus, it is recommended that

the upper management investigate why this is true and take
feasible action to develop better attitudes on this matter.
The first step might be simply to listen to the safety
director in order to discover the reason for his poor at
titude on management support.

In any case, there should be

something done by management.

Management should be active

in initiating action to strengthen the attitudes of the
safety directors on management support.
A second recommendation to upper management is to
always have people in training for the safety director's
position.

This is suggested because of the role that
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full-time safety experience plays in influencing attitudes.
Too often the safety director is cast into the job right out
of line management without the benefit of safety experience.
Power was another variable that apparently influenced
attitudes favorably, consequently, the third recommendation
is for management to overtly give the safety director as
much power as possible.

This is not to indicate that power

will lower the accident rate directly, but it is believed
that it will strengthen the attitudes of the safety direc
tor, and this may be a prerequisite to better accident re
cords.

It must be remembered that the attitudes were dif

ferent when power was evaluated on the basis of what power
the safety director thought he possessed.

Therefore, the

managers must be sure that safety directors are aware of
any change in his power and management's actions must re
flect the change.
A filial and obvious suggestion to roanagament is to
place someone who is concerned about accident prevention in
the safety director's position.

In fact, this should be one

of the first requirements for the job.

However, in view of

the shortage of people seeking positions in safety, the
first thing to do to get persons to think about safety may
be to give the job certain characteristics as status.

185
importance, power, etc.
The advice given to safety directors is to recognize
the fact that attitudes seem to be associated with effec
tiveness, thus a technical and behavioral orientation is
beneficial.

If the safety director is weak in one of the

areas, he should take action formally through courses or
informally through self study to strengthen himself.

It is

recognized however that this is a personal thing on which
future study is needed to see what would change attitudes.
But the safety director being aware of the influence of at
titudes should be beneficial if for no other reason than
his becoming concerned about the attitudes of his subor
dinates, and hopefully his own.
It is recommended that researchers perform empirical
studies concerning the following problem areas:
(1)

Do attitudes of safety directors differ among
the highly technical firms and less technical or
service oriented firms?

To explore this question

it would be necessary to sample industries, such
as the ones used in this study, and other
industries, such as telephone companies, and
other utilities.

(2)

What influence does technical and behavioral
courses have on changes in attitudes?

The

answer to this question could be facilitated

1-16
with a series of tests and control groups.
(3) What are some other important variables that
influence attitudes?
variables?

How influential are the

How long does their effect last?

The use of depth interviewing and testing
should prove valuable in studying these issues.
(4)

Why do safety directors have weak attitudes
relative to management support for them and
their department?

What influence does the

attitudes of upper management have on the
attitudes of safety directors?

Does the

philosophy of upper management filter down to
the safety director and below?
(5)

What are the sources of power of safety direc
tors?

Can the safety director change his

power and if so, why doesn't he do so?

What

effect does an increase in power of the safety
director have on line management and workers?
The list of recommendations could, no doubt, continue,
but the above issues are considered to be worthwhile.
Most of them revolve around the puzzling area of "from
where do attitudes come?," thus, a logical next step is
depth interviews in industry to help answer this question.
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The researcher believes answers to the above questions will
result in reduced accident rates.

It is hoped that the

findings given in this study will ultimately reduce industrial accidents.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE

Lo u i s i a n a
AND

S tate

AGRICULTURAL

BATON

ROUCE

AND

U niversity

MECHANICAL

• LOUISIANA
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COLLEOK

• 7OS0J

C o lle g e o f B u sin e ss A d m in is tr a ti o n
departm ent

o p

managem ent

an d

MARKETI NG

September 2 7 ,

1968

Dear Sir
What factors Influence the effectiveness of a safety director in
accident prevention?
Is one's university degree, organizational position,
or orientation to problem solving important?
1 am attempting to answer these types of questions in my doctoral
dissertation research at Louisiana State University and I need your help.
Basically, 1 am trying to relate certain factors in a safety director's
background and environment to accident statistics.
Enclosed is a questionnaire designed to provide data for my research.
Will you please take fifteen minutes of your time to complete this form
and return it to me?
I can assure you that my analysis of the data will
be completely statistical and there will be no attempt to identify any
respondent.
Also, 1 will gladly share my results with you upon request.
Perhaps, with your help, I will be able to make a positive contribution
to the field of safety management.
Your prompt reply will certainly be ap
preciated.

HJB/jem
Enclosure

A M E R IC A N S O C IE T Y OF S A F E T Y E N G IN E E R S
• t o ftustfc «i<iN*fcv ■ f a s s m u G i. t t u i a o i t w o M * t i l c pho*< l i t j ) M j t j f \

O c t o b e r 14,

196 8

D e a r F e l l o w Mem b e r ;
Y o u r S o c i e t y is a n d h a s b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d
p r o m o t i o n of the S a f e t y P r o f e s s i o n .
A s p a r t of a c a r e f u l l y
p l a n n e d p r o j e c t , w o r k has b e e n s t a r t e d o n the d e v e l o p m e n t of
e d u c a t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s t h a t w i l l a s s i s t e a c h of us to i n c r e a s e
our competence.
Mr. H y l e r B r a c e y is w o r k i n g o n a d i s s e r t a t i o n w h i c h i n c l u d e s an
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f c e r t a i n f a c t o r s t h a t m a y i n f l u e n c e the s a f e t y
professional's effectiveness.
T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d be a g o o d
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the w o r k o f the S o c i e t y .
It is o u r o p i n i o n this
is a w o r t h w h i l e u n d e r t a k i n g a n d h o p e y o u w i l l a s s i s t Mr. B r a c e y
b y p r o v i d i n g the d a t a r e q u e s t e d .
Sincerely,

w
President
WES/re
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INSTRUCTIONS
One purpose of this study Is to measure the meaning of certain concepts to
safety directors.
In order to accomplish this objective you are asked to judge
these concepts'against a series of descriptive scales.
In taking this test, please
make your Judgments on the basis of what these things mean to y o u . On each page
you will find a different concept to be Judged and beneath it a set of scales.
Here is how you are to use these scales:
If you think the concept at the top of the page is very c 1osely related
one end of the scale, place your mark in the following manner:
Cood

X

:

:

Cood _____ ;

:

:
:______ :_____
or
;______ ;______:
: X

:

to

Bad
Bad

If you think the concept is quite closely rela ted to one end of the scale
(but not extremely), mark as follows:
Good

:

X

:______ :_____ :______ :______ :______ Bad
or
Cood ______:_______:______ :_____ :
: X
;_____ Bad
If the concept seems only slightly rela ted to one side (but is not neutral),
mark as illustrated below:
Good

:______ :

X

:

:

t

:

Bad

:

:

Bad

or
Cood ______ :_______:______ :

: __ X

The extreme toward vhich you mark depends upon which extreme seems the moat
characteristic of the proposition being Judged,
If you think the concept is neutra 1
with respect to a particular scale or that a given scale is completely irrelevant,
place your mark in the middle space.
Good
IMPORTANT:

:

:

: X

:

:

:

Bad

Please mark in the center of the apace.
T h i s ______ :______ :_____ : X
:______ :______ :_____
Not T h i s
:_______:_____ :______ :
X
:_____

None of the concepts will be repeated, so please do not look back and forth
through the items and do not try to remember how you marked associated items in
the questionnaire.
Make each item _* separate and independent judgment.
You are encouraged to work at a fairly high rate of speed.
Do not be puzzled
over individual Items; it is your first impression that is important.
On the other
hand, please work carefully so that the true impressions may be revealed.
The concluding pages of the questionnaire are designed to obtain some extremely
important data.
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.

"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant
Wise
Unsuccessful

Important
Foolish
Successful

Good

Bad

True

False

Severe
Shallow
Light

Lenient
Deep
Heavy

Strong

Weak

Soft

Hard
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.

"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant
Wise

Unsuccessful

Impor tant

Foolish
Success ful

Good

Bad

True

False

Severe
Shallow
Light

Lenient
Deep
Heavy

Strong

Weak

Soft

Hard
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.

"EMPHASIS OH EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT,

TRAINING, AND COUNSELING

IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimpor tant
Wise
Unsuccessful

Xmpor tant
Foolish

Su ccessfu l

Good

Bad

True

False

Severe
Shallow
Light

Lenient
Deep
Heavy

Strong

Weak

Soft

Hard

Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.

"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant ____
Wise
Unsuccessful

Important
— __ Fooliah
Successful

Good

Bad

True

False

Severe
Shallow
Light

Lenient
Deep
Heavy

Strong

Weak

Soft

Hard

Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.

"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
U n i m p o r t a n t ______ :_____:______
Wise ______ :_____ :______
U n s u c c e s s f u l ______ :_____:

:

:_____:______

:_______:

Important

:______ Foolish

:______ :_____:______

Successful

Good ______:_____ :______

:_______:_____:______ Bad

True

:_______:_____:______

:_____:______

S e v e r e ______ :_____:

;

False

:_____:______ Lenient

S h a l l o w ______ :_____:______

:______ :_____:______

Deep

Light ______ :_____ :______

:______ :_____:______

Heavy

S t r o n g ______ :_____:______
Soft

:

:

;_____:______ Weak

:

:

:

Hard
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to whac the
following concept means to you.

♦'EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE M O S T ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant
Vise
Unsuccessful

Important
Foolish
Successful

Good

Bad

True

False

Severe
Shallow
Light

Lenient
Deep
Heavy

Strong

Weak

Soft

Hard

Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.

"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant
Wise
Unsuccessful

Impor tant
Foolish
Successful

Good

Bad

True

False

Severe
Shallow
Light

Lenient
Deep
Heavy

Strong

Weak

Soft

Hard

QUESTIONNAIRE
Industry Dsts
1.
2.

3.

4.

I a™ working In the following Industry;
My responsibility Is exercised in: (check one)
(

)

s single plant.

(

)

a number of plants In s singlecity.

.

( ) other (please specify)
The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment In our plant is

The
(
(
(

.
year

total nunfcer of employees in 2 above who ere served by my safety work la I
) under 200.
( ) 1001-1500.
( ) 2501-3000.
) 201-500.
( ) 1501-2000.
( ) 3001-3500.
) 501-1000.
( ) 2001-2500.
( ) 3501 or more.

Safety Department Date
1.
2.

3.

4.

Are you involved in safety work on a full-time basis?
( ) Yes
( ) No
How many people are there in your department that are engaged in safety work,
excluding yourself?
Full-Time
Part-Time

Engineers and Inspectors
Medical

_________

Fire

__________

_________

Clerical
Oth*r■ (please specify)

_ _ _ _ _

_________

_________

If you had to characterize your most Influential subordinate's orientation to
accident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily: (check one)
( ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
( ) with human aspects of accident prevention.
The titles of those above ms in the chain of command of the plant In which I
work are:
EXAMPLE
(1) ________________________________________
(1) plantmanager
(2)
(2) personnel director
(3) ________________________________________(3)
me
(4) ________________________________________
(5) _______________________________________

(6) __________________________
(7) ________________________________
5.

How many levels of msnageiMnt era there from ths top executive to the foremen
in your plant?
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive

/--- 1-- 7
(2) Production
Manager
/
Supervisors

(3)

H

(4) Heed of
Processing

/
(5) Foreman

6.

— i

L__/

Example Answer:

5_____

The annual expenee budget of my department that relates to the safety function
la approximately i
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2
C.

Your Experience

b.
0.

Tot.il yc.irs of work experience:
years,
Total
years cng.-igvd in a supervisory capacity over any activity:
Total
years engaged tn safety work full-time: ___________ years.
Total
years engaged in supervising safety personnel:
years.
How long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now
work? ___________ years.
Your age: ___________ years,

years.

Education and Training
My
(
(
(
(
In

J.

highest degree held is: (check one)
) elementary school.
) high school,
) college.
) graduate school.
add it ion to the degree indicated above, 1 have completed:
years of collage beyond my high school diploma.
___________ years of college or graduate school beyond roy bachelors degree.
years of graduate school beyond my masters dsgree.
If you attended college at any time, what was your major; and if you graduated,
what degree did you receive?
Major in College

4.

5.

Degree (if received)

Do
(
(
(
Do
(

you feel that for your position a collage degree la: (check one)
) necessary?
) useful?
) not needed?
you feel that for your position an engineering degree is: (check one)
) necessary?

(

) useful?

( ) not needed?
6 . What college curriculum would be mostuseful for your position? ___________________
7.
Have you had any special courses dealing with thetechnical or non-human aspecta
of accident prevention?
( ) Yes
( ) ho
If yes, how many hours of instruction? __________ hours.
Who was the sponsor?
How would you rate the training? (check one)
( ) very beneficial to my Job
( ) beneficial to my job
( ) slightly beneficial to my Job
( ) s waste of time
8 . .Have you had any special courses dealing with thebehavioralor human aspects of
accident prevention?
( ) Yes
( ) Ho
If yes, how many hours of instruction? _ _ _ _ _ hours.
Who was the sponsor?
How would you rate the training? (check one)
( ) very beneficial to my job
( ) beneficial to my Job
( ) slightly beneficial to my Job
( ) e waste of tlsM
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3

E.

My Plant's Accident Record
Disabling injury experience computed according to USAS1 Standard Z16.1

1. Dlsabltrg Injury frequency rate:
2. Dleabling Injury aeverity rate:
3. Average daye loet per dleabling
Injury:
F.

Average Reported for
Year* 1966, 1963, and 1966
^

_

_______________

Your Authority
1.

2.

3.

6.

C.

For Calendar
1967
____________

Whet right do you have in Initiating tafaty program* and campaigne7 (check one)
(
) the right to require actions
(
) the right to advlac and recommend, but my recommendation* ere actually
carried out a large mo tor 1ty of the time
(
) the right to adviee and recommend
( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require ectiona, which of your auperior* ha*
thla right?
.
What right do you have relative to the dlaciplina of employaea outeld* of your
department? (check one)
(
) the right to require action*
(
) the right to advice and recommend, but my recommendation* are actually
carried out a large m e 1ority of the time
(
) the right to adviee and reconmend
( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your auperiora hai
thla right?
.
What right do you have to stop a Job or any phase of a job outaide of your
department that you consider hazardous? (chack one)
( ) the right to require actlona
( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large majorltv of the time
( ) the right to advise and recommend
( ) no right at *11
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superIo t s has
this right?
.
Wist right do you have to sat safety apeclflcationa and/or procedures on such
thing* *a plant layout, new process**, job specifications, end machinery
specifications? (check one)
( ) the right to require action*
( ) th* right to advise end recommend, but my recomawndationa are actually
carried out a large re*lority of the 11dm
( ) the right to advise and reconand
( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
thla right?
.

Homographlc Data

Name__
Titl# _
Address

APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES BY INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION
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QUESTIONNAIRE
A,

Industry Oats
1.

I an working in the following industry:

Transportation Equipment

2, My responsibllity is exercised in; (check one)
j'"( ) a single plant.
V? 2■ 5( ) a number of plants in asingle city.

B.

27. 5( / other (please specify) _____
3. The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant 1* _ _ _ _ yaars.
A. The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by sty safety work is:
0.0( ) under 200.
5.0< > 1001-1500.
2 . 5( ) 2501-3000.
0.0. ) 201-500.
1 0 . 0( ) 1501-2000.
5.0( ) 3001-3500.
7 . 5( ) 501-1000.
1 0 . 0( ) 2001-2500.
6 0 . 0( ) 3501 or more.
Average Number of employees
- 3000
Safety Department Data

100 .0
1.
2.

Are you Involved in safety work on a full-time basis?
( ) Yes
( ) No
How many people are there in your department that are engaged in safety work.
excludinn yourself?
Full-TimePart-Time
Engineers and Inspectors
3. 9
_________
Medical
______
Firs

_____________

Clerical
Others (plaase specify)

6.8

T otal
3.
*NR15.
32.
52.
4.

10-7

If you had to characterise your most influential subordinate’s orientation to
Oaccidsnt prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily: (check one)
5{ ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
5 ( ) with human aspects of accident prevention.
The titles of those above me In the chain of command of the plant in which 1
work are:
EXAMPLE
(1)
(1) plant manager
(2)
7.5
(2) personnel director
(3)_____ 47.5______________________________
(3) me
(4)
30.0
M e a n - 36_______________
(5)_____ 10.0______________________________
(6)

5,

_____________

_______

2.5

(7)
2.5
Bow many levels of management ere there from the top executive to the foreman
in your plant? __________
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive
3
5.0
/
4 - 17 . 5
/
7
5
32. 5
<2) Production
6
25.0
Manager
7
7.5
/
8
5.0
/
7
9
5.0
(3) Supervisors

r - 1—

!

(4) Head of
Processing

/
(3)

6.

Foremen

{— j
Kxampla Answer:

3

The annuel expense budget of my department chat relates to the safety function

is approximately

*K R - No Response
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2
C.

Your Experience
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

0.

Total years of work experience:
year*.
Total years engaged in a supervisory capacity over anyactivity;
1 4 . 0 years.
Total years engaged in safety work full-time;
14 ..0
yean.
Total years engaged in supervising safety personnel:
10.0
years.
How long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now
work?
7. S
year*.
Your age:
4 5 .0
years.

Education and Training
1.

My
(
42. S(
4 7 . 5(
1 0 . 0(
2. _In
_ _

3.

highest degree held is: (check one)
) elementary school.
) high school,
) college.
) graduate school,
add 1 1 ion to the degree indicated above, I have completed:
_______ years of college beyond my high school diploma.
year* of college or graduate school beyond my bachelors degree.
___________ year* of graduate school beyond ray masters dsgres.
If you attended college at any time, what was your major; and if you graduated,
what degree did you receive?
None
17.5
42.5
Major in College
Degree (if received)

,0
■ ■ ¥ --- -----Science
10. 0
Science
5.
Nonenqineer
47.5
Nonenaineer
30.
4. Do you feel that for your position a college degree is: (check one)
35.0 ( ) necessary?
55. 0(
) useful?
1 0 .Q (
) not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an engineering degrse is: (check one)
1 2 .5 ( )necessary?
N R
- 2.5
77.5 ( ) useful?
Engineer
-60.0
10.0 ( )not needed?
Science
- 5.0
6 . What college curriculum would be most useful for your position? N o n s n a i n eer-3fi. Q
7. Have you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non-human aspects
of accident prevention? 7 2 . $ Yes 22. t ) No
If yes, how many hour*
ofinstruction? 61
hours.
Who was the sponsor?
.
How would you rate the training? (check one)
College
- 45.2
54.8 (
) very beneficial to my job
Trade
- 6.5
39. 8 (
) beneficial to my Job
NSC, A S S E
- 25.8
6.4 (
)slightly beneficial tomy job
Company
- 19.4
0.0 (
) a waste of time
Government
- 3.2
8 . Have you had any special course* dealing with the behavioral or human aspects of
accident prevent ion?57( 5 ) Ye*40.0( ) No
If yes. how many hour*
ofInstruction?is
houra.
Who was
the sponsor?
How would you rats the training? (check one)
College
- 39.2
56.5
<
)
very beneficial to my job
Trade
0.0
34.8
(
)
beneficial to my Job
NSC, A S S E
- 21.8
8.7 (
) slightly banaficlal to my job
Company
- 34.8
0.0 < ) a waata of time
Government
- 4.3
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E.

My Flint1a Accident Record
Disabling Injury experience computed according to USASI Standard Z16.1
For Calendar
1967
5.06______
389

1. Diaabling Injury frequency rate:
2. Diaabling injury aeverity rate:
3. Average daya loat per diaabling
injury:_______________________________ ____________
7.

Average Reported for
Yeara 1964, 1965, and 1966
5.71
370
~

Your Authority
1. VJhat right do you have in initiating safety program* and campaign*? (check one)
5 0 . 0(
) the right to require actions
37. S(
) the right to adviae and recommend, but my recommendat Iona ere actually
c a n led out a larce malority of the time
1 0 . 0( ) the right to adviae and recommend
0. 0 ( ) no right at all
If you don1t have the right to require action*, which of your superiors ha*
thi* right?
.
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your
department? (check one)
32. 5(
) the right to require actions
40.0(
) the right to advise and recommend, but my recoenendationa are actually
carried out a large majority of the time
15.0 (
)the right to adviae and reconmend
10.0 (
)no right at all
If you don't have the right to require action*, which of your superior* ha*
this right?
.
3.
What right do you have to atop a Job or any phase of a Job outside of your
department that you consider hazardous? (check one)
72.5 (
)the right to require action*
15.0 (
)the right to advise and recommend, but my recomendatlons are actually
carried out a large malority of the time
10.0 (
)the right to advise and recommend
0.0 (
)no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
4.
What right do you have to set safety specifications and/or procedures on such
thing* as plant layout, new processes, Job specificstions, and machinery
specifications? (check one)
57.5 (
)the right to require action*
17.5 (
)the right to advise and recommend, but my recoenendatton* are actually
carried out a large melorltv of the tints
22.5 (
)the right to adviae and reconmend
0.0 {
)no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.

C.

Demographic Data
Name _ _
Title _
AddreaT
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QUESTIONNAIRE
A.

Industry Data

1.

I an working In the following industry: _
Petroleum_Refining
My responsibility is exercised in: (check one)
( ) a single plant.
Cl- 0 ( )a number of plants in asingle city.
39. 0 ( ) other (please specify) ______________
3. The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant is
years.
4. The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by ray safety work is:
3. 2 ( ) under 200.
6.5 ( ) 1001-1500.
3 .2 f ) 2501-3000.
19. 4 ( ) 201-500.
6.5 ( ) 1501-2000.
3 , 2( ) 3001-3500.
25. 8 ( ) 501-1000.
9.7 ( ) 2001-2500.
22. 6 ( ) 3501 or wore.
A v e r a g e N u m b e r O f E m p l o y e e s - 1678
Safety Department Data
2.

100.0

1.
2.

Are you involved in safety work on a full-time basis?
( ) Yea
( ) No
How many people are there in your department that are engaged in safety work,
exclud ing yourself?
Full-Time
Part-Time
Engineers and Inspectors
? ts
_ _ _ _ _
Medical
_________
_________
Fire
_________
_________
Clerical
_________
_________
Others (please specify)
2,36
__________ Total________
5.10
_________
3. If you had to characterize your roost influential subordinate*s orientation to
N R * 1 6 . 1 accident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily: (check one)
16.1 ( ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
67,7 ( ) with human aspects of accident prevention,
4. The titles of those above me in the chain of comnsnd of the plant in which I
work are:
EXAMPLE
(1) plant manager
(1)
(2) personnel director
(2)
22-6
(3) me
.Haan.
2.37
(4)
19-4
(5)

(6)

O)
How many
_

5.

levels of management are there from the top executive to the fores
in your plant?
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive
3
3.2
X
7
4
35. 5
(2) Production
48.4
5
M e a n - 4.74
Manager
6
9.7
7
3.2

r S

(3) Supervisors
/

1

(4) Head of
Processing

X
(S)
6.

/
Foreman

f
Example Anawer:

X

The snnua1 expense budget of ay department that relates to the safety function
la approximately •
Qmit

•NR - N o Ranponsm
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2
C.

Your Experience
1.

Total years of work experience:

2.
3.
4.
5.

Total years engaged in a sopcrvisory capacity over any activity:
Total years engaged in safety work full-time:
11.7
year*,
Total years engaged in supervising safety personnel:
7.6
years.
How long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now
work?
7 .B
year*.
Your age: 4 6 . 4 5
year*.

6.

D.

years.

yeara,

Education and Training

1.

My highest degree held is: (check one)

(
2 5 . 8(
7 1 . 0<
3.2(
2. _l_n

3.

) elementary school,
) high school.
) college.
) graduate school,
add it ion to the degree Indicated above, I have completed:
year* of college beyond my high school diploma.
___________ years of college or graduate school beyond my bachelors degree.
__________ years of graduate school beyond my master* degree.
If you attended college at any time, what was your major; and if you graduated,
what degree did you receive?

None

16.1

Major in College

Enqineer
Science
Nonenqineer

None

25.8

Degree (if received)

_3.5t5._
22.6
25.8

Enoineer
Science
Nonenaineer

.32.3
19.3

22.6

4. Do you feel that for your position a college degree fa: (check one)
54. 8( ) necessary?
3 8 . 7( ) useful?
6.5( ) not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an enginearing degree lei (check one)
22.6
() necessary?
N R
- 3.2
6 7 . 7(
) useful?
Engineer
- 80.6
9.7(
) not needed?
Science
- 0.0
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your position?
7. Have you had any special course* dealing with the technical or non-huatan aspect*
of accident prev»ntion?71£ 0 ) Yes 29.0 ) No
If /e*, how many hours or Instruction?
46
hour*.
Who was the sponsor?
.
How would you rate the training? (check
one)
C M lege
- 36.3
5 9 . 1{
) very beneficial to my Job
Trade
4.5
36.3
{) beneficial to my Job
NSC, A S S E
- 13.6
4.5(
) slightly beneficial to my Job
Company
- 36.6
0.0{
) a waste of time
Government
9.1
8. Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human aspects of
accident prevention? 6 X 7) Yes 32. X
) No
If yes■ how many hours of instruction?
39
houra.

How would you rate the training? (check one)
) very beneficial to nry Job
) beneficial to my Job
0.0 ( ) slightly beneficial to my Job
0.0( ) a waate of time

52. 5 (
47 . 5 (

*

College
Trade
NSC, A S S E
Company

- 38.1
9.5
- 14.3
- 36.8

Government

-

4.8
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E,

My Plant'* Accident Record
Diaabling Injury experience computed according to USASI Standard Z16.1

1. Diaabling Injury frequency rate:
2, Diaabling injury aeverlty rate:
3. Average day* loat per diaabling
Injury:

F.

For Calendar
1967
5 - 2 6 ____

404

Average Reported for

Year* 1961., 1965, and 1966
7,20

703~

Your Authority
1. What right do you have in initiating aafety program* and campaign*? (check one)
3 2 . 3(
) the right to require actions
64. 5(
) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large maloritv of the time
3.2( ) the right to adviae and recommend
0. Q( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superior* has
thla right?
.
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your
department? (check one)
2 2 . 6(
) the right to require actions
25. 8(
) the right to adviae and recoamend, but my recoenendstiona are actually
carried out a large malorltv of the time
29, 0( ) the right to advise and recoaaaend
22. 6( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require action*, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
3. What right do you have to atop a Job or any phase of a Job outside ofyour
department that you consider hazardous? (check one)
4 8 , 4( ) the right to require actions
3 5 . 5( ) the right to adviae and recommend, but my recomsandatlona are actually
carried out a large malorttv of the time
16. 1( ) the right to adviae and recommend
0 . Q( ) no right s t a l l
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
4.
What right do you have to set aafety specifications and/or procedures on such
thing* as plant layout, new processes. Job specifications, and machinery
apaciflest Iona? (check one)
35. 5( ) the right to require actlona
4 8 . 4( ) the right to advise and recon»end, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large matori tv of the time
1 6 . 1( ) the right to advise and recommend
0.0( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require act lone, which of your super lor a ha*
this right?
.

C.

Demographic Data
Hama __
Titl* _
AddTeae
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QUESTIONNAIRE
A.

■

Industry Data
1. I am working In the following industry: Electrical Manufacturing
2. My responsibility is exercised in: (check one)
/■—
(
) a single plant.
l ? 2 . 0(
) a number ofplants in a single city.
28. Of ) other (please specify)
.
3. The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant is
years,
A, The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by my safety work is:
3.1( ) under 200.
12. 5( ) 1001-1500.
9 . 4( ) 2501-3000.
3. If
) 201-500.
9.4( ) 1501-2000.
6.3< ) 3001-3500.
0.0(
) 501-1000.
9.4( ) 2001-2500.
4 6 . 9( ) 3501 or more.

B.

Safety Department Data

1 00.0
Are you involved in aafety work on a full-time basis?
( ) Yes
( ) No
How many people ere there in your department that are engaged in aafety work,
excludtna yourself?
Full-Time
Part-Time
Engineers end Inspectors
3.25_____ _________
Medical
_________
_________
Fire
_________
_________
Clerical
_________
_________
Other a (please specify)
3.22
__________ T o t a l ______________
6-^7
_____
3. If you had to characterize your most influential subordinate's orientation to
N R * 6 . 3 accident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily: (check one)
31 . 3 ( ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
62. S ( ) with human aspects of accident prevention.
A. The titles of those above me in the chain of comaand of the plant in which I
work are:
_
EXAMPLE
(1)
(1) plant swnager
(2)
15.6
(2) personnel director
(3)
31.3
M e a n - 3.59_____________
(3) me
<4)
37. 5________________________________
<5)
12.5________________________________
1.
2.

(6)
(7) ___________________________________
5,

How many levels of management are there from the top executive to the fori
in your plant?
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive
3
3.1
/
4 - 21.9
/
7
5
43. 8
M e a n - 5. 1 9
(2) Production
6
18 . 8
Manager
7
9.4
/
8
3.1
/
7
(3) Supervisors

/

7

(A) Head of
Processing

L___
/

(5) Foreman

6.

/

Example Answer;

5

The annual expense budget of my department chat relates to the safety function
is approximately B
Omit
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2
C.

Your Ex per iciicc
t,

Tot.il years of work uxpcr ionce:

2.

Total years cng.iged In a supervi sorv capacity over any activity:
13.5
Total years engaged in aafety work full-time:
12.8
year*.
Total years engaged in supervising safety personnel:
8. 9
years.
How Long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now
work?
6 . 6____ years.
Your age;
4 6.6
years.

3.
4.
5.
6.
P.

23.7

year#.

I

Eduration and Training
1,

years.

My highest degree held is: (check one)
( ) elementary school.

46. 9(

) high school.

28. 1( ) col lege.
21. 9(

2.

].

) graduate school.

_In addition to the degreeindicated above,
1 have completed:
years of college beyondmy
high school diploma.
years of college or graduate school beyond my bachelors dagraa.
years of graduate school beyond my masters dagraa.
If you attended college at any time, what was your sujor; and If you graduated,
what degree did you receive?
None
21. 9
None
46.9
Major in College
Degree (if received)
Engineer
31.3
Engineer
22.1

Science
3.1
Nonenaineer 43.8

Science
J.i
Nonengineer 28.2

4.
Do you feel that for your position a collage degree is: (check one)
25. (X ) necessary?
7 1 . 9( ) useful?
0.0( ) not needed?
5. Do you feci that for your position an engineering degree is: (check one)
9.4( ) necessary?
N R
- 9.4
8 1 . 3( )useful?
Engineer
- 5 0.0
6.X
) not needed?
Science
- 3.1
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your position? N o n e n g i n e e r — 37.5
7. Hnve you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non-humsn aspects
of Occident prevent ion? 8)(. 3) Yes 3 ® ’7 ) jjt,
tf yes, how many hours of instruction?
hours.
Who was the sponsor?
.
How would you rate the training? (check one)
College
- 19.2
38.X
) very beneficial to my job
Trade
- 7.7
5 7 . 8( ) beneficial to my job
NSC, A S S E
— 26.8
3.X
) slightly beneficial to my Job
Company
- 30.8
0.0(
) a waste of time
Government
- 15.4
8. Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human eapecte of
accident prevention?S9( g) Yea 3 1 . X
) No
If yes■ how many hours of instruction?
hours.
Who was the sponsor?
.
How vouLd you rate the training? (check one)
3 6 . 8( ) very beneficial to my Job
College
- 26.4
5 8 . 0( ) beneficial to my Job
Trade
- 5.3
O.tX
) slightly beneficial to my job
NS C , A S S E
- 26. 4
5.X
) e waste of time
Company
- 36. 9
Government

■*

5.3
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E.

My Plant’s Accident Record
Diaabling injury experience computed according to USAS1 Standard 216.1
For Calendar

1, Diaabling injury frequency rate:

1967
2.3 5

2. Diaabling injury severity rate:

166

3. Average days lost per disabling
injury:
F.

Average Reported for

Year* 1964. 1965, and 1966
2.10
102

_____

Your Authority
1. What
5 0 . 0( )
43. 8( )

right do you have in initiating safety programsand campaigns? (check one)
the right torequire actlona
the right to
adviee and recommend, but
my recommendationsare actually
carried out a large malorltv of the time
6.3( ) the right to advise and recommend
0 . 0( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, vhLch of your superiors has
this right?
.
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside ot your
department? (check one)
25. 0( ) the right to require actions
34. 4( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large malorltv of the time
37. 5( ) the right to adviae and recomnend
3.1( ) no righ t a t a 11
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
3. Whet right do you have to atop a Job or any phase of a Joh outside of your
department that you consider hasardous? (check one)
6 8 . 8( ) the right to require actions
2 5 , Q(
) the right to advise and recommend, but my raconmendations are actually
carried out a large malor 1 tv of the time
3.1( ) the right to advise end recommend
3 . 1( ) no Tight at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
4.
What right do you hive to aet safety spedflcatlona and/or procedures on such
things as plant layout, new processes, Job specific*tions, and machinery
specifications? (check one)
5 9 . 4(
) the right to require actlona
2 8 . 1(
) the right to advise and recoasscnd, but nry recommendations are actually
carried out e large maI ority of the tIs m
9,4 ( ) the right to adviae and racoon end
3.1
()
no right at all
If you don’t have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
C.

Demographic Data
Noise

Title __
Address
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QUESTIONNAIRE

A.

Industry Dots
1.
2.

L

I am working in the following Industry:
My rcsponsihil ity is exercised in: (check one)
( )

a

Chr.mi r-n 1

single plant.

0.0 ( ) a number of plants in a single city.
2 0 . )
other (please specify)
3. The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant is 1 fi. q years.
4. The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by my safety work is:
4.8( ) under 200.
16 2 < > 1001-1500.
e.7( ) 2501-3000.
2 1 . 0< ) 201-500.
a- 6 ( ) 1501-2000.
l. 9( ) 3001-3500.
2 2 . 9 ( ) 501-1000.
g .7 (
> 2001-2500.
1 1 . 4( ) 3501 or more.
A v e r a g e Number Of Employees 1390
Safety Department Data
1.
2.

Are you involved in safety work on a full-time baste?
( ) Yes
( ) No
How many people are there in your department that are engaged in safety work,
excluding yourself?
Full-Time
Fart-Time
Engineers and Inspectors
? n?
—
Medical___________________________ _________
_________
Fire______________________________ _________
_________
Clerical
^
Others (please specify)
3.47
Tnfal__________
__<1- do
3. If you had to characterise your most influential subordinate’s orientation-to
NR* 6.6sccident prevention, would you aey he is concerned primarily; (check one)
3 1 . 4( ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
60, 0( ) with human aspects of accident prevention.
4. The titles of those above me in the chain of comnand of the plant in which I
work are:
EXAMPLE
fl)
(1) plant managaT
(2)
20.0
(2) personnel director
(3)
49. 5
M e a n - 3.2
(3) M
(4)
2d.Q
(5)
10.5

(6)
(7)
S.

How many levels of management are there from the top executive to the fora
in your plant?
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive
3- 7.9
/
4-25.7
/
7
5-41.0
M e a n • 5.0
(2) Production
6-17.1
Manager
7-2.9
/
fl- 2.9
/
7
(3)
Supervisors

/"

7

(4) Heed of
Processing

/
(5) Foreman

6.

i

/
Example Answert

5

The annual expense budget of my department that relates to the aafety function
la approximately ♦
OMIT
N R * 1 No Rssponts
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C.

Your Experience
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

0,

Total years of work experience:
23.6
year*,
T o t a l y e a r s (.'iif.igi-d In a mi pnrv <mi r y c a p a c i t y o v e r a n y a c t i v i t y ;
16 • 9
Total years engaged In safety work full-time:
12.4
yean.
Total years engaged in gunorvising safety personnel; 10.5
year*.
H o u long luve you been safety director at the facility at which you now
wo rk?
B .1
years.
Your age;
47.Q
years.

yean.

Education and Training
1.
35.

My highest degree held is: (check one)
( ) elementary school.
2( ) high school.

58. 1( ) col lege.
6 . 7( ) graduate school.
2. In addition to the degree indicated above. I have completed:
__________ years of college beyond my high school diploma.
years of college or graduate school beyond s»y bachelors degree,
years of graduate school beyond my masters degree,
3. If you attended college at any time, what was your M j o r ; and if you graduated,
what degree did you receive?
None
16.2
None
35.2
Major in College
Degree (If received)
Engineer
39.0
Engineer
26.6
Sciance
Science
Nonenqineer
33.5
Nonenqineer
39.0
4. Do you feel that for your position e college degree is; (check one)
44. Q( ) necessary?
53•2( ) useful?
2.8( ) not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an engineering degree is; (check one)
1 9 . 3( ) necessary?
HR
1.9
7 3 . 4( ) useful?
Engineer
- 61 . 0
7 . 3( ) not needed?
Science
6.7
6. What college curriculum would be mostuseful for yourposition? N o n e n g i n e e r
- 30.5,
7. Have you had anyspecial courses dealing with thetechnical
or non-human aspects
of accident prevention? 67.9 Yes 32. 1
No
If yes, how many hours or instruction? 5 9 . 0
hours.
Who was the sponsor?
.
How would you rate the training? (check one)
College
~ 2b.6
48-'5( ) very beneficial to my Job
Trade
- 14.3
3 8 . 5( ) beneficial to ray Job
NSC, ASSE
~ 18.5
1 2 . 9( ) slightly beneficial to my Job
Company
- 25.8
Government 0.0( ) a waste of time
8.6
B. Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human aspects of
accident prevention? 61.8) Yes36.2( ) No
If yes, how many hours of Instruction?
48
hours.
Who was the sponsor?
.
How would you rate the training? (check one)
College
~ 39 . 0
55.5 ( ) very beneficial to ray Job
Trade
- 10.5
43.0 ( ) beneficial to my Job
NSC, A S S E
- 22,4
( ) slightly beneficial to my Job
Company
- 24.8
( ) a waste of time
Government
- 1.5
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E.

My Plant's Accident Record
Disabling Injury experience computed according to USASI Standard Z16.1

1. Disabling injury frequency rate:
2. Diaabling injury severity rate:
3. Average days lost per disabling
injury;
F.

For Calendar
1967
3.61_
3.63

Average Reported for
Year* 1966 1966. and 1966
4-56
3.62

Your Authority
1. What right do you have in initiating safety programs and campaigns? (check one)
40. 0( ) the right to require actions
54. 3( ) the right to adviae and recommend, but my recommendations are
actually
carried out a large nu jor itv of the time
5.7( ) the right to advise and recommend
0. 0( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your
department? (check one)
29.5(
) the right to require actions
33. 3(
) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are
actually
carried out a large m a 1ority of the time
2 4 , 8( ) the right to advise and recommend
12. 4( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
3.
What right do you hava to stop a job or any phase of a Job outside ofyour
department that you consider hasardous? (check one)
6 7 . 6( ) the right to require actions
2 4 . 8( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large maiorlty of the time
3.8(
) the right to advise and recommend
3. fK ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right? _______________
.
4.
What right do you have to eat safety specifications and/or procedures on such
things as plant layout, new proceaaea, Job specifications, and stachinery
Specifications? (check one)
4 2 . 9( ) the right to require actions
41, 9( } the right to advise and reconsnend, but my recomendatlons are actually
carried out a large malorltv of the time
13. 3(
) the right to advise and recommend
1. 9(
) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?_________________________________________________________________ .

C,

Demographic Data
N a m e ________________________________________________________________________
Title _
Address

APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES OF THE EFFECTIVE
AND INEFFECTIVE SAFETY DIRECTORS
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Legendi

A.

Effective Safety Director*
(Ineffective Safety Directors)
52.S
9.7
18.1

Industry Data

Chemical
Petroleum
Electrical
Transportation

1.
2.

I am working in (lie following industry!
My responsibility is exercised in: (check one)
( ) a single plant.
( ) a number of plants in s single city,
( ) other (please specify)
13-6
3. The soproximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant is
years,
it. The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by my safety work is:
6.9
(1.3) under 200.
16.7 (13.3) 1001-1500.
6.9
(9.3) 2501-3000.
8.3
(20.0) 201-500.
9.7
(8.0)
1501-2000.
4.2
(1.3) 3001-3500.
19.4
(16.0) 501- 1000.
2.8
(8.0)
2001-2500.
25.0 (21.3) 3501 or more.
b.

Ssfcry
1.

2,

be p e r t i n e n t

Dj i h

Are you involved in safety work on a full-time basis? (100) Yes

( ) No
Ho* many people arc there in your department that are engaged in safety work,
.kc Iuding yourself?
Full-Time
Part-Time
Engineers arui Inspectors
2.6 ti.D
______

Medical
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _________
Fire________________________________ __________
__________
Clerical____________________________ __________
__________

Other■ (please specify)
3.5 (4.7)
______________ TOTAL
6.1 (7.1)
_________
NR
3, If you had to characterize your most influentlal subordinate's orientation to
10.6 (12.7)accident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily:(check one)
28,0 (20.8) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
61.3 (66.7) with human aspect* of accident prevention.
A. The title* of those above me In the chain of coranand of
theplant in which I
work arc:
EXAMPLE
(1) plant manager
(0
(2) personnel director
(lfl- 71
9-7
(2)
(tf,
(3) me
(3)
(4)
■}(. A
?’ 1)
10.7J
8.3
(5)
(6)
(7)
11. 31
How many level* of management sr* there from the top executive to the foreman
in your plant?
(2.7)
311.1
EXAMPLE; (1) Top Executive
422.2
(28.0)
(37.3)
536.1
(2) Production
6- 22.2
(20.0)
Manager
(6.7)
75.6
82.8
(1.3)
(4.4)
90.0
(3) Supervisors
Hean-5.2
M e a n - 4 .92

±

1

(4) Head

r^— i

of
Pn •cessing

<S)

J.__
I
Foreman

Example Answer;

6 . The annual expense budget of my department that relates to the aafety function
1* approximately 8 Omit

Nil

No Response
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c.

Your■ Expo r ionce
To t.-il you rs of wi>rV i
Tot J 1 yc .1rs Ctlg.’god
TotO 1 year a C IIgaged
Tot.i 1 years engaged
Itou 1ong have y ou b e i
work? 3_ 5 — -IS. 7) yea:
Your a g o :4 6 .7 (46. b :

1.

3.
it.

5.
6.

D.

Ed ui j t ion ,ind Trai ning

1.
0.0

My highest decree held
10 .0 ) c 1omen tury school.

Ik:

(check one)

(44.0)high school.
(40.0)col Ifuc.
3(8 .0 ) gruduate school.
2,
In add 11 Ion to the degree Indicated above,

I have completed:
years of college beyond my high school diploma.
years of college or graduate school beyond my bachelors degree.
years of graduate school beyond my masters degree.
If you attended college at any time, what was your major; and if you graduated,

_

40.3
51.4
S.

£9.6) years.

3.

what deg ice did you receive?

NONE
Major

20.8
in College

(16.0)

40.3

(44.0)

Degree (If received)

33.3
(33.3)
22.2
Science
11.2
(10.7)
6.9
(9.3)
N onengineer34.7
(40.0)
30.5
(?«,7)
4. Do you feel that for your position a collage degree la: (check one)
38.9
(36.0)necessary?
55.6
(60.0)useful?
4.2
(4.'07 not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an engineering degree is: (check one)
18.1
(9.3)necessary?
Engineer- 58.3
(65.3)
75.0 (81.3)useful?
Science- 5.6
(5.3)
5.6
(9 .3 )not needed?
Nonengineer- 33.3
(23.3)
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your positioning- 2.B
14.01
7. Have you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non-human aspects
of accident prevention? 68.1
(76.0)
Yea
37.0
(24.0)
NO
If yes. how many hours of instruction? 67
53
hours.
Who was the sponsor?
How would you rate the training? (check one)
36.8
College(29.9)
47.0
(45.6)very beneficial to my Job
Trade 14.3
(10.5)
45.0
(44 .0) benef ic ial to my Job
NSC, ASSE16.3
(17.5)
(10.4 slightly beneficial to my Job
8.1
Company22.4
(31.6)
( )
a waste of time
0.0
Covernnent10.2
(7.0)
8. Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human aspects of
t:cidant proventlon?52.8
(65.3) Yes
43.1
(34.7) No
If yes. how many hours of Instruction? 55
(49) hours.
Who was the sponsor?
How would you rate the training? (check one)
College36.8
(38.8)
55.5
(49.0)very beneficial to my Job
Trade10.5
(8.1)
(51.0)benefIclal to my Job
42.0
NSC, ASSE21.0
(20.5)
( )
slightly beneficial to m y job
2.5
29.0
Cosipany(28.6)
( )
s waste of tlsw
0.0
Govenusent2.6
(4.0)
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E,

My Plant*■ Occident Record
Disabling Injury experience computed according to USAS1 Standard 216.1
For Calendar
1967

Avaraga Reported tor
Years 1964, 1965, and 1966

1. Disabling injury frequency rate:
2. Di tab ting injury aeverlty rate:
___
3. Average daya loal per disabling
injury:____________________________________________________ _______________
F.

Your Authority
1,

What right do you have in initiatingsafety programs andcampaigns? (check one)
(41.3)the right to require actions
(46.7)the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendationsare actually
carried out a large ira lorltv of the time
2.0
(12.0)the right to advise and recommend
0,0
( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
2. Whet right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your
department? (check one)
30.9 (25.3)the right to require actions
27.0 (30.7)the right to advise end recoanend, but my recosmtendatlons are actually
carried out a large me tort tv of tha time
27.9
(20.0)the right to advise and recoanend
5.6
(16. 0 )no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
3,
What right do you have to atop a Job or any phase of a Job outside Of your
department that you consider hatardoua? (check one)
76.4 (58.7)the right to require actions
19.4 (25.3)the right to advise and recommend, but my reconseendatlona are actually
carried out e large mstoritv of the time
1.4
(13.3)£he right to advise and recommend
2.8
(2.7)n° right at all
If you don't have the Tight to require actions, which of your superiors has
50.0
47.2

this right?

4.

56.9
34.7
6.9
2.4

C,

■

What right do you have to set safety specifications and/or procedures on such
things as plant layout, new processes. Job specifications, and machinery
spec iflest ions? (check one)
(42.7)the right to require actions
(30.7)the right to advise and recoanend, but my recommendations are actually
carrlad out a .large ma 1or 1 tv of the tls«e
(24.0)the right to edvlae and recommend
(2 ,7 )no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.

Demographic Data
Name
Title ________________________________________________________________________
Address
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Legondi

Effective Safety Directors at .32 Sigma Log C,
(Ineffective Safety Directors at .32 Sigma Log G

54. 2
44.4
Chemical
13. t
13. 3
Petroleum
17 . B
electrical
1 I aw wDrkiiii'. in IU.- tu )1i»wi ip; imliihi ry ; 24.4
16.9
Transportation
2 My re spolls ilii IiIy in i n t n iacil m i (dii'ik unc)
( ) J i-ili);ii pi.1:11 .
( ) .i niuiln'i ill plants in .)
city.
( ) utlirr (pli-asc S|>rcily)____________________
12 0
3, Thf .niproxi i.a tr age nt the majority of fixed e(|u ipmtn t in our plant ist13.5) year*.
U. 'tin* ti.ijl muvher of t-iiipioyt lh in 2 ahovc who jr .1 served hv my safety work Is:
4.4
(1.7) under ?W>.
13.3 (11. Ii)
lOGI-iSuO.
4 ,4
(10. 2) 2501- 3000.
6.7
(20.3) “hit-‘.Ml.
8.9 (10.2)
IMM-.'OOO.
6.7
(1.7) 3001-3500.
20.0
(15.3) 301-1 (nfU,
4.4
(8.5)
2001-2300. 31.1
(20.3) 3)01 or nor.,
Average number of employees - 20BC, (1775)
I1
.1.1in IV l.r;>n1 Ir itit iljl II
A.

Industry Huts

.
.

■ .-

Air

v

.1

1 nv. Ici-d

in

>.ilf t y

work

on

.j l u l l - t i m e

husis7

(100)

3(es

(

)

No

1

iy i- pic j u there in your department that ore encased In safety work,
■t . 1adi i; yiuraelf?
Ful 1-Time

■■■• la

I ..spec tnr s

u.d

2.67

MxAiliiI

Part-Time

(1.641_________

_________________

fire

~

Clerical__________________________ _______

3.42
(4.07)
6.09
(5.71)
I. .1 you had to characterize your res t influential subordinate's orientation to
ccident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily; (check one)
(27.1) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
(61.0) with human aspects of accident prevention.
TIi* titles of those above me in the chain of command of the plant in
work are:
EXAMPLE
(1) Diant manager
t 1>
(2) personnel director
(2)
6.7
(11.9)
(3) me
O)
60.0 M e a n - 3.4
(49.2) K e a n - 3 .4
(«>
24.4
(25.4)
O)
8.9
(11.9)
in)
(7)
(1.71
How many levels of management are there from the top executive to the
in your plant?
38.9
(3.4)
EXAMPLE; (I) Top Executive
4- 22.2
(27.1)
/
/
/
5- 33.3 M a a n - 5 . 1(39.0) Mean-5..2
(2) Production
6 - 24.4
(18.6)
Manager
78.9
(6 . 8 )
82.2
(1.7)
I
/
9(3.4)
£3) Supervisors
/
Others

hrt
15.6
17.8
66 . 7

_______

(please specify)
___________ T O T A L

J

(6 ) Head of
Processing

/
(5) Foreman

6.
NR

L__/

Example Answer:

_L

TTie annual expense budget of my depsrtment that relatee to the safety function
is approximately *
Omit

Me Response
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C.

Your Experience
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

D.

Education and Training
1.

37.8
53.3
8.9

44.4
46.7
6.7
20.0
71.1
6.7

56.3
34.4
9.4

56.5
39.0
4.4

Total year* of work expcriencc:2 1.6 (23.8)veara.
Total years engaged in a supervisory capacity over any activity;15.1 (15,6)years.
Total years engaged in safety work fuI 1-timei12.1 (11.7)ycars.
Total years engaged In supervising safety personnel: 9.0 (10.11 years.
How long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now
work? 7.6 (8.651
years.
Your age:45.1 (47 .D years ■

My highest degree held is: (check one)
elementary school.
(39.0) high school.
(54.2) college.
(6.8) graduate school.
2. _tn add it ion to the degree indicated above, I have completed:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ years of college beyond my high school diploma.
years of collegeor graduate school beyond my bachelors degree.
years ofgraduate school beyond
tny masters degree.
3. If you attended college at any time, what was your major; end If you graduated,
what degree did you receive?
NONE
22.2
(11.9)
37.8
(39.0)
Major in College
Degree (if received)
Engineer
35.6
(17.3) ____ 28.9
(23.7)
(10.2)
6.7______ (fUS)
Science__ 11.1
Nonenuineer— 1 U 1 ___(40.5)
17.8
(28.9)
4. Do you feel that for your position a college degree is: (check one)
(37.3) necessary?
(59.3) useful?
(3.4) not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an engineering degree is: (check one)
(10.2) necessary?
Engineer- 53.3 (5.1)
(79.7) useful?
Science6.7 (66.1)
(10.2) not needed?
Noneng^neer- 37.7 (26.4)
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your position? NR- 2.2
(5.1)
7. Have you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non'human aspects
of accident prevention? 71.1 Yes
28.9
No
85______ hours.
Who was the sponsor?
(25.0)
College40.6
How would you rate the training? (check one)
(52.2) very beneficial to my Job
9.4
(13.6)
Trade(38.6) beneficial to my Job
(20.4)
NSC, ASSE15.6
(9.1) slightly beneficial to my job
(34.2)
Company25.0
( ) a waste of time
9.4
(6.8)
GovernmentHave you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human aspects
•
accident prevention? 71.1
( ) Yes
28.9
{ ) No
If yes, how many hours of instruction? 55
(53)
hours.
Uho was the sponsor?
'
How would you rate the training? (check one)
College- 3 4 . 8 ( 3 8 . 2 )
(51.4) very beneficial to my Job
Trade- 13.0
(11.4)
(48.6) beneficial to my job
NSC, ASSE13.0 (20.0)
( ) slightly beneficial to my Job
Company34.8
(28.6)
( ) a waste of time
Government4,4
(2.8)
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E.

My Plant1* Accident Record
Disabling injury experience computed according to USAS1 Standard Z16.1
For Calendar Average Reported tor
1967
Years 1964, 1965. and 1966
1. Disabling injury frequency rate:__________________________ _______________
2. Disabling injury severity rate:
3. Average days lost per disabling
injury;
________

F,

Your Authority
1.

53.3
42.2
4,4

42.2
24.4
26.7
6,7

82.2
13.3
2.2
2.2

62.2
26.7
11.1
0,0

C.

Witat right do you have in initiating safety programs and campaigns? (check one)
(44.1) the right to require actions
(42,4) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendstions are actually
carried out a large ma jority of the time
(13.6) the right to advise and recommend
{ ) no right at all
Ii you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your
department? (check one)
(27.1) the right to require actions
(30.S) the right to advise and recommend, but my reconaendstion* are actually
e a r n e d out a large fna 1oritv of the time
(25.4) the right to advise and recommend
(16,9) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
3. What right do you have to stop a Job or any phase of a Job outside of your
department that you consider hazardous? (check one)
(62.7) the right to require actions
(20.3) the right to advise and recommend, but my recoimeendations are actually
carried out a large ma ior1 tv of the time
(13.6) the right to advise and recommend
(3.4) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
6. What right do you have to set safety specifications and/or procedures on such
thi..gs as plant layout, new processes, Job specifications, and machinery
specifications? (check one)
(49.2) th* right to Taquire actions
(27.1) the right to advise and recommend, but tty recommend*tIona are actually
carried out a large majority of the tId s
(20.3) the right to advise and recommend
(3.4) no right at all
If you don’t have th* right to requir* actions, which of your superiors has
this right?
.
Demographic Data
Name
Title ________________________________________________________________________
Address

APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER II

TABLE D-l
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of Effective And
Ineffective Safety Directors Before Deletion
Bi-Polar Scales
1

4

5

6

7

8

9

0-1 -0.604

1.774

1 .174

1.089

1.360

2.937

1.430

0.933

0.045

1.269

T-l

1.916

1.410

2.297

0.630

1.844

2.093

1.514

1.191

1.841

B-l

1.860

1.843

3 .410
3 .058

2.812

0.933

2.562

1.715

1.584

1.736

0.832

0-2

0.266 -0.386 -0

0.035 -0.287

0.124

T-2

0-453

1.327

2 .119

0.475 -0.220

0.793

1.020 -0.046

0.513

0.520

B-2

0.695

1.220

2 .900

1.261

2.213

3.519

1.742

1.692

■

3

to
1—1

2

0.262 -0.078 -0.319 -0.892

0.177

0-3 -0.983 -0.968 -1 .194 -1.076 -1.829
Note :

3.641

0.311 -0.124 -0.181

10

0.413 -0.685

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (Effective-Ineffective).
Degrees of Freedom:
145
Critical "t" values: +1.96 and -1.96
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TABLE D-2
Computed T,t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of Effective And
Ineffective Safety Directors After A Deletion Process
Bi-Polar Scales
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0-1 -0.626

1.937

1.841

1.692

1.929

3.306

1.361

0 .082

0.481

2.066

T-l

1.691

1.352

2.798

1.717

1.675

2.770

2.699

2 .301

2.006

2.666

B-l

0.706

1.741

2.616

2.561

0.702

3.148

1.489

1 .191

1.500

0.853

0-2

0.650

0.397

0.111 -0.255

0.966

0.775

0.671

0 .170

0.538

0.157

T-2

0.502

1.103

2.489 -0.449

0.184

1.280

1.722 -0 .013

1.333

0.343

B-2

0.770

0.831

2.683

1.290

0.804

2.990

2.351

3 .226

1.297

1.817

0.210 -0.023 -2.627

0.406

0.535

0 .526

1.143 -0.407

1

0-3 -0.626 -0.581
Note :

10

Underlined values indicate significant differenc es at the .05 level

of significance (Effective - Ineffective).
Degrees of Freedom:
102
Critical "tTt Values:

APPENDIX E
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER III

TABLE E-l
Computed f,t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of Engineers,
Including Scientists, And Nonengineers
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

5

3

6

7

8

9

10

0-1 -0.323

0.197

1.406 -0.624

1.897 -1.260

1.514

1.228 -0.662

1.727

T-l

1.240

0.859

2.310

0.742

2.627

1.922

2.219

1.680

1.314

1.236

B-l

2.900

2.094

1.305

1.416

3.224

1.942

2.281

2.539

2.506

1.908

0-2

0.687

0.129 -0.104

1.103 -0.282

0.224 -0.449

1.310

T-2

0.897 -0.144

0.142 -1.728

1.177 -0.642

0.607

0.916

0.649

1.724

0.055

0.394

B-2 -0.463

0.103

0.540 -0.305

0.483 -0.215

1.303

1.089

0.666

0.991

0.321

1.232

1.781

1.718

1.244

2.216

0.928

1.320

0-3

Note :

0.177

1.157

Underlined values indicate significant difference at the .05 level
of significance (Nonengineers - Engineers).
Degrees of Freedom:
125
Critical nt n Values:
+1.93 and -1.98
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TABLE E-2
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of Engineers,
Excluding Scientists, and Nonengineers
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-1 -0.18?

0.304

1.541 -0.381

1.540 -1.904

1.161

0.613 -0.699

1.043

T-l

0.888

0.606

2.015

0.375

2.376

1.484

1.846

0.950

1.253

0.957

B-l

3.198

2.502

1.376

1.240

2.678

1.639

2.028

2.385

2.149

1.869

0-2

0.878

0.237 -0.081

0.214

-1.779

0.305 -0.264

1.654

T-2

0.726 -0.116

1.519 -0.475

0.623

0.659

0.432

1.878

0.082

0.611

1.009 -0.034

B-2 -0.159

0.451

0.827 -0.188

0.363 -0.446

0.868

0.863

0.650

0.728

0.572

0.692

1.219 -0.231

1.610

0.945

1.660

0.493

0.822

0-3
Note:

0.524

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (Nonengineers - Engineers),
Degrees of Freedom:
107
Critical nt n values:
+1.93 and -1.98

APPENDIX F
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER IV

TABLE F-l
Computed nt n Values Resulting From A Comparison
Of More And Less Total Work Experience
Bi-Polar Scales
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-1

0.497

1.765 1.751

1.621

1.573

-0.100

2.217

1.430 1.314 1.303

T-l

1.109

0.559 -0.217

0.025

1.057

1.148

0.149

0.679 0.228

1.604

B-l -0.580

0.626 1.066

0.197 1.854

1.002

0.195

1.073

0.921

0-2 -1.053

0.831 0.504

0.451 -1.141 -0.680 -0.399

1.025 -0.517 -0.335

1.525

T-2

0.701

-0.174 0.881

0.951 1.359

0.000

1.717

1.251

2.115

1.178

B-2

1.835

0.850 1.526

1.363 1.500

0.826

1.843

2.533 1.227

0.925

0-3

0.879

0.004 0.230 -1.053 0.809

O .846

2.102

1.588

1.158

Note:

1.577

Underlined valued indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical nt" values: +1.96 and -1.96

TABLE F-2
Computed ttt" Values Resulting From A Comparison
Of More And Less Supervisory Experience
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

0-1 -0.273

1.814

0.731

T-l -0.302

0.290 -0.370

B-l -1.990 -0.005
0-2 -0.460

0.127

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.765

0.164

1.284

1.776

1.658

1.524

1.348

0.423

0.275

0.805

0.913

0.881 -0.222

1.636

0.280

0.620

0.456

0.251

0.773

0.367

0.763

-

0.162 -0.366 -0.202 -1.751

0.450 -0.410 -0.211 -0.674 -0.320

T-2

0.226 -0.119 -0.143

0.670

0.944

0.992

2.556

1.661

1.859

2.125

B-2

2.132

0.164

1.869

2.885

2.815

3.344

1.457

3.223

0-3 -0.192 -0.226 -0.537 -0.255 -0.874

0.908

0.342

1.129

1.042

2.055

Note:

1.144 -0.033

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level

of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical "t" values: +1.96 and -1.96

TABLE F-3
Computed wt” Values Resulting From A Comparison Of More And
Less Full-Time Safety Experience
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-1

0.426

0.699

1.591

1.153

1.048

1.660

2.087

2 264

0.754

1.046

T-l

1.552

1.462

1.256

1.832

2.431

1.980

1.731

2.005

1.660

2.348

B - l -1.256

0.857

1.296

1.109

1.595

0.809

1.281

2.065

1.864

0.421

0-2

0.670

1.444

0.692

0.589

0.970

o .464 -0.627 -0.290 -0.342 -1.040

T-2

0.184

0.182

1.114

1,821

2.061

1.257

1.253

2.007

1.101

1.450

B-2

2.765

2.052

1.250

1.879

2.728

2.648

2.470

1.846

1.554

3.606

0-3

0.389 -0.617

0.054

0.477 -2.039

1.497 -0.399

0.697

0.997

0.932

Note :

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level

of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical "tn values: +1.96 and -1.96

TABLE F-4
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of More And Less
Experience In Supervising Safety Personnel
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-1

0.916 -0.213

1.464

2.107

0.485

0.195

2.516

2.284

2.294

0.975

T-l

1.637

0.653

1.026

2.597

2.003

1.694

1.625

1.357

2.043

2.605

B-l

0.144

1.240

1.396

1.536

1.430

0.306

0.961

1.907

1.986

0.956

0-2

0.341

0.922

0.217

0.831

0.268

1.071 -0.417

0.455

0.052 -0.694

T-2 -0.530

0.080

1.266

1.415

0.613

1.302

1.565

0.907

1.592

O .848

B-2

2.858

1.946

1.5^3

2.563

1.570

1.959

1.858

2.012

2.021

2.563

0-3

0.181 -0.511 -0.870

0.092 -1.863 -0.189 -1.181 -0.975 -0.079

0.339

Note:

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .0$ level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical "t" Values: +1.96 and -1.96

TABLE F-5
Computed nt" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of More And Less
Years As Safety Director At Present Facility
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

0-1

0.956

2.252

T-l

2.534

B-l

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.713

2.092

0.609

0.131

2.163

1.822

1.701

0,082

1.265

1.593

0.761

0.811

0.030

0.746

1.271

1.316

1.643

1.139

0.010

1.671

0.566

1.026

0.068

1.333

1.560

1.653

1.341

0-2

1.461

0.166 -0.009

T-2

0.129

0.629

B-2

2.796

0-3

1.766

Note:

-2 .

0.585 -0.538

0.877 -0.307 -0.837 -1.153 -1.023

1.421

2.104

1.791

1.909

2.561

1.788

1.657

1.351

2.634

1.852

1.961

1.377

1.971

1.167

2.544

1.877

3.001

0.157

0.587 -0.712 -0.757

1.918

0.994

1.024

1.490

2.384

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical "t” values: +1.96 and -1,96

TABLE F-6
Computed r,t" Values Resulting From A Comparison
Of The Older To The Younger
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

0-1 -0.966

0.774 -0.570

T-l -0.234

0.376 -1.205 -0.365

B-l -2.095

0.769 -0.474

0.230

0-2 -0.435

1.441

0.631 -0.402

T-2

0.075

0.431 -1.444

B-2

1.716

1.092

0.739

6

0.361 -0.076

7

8

9

10

1.326

1.603 -0.652

0.419

0.224 -0.631

0.000 -1.136

0.872

0.925 -1.091 -0.255 -0.078 -0.635

0.006

0.874

0.116

0,088

1.181 -0.161

0.629

1.437

2.091 -0.359

1.510

0.765

1.061

1.080

0.554

1.773

1.935

1.476

1.146

0.153

0.742

0-3 -0.269 -0.565 -0.639 -0.322 -0.939

0.579

0.176

1.030

0.804

1.059

Note:

1.462

0.314

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom:
206
Critical nt n values: +1.96 and -1.96
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APPENDIX G
SEMANTIC PROFILES BY EXPERIENCE CLASSIFICATION

EXHIBIT 4-5
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Important

Unimportant
Foolish .
Unsuccessful .

. Wise
. Successful
Good

Bad .

True

False
Lenient

. Severe

Shallow

Deep
Heavy

Light

Strong

Weak
Soft .

. Hard

High Total Supervisory Experience
Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-9
Technical Profile One
•"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy-

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend:

High Total Supervisory Experience

— ——

Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-10
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light
Weak

ong

Soft

Hard
High Total Supervisory Experience

Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-11
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant ^

Important

Foolish .

. Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad .

. Good

False

True

Lenient .

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak .

Strong

Soft .

Hard

Legend: —
— — —

High Total Supervisory Experience
Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-12
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"

i Important
Foolish .
. Wise

•. Successful
Bad ,
i Good
False ,
•. True
Lenient .
i Severe
Shallow ,
*____ •_ Deep
Light .
i Heavy
Weak .
*. Strong
Soft .
A Hard
Legend;

High Total S

—

upervisory Experienc

Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-13
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad .

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak .

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend:

—
— — —

High Total Supervisory Experience
Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-14
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant

± Important

Foolish .

Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad ,

Good

False

True
Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy-

Weak

Strong

Soft

. Hard

Legend:

High Total Supervisory Experience

—

Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-15
Organizational Profile One

"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION”
Important

Unimportant

Wise

Foolish .

. Successful

Unsuccessful
Bad .

Good

False .

, True

Lenient

. Severe

Shallow .

. Deep
Heavy

Light

Strong

Weak .

Hard

Soft .

Legend: -----

High Full-Time Safety Experience
Low Full-Time Safety Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-16
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant

,

.

.

.

.

.

j

j

Important

-

Foolish .
. Successful

Unsuccessful .
Bad .

. Good

False .

. True

Lenient .

. Severe

Shallow .

. Deep
. Heavy-

Light j.

Strong

Weak .

Hard

Soft .
— ■ -

High Full-Time Safety Experience

—

Low Full-Time Safety Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-17
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant

,
. Important

Foolish ,
Wise
Unsuccessful .
i Successful
Bad .
. Good
False .
Lenient .
i Severe
Shallow .
i Deep
Light .
j. Heavy
Weak .
i Strong
Soft ,
. Hard

Legend:

—

High Full-Time Safety Experi ence

—

Low Full-Time Safety Experienc e
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EXHIBIT 4-16
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish .

. Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad .

. Good

False .

. True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow .

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak .

r Strong

Soft .

Hard

Legend:

High Full-Time Safety Experience

Low Full-Time Safety Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-19
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Vise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

. Severe

Shallow .

Deep

Light

Heavy

Legend:

Weak

t Strong

Soft

Hard

■ — 1

High Full-Time Safety Experience

Low Full-Time Safety Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-20
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES’ ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"

. Important
Wise

Foolish

Successful

Unsuccessful ..

. Good

Bad

. True

False

Severe

Lenient

Deep

Shallow

Heavy-

Light

Strong

Weak .

Hard

Soft

-----

High Full-Time Safety Experience

-----

Low Full-Time Safety Experience

EXHIBIT 4-21
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Important

Unimportant j,
. Wise
Foolish ^

, Successful
Unsuccessful

A

. Good
Bad .
. True
False ±
Severe
Lenient
. Deep
Shallow .
. Heavy
Light j.
Strong
Weak .
Hard
Soft .

; -----

High Full-Time Safety Experience
Low Full-Time Safety Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-22
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant
Foolish .
Unsuccessful .
Bad .
False
Lenient .
Shallow
Light
Weak .
Soft .
Legend:

Important
Wise
Successful
Good
. True
. Severe
Deep
Heavy
Strong
. Hard

■

High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety

— ——

Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
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EXHIBIT 4-23
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful

Important
Wise
Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy-

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: -----

High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety

— — — ■ Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
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EXHIBIT

4-24

Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful

Important
Wise
Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: —
— — —

High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
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EXHIBIT 4-25
Organizational Profile Two

"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful

Important
Wise
Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: ----

High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
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EXHIBIT 4-26
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"

Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful .

i Important
. Wise
. Successful
Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow .

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak .

^ Strong

Soft .

Hard

Legend: ■'

High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety

EXHIBIT 4-27
Behavioral Profile Two

"EMPLOYEES* ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Important

Unimportant
Foolish ♦

Successful

Unsuccessful
Bad

. Good

False

, True

Lenient .

Severe

Shallow .

Deep

Light

Heavy

A

Weak .

. Strong

Soft .

. Hard

Legend: ----

High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety

EXHIBIT 4-2S
Organizational Profile Three

"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Important
. Wise
. Successful
U n s u c c e s s f u l ..

. Good
Bad •
True
False ^
, Severe
Lenient
. Deep
Shallow
. Heavy
Light j.
Strong
Weak
Hard
Soft .
Legend:

High Total Supervisory Experience
Safety

Over

Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety

EXHIBIT 4-29
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"

, Important
Unimportant
. Wise
Foolish
. Successful
Unsuccessful

. Good
Bad
. True
False
. Severe
Lenient
. Deep

Shallow

±

. Heavy
Light A
Weak .
, Hard
Soft .
Legend:

■— —

High Total Experience As Safety Director
At Present Facility
Low Total Experience As Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-30
Technical Profile One

"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant
Foolish .
Unsuccessful .

i Important
. Wise
, Successful

Bad .

. Good

False .

True

Lenient ,

Severe

Shallow ,
Light

± Heavy

Weak .

±

Strong
Hard

Soft

Legend: "

High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
—

Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-31
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"

Unimportant
i

Important
“

Foolish .
Unsuccessful .
Bad

Wise
. Successful
Good

False .

. True

Lenient

. Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: ---—

High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-32
Organizational Profile Two

"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful .

Important
. Wise
. Successful

Bad

. Good

False

True

Lenient ,

. Severe

Shallow .

Deep

Light

Heavy-

Weak .

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: -----

High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-33
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"

Unimportant

Important

Foolish

. Wise

Unsuccessful .

. Successful

Bad

Good

False .

True

Lenient .

. Severe

Shallow .

i Deep

Light

^ Heavy-

Weak .
Soft

i Strong
Hard

Legend:

High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
—

Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility

EXHIBIT 4-34
Behavioral Profile Two

"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful .

Important
Wise
Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak .

Strong

Soft

Hard

Legend: ----

High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-35
Organizational Profile Three

"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Important

Unimportant
Foolish .
Unsuccessful

±

Bad .
False

. Wise
. Successful
. Good
True

Lenient .

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light ^

Heavy
. Strong

oft .
Legend:

. Hard
High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-36
Organizational Profile One

"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish .

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad .

Good

False

. True

Lenient

. Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft
Legend:

-----

, Hard
Older Safety Directors
Younger Safety Directors

EXHIBIT 4-37
Technical Profile One

MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
. Important
. Wise
Foolish
. Successful
Unsuccessful ^

. Good
Bad .
True
False
. Severe
Lenient
Deep
Shallow .

Heavy
Light ..
. Strong
Weak .
. Hard
Soft .
— ■■■■" Older Safety Directors
—

Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 4-3S
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"

Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

.Strong

Soft
Legend: ----

Hard
Older Safety Directors
Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 4-39

Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish .

. Wise

Unsuccessful .

Successful

Bad .

. Good

False

True

Lenient

. Severe

Shallow

^ Deep

Light

Legend:

Heavy

Weak .

i Strong

Soft .

Hard

-----

Older Safety Directors
Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 4-40
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard
Older Safety Directors
Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT

4-41

Behavioral Profile Two
'"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant

Important

Foolish

Wise

Unsuccessful

Successful

Bad .

. Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe
Deep

Light

Legend:

Heavy-

Weak .

Strong

Soft

Hard

-----

Older Safety Directors
Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 4-42
Organizational Profile Three

"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Important

Unimportant

Wise

Foolish

Successful

Unsuccessful

Bad

Good

False

True

Lenient

Severe

Shallow

Deep

Light

Legend:

Heavy

Weak

Strong

Soft

Hard

-----

Older Safety Directors
Younger Safety Directors

APPENDIX H
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER V

TABLE H-l
Computed ”t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 4/3
Bi-Polar Scales
_2

3

. 4

,._5

6

_?

5

9

JLSL

0-1 0.192

-1.640-1.021 -0.476

-1.719 -2.533 -0.907 -0.355 -1.234 -1.634

T-l -1.853

-1.192-1.394 -1.636

-1.584 -0.956 -1.505 -1.451 -1.599 -0.585

B-l

0.158

-0.279-0.945 -0.781

-1.163 -1.322 -1.205 -0.556 -0.357 -1.172

0-2

0.246

-0.129 0.192

0.772

-0.736

0.242

0.076

0.737

1.399

1.602

T-2 -0.123

-1.192-0.379 -0.990

-1.787 -0.672 -1.634 -1.181 -1.447 - O .359

B-2

0.370

-0.248-0.433 -0.266

-0.850 -2.160 -1.069 -1.245 -2.749 -1.916

0-3 -1.522

-1.610-1.099 -3.332

-0.106 -2.123 -1.418 -2.484 -1.367 -2.038

Note:

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 4/ 3 ).
Degrees of Freedom:
50
Critical "t" values: +2.^1 and -2.01

TABLE H-2
Computed ftt T! Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/3 And 4/4
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

0-1 -0.671 -0.279 -0.276

4

5

6

7

8

0.240 -0.315

0.826

1.249 -0 .205

9

10

1.954 -0.075

T-l

0.841

0.210 -0.769

0.678 -0.325

0,461

0.778

0 .064 -0.376 -0.841

B-l

0.271

0.378

1.368 -0.785

0.639

1.224

0 .162

0-2

0.193 -0.798 -0.281 -0.407 -O.O84 -0.135

0.316

0 .698 -0.177 -1.594

T-2

2. 510

0.670

O .984 -0 .071 -0.061 -1.117

B-2

0.255

0.235 -0.441

0.354

1.195

1.574

0.739

1 .141

1.709

0-3 -0 .471

0.726 -0.463

0,616 -0.332

1.768

0.058

0 .462

0.656 -0.685

0.766

0.448

-0.650 -0.130 -0.756

1.948 -1.616

0.943

Note •
• Underlined values indicat e significant differentes at the .05 level
of significance (4/3 - 4/4).
Degrees of Freedom:
46
Critical "t" values: +2.01 and -2.01

TABLE H-3
Computed nt" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 4/4
Bi-Polar Scales
— 1_

__2__

2__

_ 4

.

5

6

?

8

10

0-1 -0.536

-1.409 -1.122 -0.158 -1.667 -0.889

T-l -0.657

-0.603 -1.982 -0.671 -1.638 -0.294 -0.477 -1.067 -1.673 -1.577

B-l

0.371

0-2

0.397-0.889'-0.121

T-2

1.580

B-2

0.550

0-3 -1.765
Note:

0.112 -0.034

0.432 -0.870

9

0.814 -1.572

0.570 -1.746 -0.463

0.249 -0.245

1.354 -2.181

0.255 -0.588

0.299

0.828 -0.239

0.047

1.036

-0.328 0.125 -1.230 -1.420 -1.302 -0.383 -1.107 -1.371 -1.168
0.000 -0.765

0.086

0.361 -0.225 -0.155

-0.564 -1.270 -1.860 -0.402

0.056 -0.622 -0.871

0.000 -1.117 -1.271 -0.398 -2.261

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 4/4).
Degrees of Freedom:
26
Critical "t" values: +2.056 and -2.056
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TABLE H-4
Computed nt" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 5/2 And 5/3
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

7

8

4

0.591

0.622

0.111 -2.058 -0.641 -1.454 -0.509 -1.554

T-l

0.989 -0.466 -1.441

0.758

0.370

0.548 -0.208

0.100 -1.482

B-l

0.000 -0.719 -0.309

0.059 -0.172 -0.325 -0.611 -0.232

0.000 -0.428

0-2

0.952 -0.156

1.046 -0.741

1.610 -0.296 -0,495

0.585

0.427

T-2

0.499 -0.604 -0.552

0.749

1.349

1.594

1.569

1.422

B-2

0.803 -0.400

0.819

1.251

0.613 -0.596 -1.073

0-1 -0.064 -0.345

0.126

0.557

5

6

3

0.610

0.900 -0.056

9

10

0.000 -0.343

0-3 -0.155 -1.591 -1.211 -O.O 83 -0.450 -1.245 -1.917 -1.480 -1.613 -1.697
Note:

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/2 - 5/3).
Degrees of Freedom:
50
Critical "t” values: +2.01 and -2.01
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TABLE H-5
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 5/3 And 5/4
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

0.659

0.767

T-l -0.456
B-l

1.453

0-2

0.000 -1.623 -0,653 -2.054

T-2

2.370

0-1

k

5

6

7

6

9

10

1.445

1.671

0.226

2.026

0.290

1.315

1.504

0.651

0.171

1.202

0.295

0.461 -1.772 -1.323 -0.057

0.591

0.691

1.674

1.672

0.542

0.653

1.007

0.907

1.230

_ 3

1.191

1.269 -0.066

1.450 -0.219 - 0 . 4 H

1.100

0.636

0,534 -0.246

0.991 -0.943

0.217 -1.656

0.413 -1.031 -1.226

B-2 -1.331 -0.666 -1.651 -2.396 -1.545 -1.532 -1.207 -0.391 -0.696 -0.022
0-3
Note:

0.991 -0.200

0.401 -1.579 -0.034

1.062

0.306

0.279

0.269

0.916

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/3 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom:
70
Critical nt n value : +1.99 and -1.99
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TABLE H-6
Computed ,ft tf Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 5/2 And 5/4
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-1

0.401

1.640

2.044

0.301 -0.676 -0.461 -0.489

0.654 -1.080

T-l

0.780 -0.344 -0,544

0.912

0.708 -0.638 -0.436 -0.253

0.523 -0.807

B-l

1.033

0.514

0.319

0.531

0.237

0.769

0-2

0.984 -1.524 -0.379 —0.448

0.168

1.655

0.131 -0.618

0.656 -0.886

T-2

1.694

1.026

2.414

0.289

0.981

0.182

0.712

0.305

0.888

0.493

0.531

B-2 -0.080 -1.003 -0.745 -1.023
0-3
Note:

0.263

0.261

0.252

0.729

0.097 -0.505 -1.363 -1.298 -0.495 -0.347

0.542 -1.749 -0.939 -1.262 -0.543 -0.499 -1.424 -1.243 -1.355 -0.809
Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/2 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom:
44
Critical "t” values: +2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-7
Computed "t” Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 6/3 And 6/4
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

5

0-1 -0.550

0.353

0.262

1.196

0.134

T-l -0.111

1.352

0.151

0.452

B-l

0.772 -0.301 -0.391

6

7

10

9

0.111 -1.096

0.645

1.241

0.561 -0.337

0.216

0.369

0.855

0.544

0.426

0.447

0.556

0.697 -0.035

1.032

0-2 -0.435 -0.760 -0.226 -1.776 -1.539

0.157

0.063 -0.279 -0.088

0.506

0.554

T-2 -1.573

0.456

0.466

B-2 -0.354 -0.266 -0.241
0-3
Note:

1.661

1.096

1.336

6

-0.244 -0.030 -0.291 -0.650 -0.247
0.273

1.776 -0.625

0.390 -0.493

0.271 -2.135 -1.539 -2.460 -1.560 -2.071
1.396 -0.412

0.129

0.532 -0.316

0.057

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/3 - 6/4).
Degrees of Freedom:
47
Critical "t" values: +2.01 and -2.01
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TABLE H-8
Computed 1,t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 6/4 And 6/5
Bi-Polar Scales

1

2

3

2.234

0.129

1.298

-0.029

T-l -0.059 -1.165

0.195

B-l -O.O 84 -0.222

6

10

7

3

0.087 -2.160

0.725

2.234

1.640 -0.158

0.324

1.229

1.067

1.849

2.072

2.430

0.728

1.341

1.019

0.531

0.453

0.728

0.458

0.875

0.190

0-2

1.322 -0.089 -0.805

0.677

1.232

0.000

0.593

0.473 -0.085

0.352

T-2

1,323

0-1

_

k

5

9

0,183

0.691

0.677 -0.229

0.979

0.465 -0.383 -0.010

0.360

B-2 -0.152 -0.181

0.355

0.124

0.578

1.539

1.116

1.498

0-3

0.114

0.367 -0.513

Note:

0.056

0.166

0.711 -0.248

2.036

1.186

0.076 -0.386 -0.413

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/4 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom:
26
Critica? nt n values: +2.056 and -2.056

TABLE H-9
Computed Trt'r Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 6/3 and 6/5
Bi-Polar Scales
2
O"1

3

4

2.471

0.492 1.829 0.998

T-l -0.172

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.229 -1.303

0.898

1.707 2.599

0.797

-0.162 0.374 0.874

2.078

0.974

2.384

2.072 2.264

1.335

B-l

0.438

0.371 1.255 0.899

1.185

1.173

1.690

1.443 1.207

1.381

0-2

0.924

-0.836 -1.063 -0.790

0.141

0.141

0.809

0.347 -0.186

0.931

T-2

0.587

0.604 1.365 0.623

-0.310

0.844 -0.014 -0.757 O .364

0.023

B-2 -0.494

-0.413 0.146 0.328

0-3
Note:

1.655

1.127 1.687 -0.391

0.906 -0.148 -0.082
0.441

0.389 -0.181

0.510 -0.066

0.108

O .624 -O.78I -0.436

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/3 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom:
40
Critical "t" values: +2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-10
Computed ,!t'? Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/4 And 5/4
Bi-Polar Scales
1
0-1

1.357

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0.576 1.556 0.211

0.570

-0.127 -0.362

T-l -0.649

-0.624 0.951 -0.544

0.533

-0.740 -1.236 -0.105

B-l -0.511

0.260 -0.365 -0.727

0.545

-0.051

0.144

9

0.629 -0.746

10
0.203

0.776

0.494

0.194 -1.043

1.597

0-2 -0.623

-0.563 0.090 -0.766 -0.123

0.339 -0.106 -0.937 -0.037

0.265

T-2 -1.274

-0.263 0.089 0.986

1.479 -0.512

1.434

B-2

0.054 -0.145

0-3

0.860

Note:

0.606

-0.098 -0.661 -1.031

-0.454 0.150 -0.158

0.131

0.890

0.493

-1.054 -0.432 -0.606 -0.703 -0.301
-1.077 -0.373 -0.500 -0.566

1.415

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the ,05 level
of significance (4/4 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom:
43
Critical "t" values: +2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-ll
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/4 And 6/5
Bi-Polar Scales
1
°“1

2

3

4

2 -128

1.813

0.063

T-l -0.378

-0.3880.380

-0.613

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.676 -0.804

0.210

1.331

0.263

0.565

1.619

0.086

0.675

1.102

1.379

O .844

1.259 -0,351

1.737

B-l

0.053

0.196 0.236

0.329

1.590

1.016

0.546

0-2

0.366

0.272-0.191 -0.373

0.142

0.297

C.351 -0.237 -0.226 1.043

0.149

0.972 -0.453

T-2 -0.441

-0.203-0.078

B-2 -0.353

-0.253-0.154 -0.290 -0.351 -0.424

0-3
Note:

0.962

0.305 0.953

1.032

-0.102

0.194

0.459

1.232

O.O 84 -0.075 -0.586 -0.602

0.316 -0.542 -0.258

0.208 -0.685

0.675

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/4 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom:
21
Critical ”t ,! values: +2.08 and -2.08

TABLE H-12
Computed fft rT Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 5/4 And 6/5
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

0-1

2.112

0.608

T-l

0.115

B-l

3

6

7

8

9

10

0.313 -1.331

1.038

1.731

1.141

0.531

0.090 -0.580 -0.070

1.236

0.811

1.971

1.333

0.719

0.463

0.624

0.000

0.665

1.178

0.918

0.950

0.485

1.049

0.592

0.363

0-2

1.106

0.902 -0.394

0.322

0.330

0.000

0.564

0.741 -0.188

0.097

T-2

0.545

0.000 -0.179

0.198 -0.401 -0.516 -0.074 -0.615

0.071

0.210

0.562

0.476

0.542

0.481

0.056 -0.369

0.047

0.269

0.481

0.116

0.786 -0.240 -0.705

0,593 -0.126

B-2 -0.537 -0.168 -0.076
0-3
Note:

0.224

0.842

4

1.142

5

0.238

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/4 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom:
42
Critical T,t Tt values: +2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-13
Computed T,t ” Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/4 And 5/2
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

0-1 -0.606 -0.269

3
0.000

T-l

1.236

0.243 -1.172

B-l

1.276

0.347

0-2

1.279 -0.750 -0.315

T-2

1.607

4

5

6

1.562 -0.239 -0.329

7

6

0.401 -1.066

9

10

1.146 -1.062

0.151

0.066

0.745 -0.127 -0.245 -1.206

0.931 -0.251

0.543

O.O 64

0.054

1.450 -1.205

0.270

0.216

0.677

0.202

0.333

0.596 -0.977

0.333 -0.472

0.312

0.666

0.573 -0.466

0,362 -0.492

B-2 -0.093 -0.636 -0.501 -0.277

1.016

0 .466 -0.797 -0.672

0.169 -0.065

0.462

1.002

1.535

0-3 -0.293 -0.946 -0.613 -0.666 -0.563
Note

0.501 -0.914 -0.533 -0.592 -2.366

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/2 - 4/ 4 ).
Degrees of Freedom:
23
Critical "t” values: +2.069 and -2,069
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TABLE H-14
Computed *’t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 5/2 And 6/5
Bi-Polar Scales
1

2

3

4

0-1

1.556

0.547

1.944

1.629

T-l

0.779 -0.195 -0.881

B-l

1.631

7

8

0.479 -1.553

0.560

1.254

1.672 -0.329

0.932

1.712

0.140

1.336

0.990

1.090 -0.224

1.228

1.343

1.516

0.742

1.476

1.142

0.551

C-2

1.823 -0.472 -0.632 -0.095

0.389

1.414

0.702

0.116

0.457

0.388

T-2

1.448

0.625

0.472

1.716

0.162 -0.267

0.832

0.683

B-2 -0.426 —0.884 -0.608 -0.528

0.587

0.013 -0.655 -0.655 -0.362 -0.550

0-3

0.584

0.240

0.642 -0.609

Note :

1.214

0.273

5

6

9

10

0.211 -1.159 -0.165 -0.014 -1.393 -0.363 -1.485 -1.659

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the ,05 level
of significance (5/2 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom:
22
Critical ”t !1 Values: +2.074 and -2.074
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TABLE H-15
Computed T,t M Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels

6/3

And 5/4

Bi-Polar Scales

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

1.539

0.323

0.316 1.656 1.656

1.179

1.150 0,211

0.802

1.244

0.204

0.308

-0.558

0.008

-0.097

1.779

0.080

-0.195

0.435 -0.310

7

0.515 -0.066

1.564

1.551 -O .134 -0.390 -0.229 -0.274

T-l -0.416 -0.352

1.290

1.057

B-l -0.207

0.851 -0.289 -0.369 -0.080

0-1

0-2

0.517

0.979

-0.135 -2.332 -1.150 -1.514 -0.261

0.069

T-2

0.016

0.817

1.835

0.476

0.174

B-2

0.175 -0.381

0.299

0.225

0.435 -0.884 -0.914 -0.168 -0.166

0.727

0-3

1.719

0.836 -0 .58*

0.183 -0.044 -0.380 -0.318 -0.712

0.428

Note:

0.293

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/3 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom:
62
Critical Mt" values: +2.01 and -2.01
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TABLE H-16
Computed ’’t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of'
Organizational Levels 6/3 And 4/4
Bi-Pclar Scales
1

2

. 3_

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-1 •
-1.143 -0.554 -0.524

0.932 -0.639 -0.125

0.707 -0.908

1.981

0.018

T-l

0.323

0.359 -0.068

1.684

1.663

1.450

0.468

0.456

B-l

0.345

0.100

0.472 -0.747 -0.006

0-2

0.435 -1.129 -0,792 -0.346 -0.052 -0.213

T-2

1.329

B-2

0.065 -0,136

0-3

0.410

Note:

0.911

0.711

0.930

0.196

0.392

1.405 -0.376 -0.527 -0.099
0.333

0.735

1.415

0.442 -0.267 -0.009

0.721 -0.055

1.662 -0.815

0.326

0.093 -0.310

0.624

0.547 -1.041 -0.133 -1.630

0.336 -0.198

0.696

0.650

0.929

0.310

0.058 -1.201

0.129

0.988

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/3 - 4/4).
Degrees of Freedom:
41
Critical "t" values: +2.02 and -2.02

TABLE H-17
Computed nt” Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 6/5
Bi-Polar Scales
1
0-1

2

2.143 -0.495

3

4

5

6

0.904 -0.034 -0.763 -2.270

T-l -1.00? -1.130 -1.553 -1.293

0.079 -0.137

7

8

0.611

1.460

1.274 -0.583

0.399

0.355

0.051 -0.160

9

10

B-l

0.499

0.923 -0.011

0.470

:■ .123

1.255

0.999

0.031

0-2

0.896 -0.632 -0.407 -0.168 -0.451

0.506

0.759

0.938

0.714

1.081

T-2

1.112 -0.532

0.038 -0.118 -1.223 -0.160 -1.011 -0.823 -0.839

0.254

B-2

0.154 -0.246 -0.890 -0.227 -0.031 -0.711 -0.038 -0.038 -1.255 -1.301

0.346

0.249

0-3 -0,784 -0.i8l -0.127 -2.394 -0.040 -0.694 -1.760 -1.218 -1.338 -1.478
Note:

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom:
25
Critical "t" values: +2.06 and -2.06

TABLE H-18
Computed l!t M Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 5/4
Bi-Polar Scales
1

0-1

2

3.935 -1.387

3
0.469

4

5

6

7

8

0.037 -1.442 -1.569 -0.520 -0.279

9

10

0.167 -1.512

T-l - L.633 -1.664 -0.925 -1.360 -1.312 -1,163 -2,031 -1.265 -0.819 -0.811
B-l - 3.085

0.449 -0.474 -0.03o -1.064

0.560

0.476 -0.033

0.560 -0.414

3.233 -1.766 -0.072 -0.575 -0.967

0.574

0.272

0.944

0.006

T-2

L.150 -0.738

0.470 -1.127 -0.315 -1.111

0.071

B-2

3.629 -0,153 -1.061 -0.592

0-2

-

0.253 -0.380 -1.222

0.178

0.691 -1.468 -0.721 -0.644 -1.468 -1.001

0-3 - L.301 -1.276 -1.545 -2.415 -0.371 -1.295 -1.657 -2.229 -I.I84 -0,623
Note:

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom:
47
Critical "t" values:
+2.02 and -2.02

TABLL H-19
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 5/2
Bi-Polar Scales
1
0-1

. 2 .

3

4

5

6

7

0.281 -1.075 -1.200 -1.919 -1.449 -0.756 -0.010

8

9

10

0.250 -0.551 -0.230

T-l -1.855 -0.990 -0.179 -2.272 -1.767 -0.337 -1.365 -0.913 -1.305

0.145

B-l -1.061 -0.284 -1.237 -0.480 -1.487 -1.008

0.207 -0.336 -0.242 -0.669

C-2 -1.143 -0.277

0.133

0.277 -0.057 -0.920 -1.271

•0.754

0.219

0.965

T-2 -0.517 -0.826 -0.272 -0.806 -1.875 -2.178 -1.089 -0.469 -1.797 -0.550
B-2

0.632

0-3 -1.472
Note:

0.655 -0.151

0.371 -0.687 -0.815

0.566 -0.389 -0.916

0.816

0.816 -0.747 -0.492

0.142 -0.625 -0.036 -0.911

0.320

0.295

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 5/2).
Degrees of Freedom:
27
Critical Mt rt values:
+2,052 and -2.052
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TABLE H-2Q
Computed fft tr Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 6/3
Bi-Polar Scales
1
0-1

2

3

4

5_

6

7

2

9

10

0.599

-1.195-0.247 -1.275 -1.362

-1.120 -0.327 -0.061 -1.22$ -2.016

T-l -1.251

-1.312-2.404 -2.740 -2.233

-1.410 -2.546 -3.095 -2.719 -2.031

B-l

0.025

0-2 -0.104

0.037-1.200 0.195

-1.362

0.202 0.233

-0.751

0.711

-0.607 -0.566 -0.242 -0.099 -1.677
0.330 0.019

0.675

0.954

0.026
0.312

T-2

1.256 -1.448 -1.496 -0.272 -1.439

-1.159 -1.150 -0.152 -1.351

B-2

0.797

0.145-1.371 -0.695 -1.023

-0.591 0.055

0-3 -2.904

-1.649-2.193 -1.776 -0.570

Note:

-0.720 -1.462 -1.963

-1.111 -1.545 -2.173 -0.567 -1.025

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the ,05 level
of significance (4/2 - 6/3).
Degrees of Freedom:
45
Critical "t” values:
+2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-21
Computed nt" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 5/2 And 6/3
Bi-Polar Scales
1 _

2

_3 _

_4

.

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-1

0.091

T-l

1.054 -0.061 -1,568

0.235 -0.018 -0.756 -0.722 -1.647 -0.776 -1.781

B-l

1.145

0.243

0.672

0.447

0.717 -0.720

0.126

0.178 -0.723

0-2

1.011 0.487 0.523

0.689

0.355

1.307 -0.121 -0.209

0.662 -0.720

T-2

1.960 -0.312 -0.953

0.260

0.985

1.065

0.569

0.208

0.349

0.556

0.985

O .414 -0.320 -0.287 -0.315 -0.596 -1.456

B-2 -0.210 -0.643 -0.982 -1.059 -0.249

0.223

0.400

0.930

0.179 -0.808 -1.559 -0.410 -0.946

0-3 -0.783 -2.098 -1.535 -0.749 -0.796 -0.411 -1.306 -1.109 -0.809 -1.262
Note:

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/2 - 6/3).
Degj L.es of Freedom:
42
Critical "t" values:
+2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-22
Computed nt n Values Resulting From A Comparison 01* The Safety
Directors In High And Low Positions
Bi-Polar Scales
1
0-1

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.225 -0.035

2.126 -0.609

T-l -0.514 -0.776 -0.397

0.636

0.472

1.067

0.948

0.343

B-l

0.599

0.677 -0.276

0.290

1.271

0.591

1.732

0.278

0-2

0.800 -2.464 -1.124 -1.062 -0.348

0.800

0.643

0.138

0.634 -0.081

T-2

1.674

1.732 -0.096 -0.726

0.071 -0.334

B-2

0.209 -0.698 -0.592 -0.145

0-3

0.409 -0.545 -O.O84 -1.838 -0.219 -0.155 -1.417 -1.142 -1.402 -1.177

0.717

0.390

1.573

A

1.684 -0.700 -1.435

Note:

1.203 -0.539

3

1.091

1.460 0.020

0.60? -0.110

-O .464

0.649 -0.853 -1.136 -0.532 -0.659 -0.092

Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More powerful - Less powerful).
Degrees of Freedom:
200
Critical T,t n values:
+1.96 and -1.96
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